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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

IDENTITY IN EVANGELICAL UKRAINE: NEGOTIATING REGIONALISM,
NATIONALISM, AND TRANSNATIONALISM

This dissertation examines identity formation among evangelical Protestants in
contemporary Ukraine. The overarching question is this: how do Ukrainian evangelicals
view themselves and their churches in the context of Ukrainian regionalism, Ukrainian
nationalism, and religious transnationalism? This question demands a closer look at
Ukrainian regional variation, the status of Ukrainian national identity among evangelical
practitioners, and the process of religious transnationalism, including how evangelicals
perceive the West. This project is primarily based on qualitative research methods
carried out over a ten month period. Field methods included participant observation,
focus group interviews, and individual interviews. A set of maps produced by research
subjects is also evaluated.
In order to permit a regional comparison, case study churches were selected in
four Ukrainian cities. Before beginning the field research it was hypothesized that
Baptists, those evangelicals whose religious roots date to the nineteenth century and who
survived the Soviet Union, would have different perspectives on many of the research
questions than members of churches founded recently by American missionaries. To test
this assumption, one Baptist church and one new evangelical church were selected in
each of the four cities.
Among Ukrainian evangelicals, regionalism is closely related to language
preference and to notions of national identity. Members of churches in L’viv are strong
supporters of Ukrainian-only language practices; members of churches in other parts of
the country identify themselves as Russian speakers who dislike the exclusive language
policies in western Ukraine.

Study participants generally rejected a Ukrainian

nationalism that was connected to religion, although members of new Protestant churches
incorporated aspects of civic nationalism into their religious practice. In terms of their

participation in a transnational religious network, all churches (both older Baptist and
newer evangelical) were highly integrated with people, ideas, and money from the West.
However, evangelicals’ views towards the West and their own identities as transnational
actors were correlated to church type. Members of older Baptist churches were much
more critical of Western churches and missionaries than were members of new
evangelical congregations.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Ukrainian evangelicals are building their lives and their churches in the aftermath
of political revolution and in the midst of societal transformation. Although they hail
from the ‘Bible Belt’ of the former Soviet Union – the birthplace of the Baptist
movement of Russia and Ukraine, and the place where the church is strongest – these
Protestants exist in a country where, until recently, their religion was publicly
discriminated against and widely scorned. Fourteen years ago a state that repressed the
expression of religious faith was replaced by one in which religious freedom is the norm.
As part of a newly independent Ukraine, the members of these churches, together with
their countrymen, are working out what it means to be Ukrainian in a newly independent
state. In the case of Protestants, their faith is an interesting complicating factor in the
process of nationalization, because while their churches are replicating rapidly, they
remain a distinct religious minority in a country where several other religious groups
(varieties of Orthodoxy and Catholicism) claim a special status as Ukraine’s ‘national’
religion.
When the ‘iron curtain’ collapsed, Ukrainian churches were suddenly deluged by
visitors from around the world. After spending decades in an essentially closed society,
Ukrainian evangelicals found themselves incorporated into (and helping to build) a vast
transnational religious network.

Since then, Protestant churches have collectively

received millions of dollars in financial contributions from the West; they regularly host
missionary groups from Western countries, particularly the United States; they send their
future leaders to seminaries and Bible colleges run by or funded by foreigners; their
pastors visit Western partners overseas; and their members read Bible study books and
other theological materials translated from English into Russian or Ukrainian. This has
happened both in the older Ukrainian Baptist churches and in new churches founded
since 1991 by Western missionaries.

Both historical Baptist churches and new

evangelical churches are now intimately connected with churches, people, and religious
ideas in other parts of the world. Studying Ukrainian Protestants provides us with an
opportunity to find out how one kind of transnationalism is initiated, received, negotiated,
and lived out in daily practice.
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While this dissertation contributes to the growing literature about post-Soviet
transition generally and the social transition in Ukraine more specifically, it is written by
a cultural geographer who has a geographer’s eye for questions about space. As a
geographer I seek to understand three spatial aspects of the lives of Ukrainian Protestants
– their regional, national, and transnational identities. Before beginning the research I
suspected that the three were closely connected, that regionalism would be related to
nationalism and nationalism would, in turn, be germane to an understanding of how
transnationalism has been incorporated into Ukrainian religious life.

Recent events

underscore the relevance of these questions.
Not long before I completed this dissertation, the world watched as a highly
contested, and rigged, Ukrainian presidential election raised questions about each of these
identities – regional, national, and transnational – and emphasized their significance in
contemporary Ukraine. The election reminded us that Ukraine is a country with deep
regional divides, various regions having become part of a unified Ukrainian state through
completely different historical paths over several hundred years. Eastern Ukrainians
tended to vote for Viktor Yanukovich, the government endorsed candidate also supported
by those who control much of the industrial complex of eastern Ukraine. Western
Ukrainians tended to vote for Viktor Yushchenko, a man who promised to draw Ukraine
closer to Europe. Not only was there a regional pattern to the voting, but questions were
raised about the independence of Ukraine (did Russia interfere in the election?) and the
relationship between Ukraine and the rest of the world. The election forced Ukrainians to
consider their country’s relationships to Western Europe and Russia, and citizen protests
after the first, fraudulent, election took place on Independence Square in Kyiv, a spot that
evokes Ukrainian national identity and independence.

The roles of regionalism,

nationalism, and transnationalism in Ukrainian life have not been settled.

This

dissertation increases our understanding of Ukraine’s regional divisions, how they do or
do not exist in the minds of one subset of the Ukrainian population, and how they affect
the residents’ views of Ukraine and the rest of the world.
The research questions that drive this study can be organized according to these
three scales of geographic identity:

regional, national, and transnational.

The

overarching question is this: how do Ukrainian evangelicals view themselves and their

2

churches in the context of Ukrainian regionalism, Ukrainian nationalism, and religious
transnationalism? This broad question demands a closer look at Ukrainian regional
variation, the status of Ukrainian national identity among evangelical practitioners, and
the process of religious transnationalism, including how evangelicals perceive the West.
In order to speak about Ukrainian regionalism I chose case study churches in four
different Ukrainian cities:

in the West (L’viv), the center (Vinnytsia), the South

(Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy), and the Southeast (Kherson).

Before beginning the field

research I hypothesized that Baptists, those evangelicals whose religious roots date to the
nineteenth century and who survived the Soviet Union, would have different perspectives
on many of the research questions than members of churches founded recently by
American missionaries. To test this assumption I chose one Baptist church and one new
evangelical church in each of the four cities. I also hypothesized that young people who
have come of age since the collapse of the Soviet Union might have different ideas about
their identity and the identity of their churches than would older people who were already
adults in 1991. For that reason, in each of the eight churches I collected data both from
young adults and older people.
The first set of research questions focuses on regional identity:
•

How do Ukrainian Protestant churches vary regionally?

•

How do Ukrainian evangelicals portray Ukrainian regions? How do they position
themselves and their churches within their respective region of Ukraine?

•

How does their self-awareness of regional identity contribute to, or undermine,
national and transnational identifications?

•

Are there differences between members of older Baptist churches and newer
evangelical churches, or between people of different generations, in how they
approach matters of regional identity?

These questions acknowledge long-standing regional variation in Ukraine, and seek to
determine how Ukrainian regionalism impacts evangelical churches in the country. In
particular, I wanted to find out how and to what extent regionalism is connected with
Ukrainian nationalism and religious transnationalism.

Do people living in different

Ukrainian regions approach their identity as Ukrainian nationals differently from others?
Are there differences in how they view their participation in a transnational religious
network?
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The second set of research questions investigates the place of national identity in
Ukrainian evangelical churches:
•

How do congregation members position themselves and their churches within the
Ukrainian nation?

•

How does their self-awareness of national identity contribute to, or undermine,
regional and transnational identifications?

•

To what extent do Ukrainian evangelicals challenge or accommodate the idea of a
Ukrainian national church?

•

Are there differences between members of older Baptist churches and newer
evangelical churches, or between people of different generations, in how they
approach matters of national identity?

Here the key question is the second one, about how national identity is linked to regional
and transnational identity.

Are evangelicals who are more expressive about their

Ukrainian identity less enthusiastic about their participation in a transnational religious
network?

How is national identity related to regional identity?

Because of the

historically close relationship between Ukrainian national identity and the Orthodox and
Greek Catholic churches, question three above inquires about how Protestants
incorporate or reject those traditional aspects of Ukrainian identity.
The final category of questions considers transnational identity. The previous
questions were ultimately pointing here, to the place of Ukrainian evangelicalism within
a large and active transnational religious network:
•

How do Ukrainian evangelicals position themselves within a transnational religious
network?

•

How does their self-awareness of a transnational identity contribute to, or undermine,
regional and national identifications?

•

Are there differences between members of older Baptist churches and newer
evangelical churches, or between people of different generations, in how they
approach matters of transnational identity?

Ukrainian regionalism has been a persistent characteristic of Ukrainian social life for
generations, and Ukrainian nationalism has existed in various guises for a couple of
hundred years. However, the fact that Ukrainian evangelicals are active in religious
transnationalism at this scale is something new. In this dissertation I investigate how
exposure to Western evangelicalism is impacting Ukrainian Protestant churches, and how
it is challenging and interacting with their national and regional identifications.

4

Chapter Two lays the theoretical foundation by situating this work in the context
of other scholarship about post-Soviet Ukraine, showing how I am responding to ongoing
debates in the literature of Ukrainian Studies and post-Soviet transition. I also examine
three relevant theories of social life in the contemporary world:

globalization,

transnationalism, and nationalism. I define my use of the terms and how I contribute to
the debates surrounding them. Finally, I define what I mean by ‘identity,’ a concept that
is used throughout the entire work.
Chapter Three presents the research methodologies and research design of this
dissertation. I explain my use of ethnographic research methods, how and why I chose
the eight case study churches, and what I actually did as part of the field research. I also
consider my positionality in relation to the research subjects, including any special
benefits or challenges it brought about.
Chapter Four lays the historical foundation for this dissertation and traces the
history of Ukrainian evangelicalism from its roots in the nineteenth century Russian
empire. The history of Ukrainian Baptist churches was influenced by state policies
towards religion from that time until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Soviet
church history continues to influence the identities and actions of Ukrainian evangelicals
today. I also explain how the deep regional divides in contemporary Ukraine are direct
consequences of the regions’ different historical trajectories in the twentieth century and
before.
Chapter Five examines the transnationalization of Ukrainian evangelicalism after
1991. I show how openness to the West has not only impacted older Baptist churches,
but has also created a new set of Ukrainian Protestant churches – those that have been
opened through the efforts of Western missionaries working in Ukraine. Each church has
its own personality – worship style, ministries, history – and also has its own experiences
of interacting with people and churches in other countries. This chapter is based on my
experiences living for ten months in Ukraine (September 2002 through June 2003) while
I was collecting data for the dissertation. It is also influenced by previous visits to
Ukraine, including a summer of pre-dissertation fieldwork (2001). I describe the two
main categories of Ukrainian evangelical churches, and present a profile of each of the
case study congregations.
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Chapter Six presents empirical research from the ethnographic data that is
relevant to questions of regional and national identity. I examine Ukrainian regional and
national identity as expressed by the Ukrainian evangelicals who participated in the
study. This chapter includes an analysis of maps of Ukraine’s cultural regions that were
produced by research subjects. The maps tell us where the participants think Ukraine’s
regions are located, and which regions are more or less well defined than others.
Chapter

Seven,

also

based

on

the

ethnographic

material,

examines

transnationalism in Ukrainian evangelical churches. This chapter pays close attention to
differences between older Baptist and new Protestant churches in how they approach
transnationalism and view the West.

We will see how transnationalism presents

particular challenges to older churches now operating under a new set of conditions from
when current church leaders were raised. The interaction of Ukrainian and Western
churches is something that all Ukrainian evangelicals have an opinion about, and we will
examine those opinions in Chapter Seven.
Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by drawing together the findings
of the previous chapters, presenting thematic connections between them, and offering
suggestions for further research.

Copyright © 2005 Esther Grace Long
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Chapter Two: Theoretical and substantive context
2.1 Introduction
The transnationalization of Ukrainian Protestant churches is taking place in the
context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of a post-Soviet political
and social order. This dissertation fits into a larger body of scholarly work examining the
Ukrainian post-Soviet transition; throughout the chapter are discussions of how it
responds to and advances the research of other Ukrainian-focused scholars.

Other

literatures – of transnationalism, globalization, nationalism, and identity – create a
theoretical framework for the study. These four terms have been widely used by scholars
and non-scholars alike, with the result that their definitions have multiplied and become
more generalized, and their usefulness has been diluted. Here we will examine how this
dissertation contributes to the key debates surrounding each theme.

2.2 Post-Soviet transition
The identities and actions of Ukrainian evangelicals cannot be adequately
understood without situating them within the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the tumultuous period of transition in subsequent years. The lives of religious
Ukrainians were revolutionized: devout religious practice went from being restricted to
completely legal. In the past Baptists were persecuted by the state and ridiculed by
society; now the state has backed away and society’s views towards this large religious
minority have been challenged. Many of those who were atheists and members of the
Communist Party before 1991 are now devout Protestants. They worship publicly and
interact with people they were formerly taught to revile. Meanwhile, the economic and
political foundations of life also shifted. The government no longer promises lifetime
employment, pensions are nearly worthless, and a Moscow-based government does not
control the political parties and elections in Ukraine. 1
Many responses to the collapse of the Soviet Union treated the demise of state
socialism as perhaps the greatest achievement of the twentieth century, and recommended
the implementation of drastic economic reforms to reverse the damages caused by seven
1

Moscow still tries to keep Ukraine in its fold – Russia has been accused of interfering in Ukraine’s 2004
presidential election.
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decades of communism. Authors who wrote in support of rapid and complete economic
transformation included Jeffery Sachs and Anders Åslund, two prominent proponents of
‘shock therapy’ who advised government officials in newly independent post-communist
states how to develop market economies based on Western models.
Those who advocated rapid economic transformation endorsed what John Pickles
and Adrian Smith have called the “techniques of transition” (Smith and Pickles 1998).
For example, an examination of the Ukrainian economic transition literature shows that
nearly all of the authors have blamed Ukraine’s dismal economic performance on the
failure of the government to properly and quickly carry out appropriate economic
reforms. These authors have evaluated nearly every category of Ukrainian economic life
in relation to transition, laying out either a diagnosis of what “went wrong” or a
prescription for solving the problems, and usually doing both. The difficulties have been
traced to privatization that was too slow or of the wrong kind, a populace that was overly
resistant to the entrance of foreign companies, a country that was unwilling to undergo
the stresses necessary to adjust its economy, and the lack of sufficient loans from
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. The goal is always assumed to be a
liberalized capitalist economy formed on the pattern of most in the Western developed
world. Specific examples include reports from agencies such as the World Bank (see, for
example Hansen and Cook 1999) and research articles in prominent journals (examples
include von Cramon-Taubadel and Koester 1998; Yekhanurov 2000). Support for rapid
economic and social transformation has also become embedded within popular accounts
of the post-Soviet transition period, as seen, for example, in a book by journalist Rose
Brady, who documents the history of Russia’s economic reforms in the early 1990s
(1999).
An alternate group of scholars disputes the idea that post-Soviet economic
reforms must be rapid, must have a set goal (Western-style capitalism), and are best
carried out at the national scale (see Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Smith and Pickles 1998;
Verdery 1996a). These authors successfully address some of the most obvious flaws of
the ‘transition techniques’ set. While they do not agree with each other on all counts, in
general they reject the idea that post-communist transition is a process with a clear
beginning, an obvious path forward, and a visible and agreed-upon end. They take
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seriously the variety of ways post-communist transition has been experienced (and
created) by people in local contexts, acknowledging that it occurs in diverse ways and has
no certain conclusion. A theme in the writing of these scholars is opposition to the idea
that economic reform should primarily take place at the scale of the nation state. They do
not think that a truly capitalist system fashioned on western models will be achieved in
post-Soviet countries in the near future, and in fact it appears that western capitalism is a
system these authors would like post-communist countries to avoid.

Burawoy and

Verdery, for example, place themselves among those that “see change in less apocalyptic
terms, that see evolution rather than revolution, that see hybrid societies rather than polar
extremes” (Burawoy and Verdery 1999, 1). They propose that no theory or set of
theories for understanding transition can suffice, because economic transition can best be
understood within the local, everyday contexts of lived experience.
Although economic transition is not the focus of this dissertation, the church
members who participated in this research project have been living through that
transition. Ukrainians know the effects of economic instability first-hand; some of the
most vulnerable among them live in desperate poverty. It is within that context that
Ukrainian evangelicals seek relationships with Western churches and international
Christian organizations. The financial inequities between Ukrainians and Westerners
color the entire missionary enterprise.

2.3 Ukrainian regionalism
A recurrent theme in Ukrainian studies literature is the country’s regional
variation. The differences between western and eastern Ukraine go back hundreds of
years, and are rooted in the completely different histories of Right and Left Bank
Ukraine.

Some of the more recent history of Ukraine’s regional differentiation is

examined in Chapter Four. Ukraine observers have wondered how regionalism might
change after the country became independent in 1991. Regional variation in the results
of the highly contested 2004 presidential election reminds us that regional differentiation
remains a powerful force in Ukraine. 2

2

Eastern areas of Ukraine served as the support base of government-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovich,
with western parts of the country supporting opposition candidate, and ultimate victor, Viktor Yushchenko.
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A number of social scientists have recently evaluated the “regional effect” in
Ukrainian politics and economic development. The overwhelming consensus is that
regional variation in Ukraine is profound. Birch (1995, 1035) found that “region” exerts
independent impact on political beliefs, even when variables like ethnicity and
occupational sector are accounted for. Craumer and Clem (1999) showed that regional
variation is evident in the results of the 1998 elections, although Hesli and her research
group (1998) concluded that over time Ukraine’s regional polarization has been in
decline. 3 I agree with Kubicek that a regional effect continues to persist in Ukrainian life
(2000).
Those who are interested in Ukrainian regions typically carve the country into two
pieces, East and West. Stephen Shulman writes that:
The structure of Ukrainian society is basically ‘bipolar’. Geographic cleavages in
Ukraine reinforce ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic cleavages.
Predominantly agricultural Western Ukraine is composed mainly of ethnic
Ukrainians, many of whom are Greek-Catholic. Predominantly industrial Eastern
Ukraine is composed mostly of ethnic Russians or Russified (Russian-speaking)
Ukrainians, many of whom are Eastern Orthodox (1999b, 1012).
Not everyone agrees with this assessment. It is argued that Ukrainian regionalism is
much more complicated and blurred than an East-West, linguistic divide (Wanner 1998,
xxvi). While I agree with Wanner that Ukraine’s regional variations are too complex to
be reduced to an East – West, Russian – Ukrainian dichotomy, I will show that L’viv
churches stand apart from the others in this study in a number of respects. The idea of
Western Ukraine is firmly lodged in the minds of the Ukrainian evangelicals I
interviewed, both in what they said about themselves, their churches, and their country,
and in how they cartographically represented Ukraine’s regions on blank outline maps.
Because of a long history separating Western Ukraine from other parts of the
country, it is no surprise that residents of L’viv have a different understanding of what it
is to be Ukrainian than do residents of Kherson.

This research contributes to the

discussion, not by providing a comparison of regionalism over time, as some scholars
have done (see, for example, Subtelny 1994), but by opening the field of inquiry into a

3

Among others who have evaluated post-Soviet regional divisions in Ukraine are Barrington (2002),
Furman (1999), Liber (1998), and Zimmerman (1998).
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previously unstudied population and examining the interrelationship of region, nation,
and the transnational. Ukrainian Protestants from L’viv clearly have different ideas about
the nature of the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian national identity than do evangelicals
living in the other cities (Kherson, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, and Vinnytsia).

2.4 Globalization
The term ‘globalization’ tends to be widely and imprecisely used. It refers to the
increasing scope and intensity of linkages between states and societies of the modern
world system (cited in Dicken 2000, 316; McGrew 1992). Globalization describes the
process by which social relations across space are being globally integrated both
intensively and extensively (Kelly 1999). A standard definition is as follows:
Time-space compression…has so transformed the structure and scale of human
relationships that social, cultural, political, and economic processes now operate
at a global scale . . . . [Globalization processes] involve not merely the
geographical extension of economic activity across national boundaries but also –
and more importantly – the functional integration of such internationally
dispersed activities (Dicken 2000).
The globalization literature is immense, but here I focus on two of the aspects of
globalization as defined by Jameson: the economic and the cultural (1999). 4 There is a
risk to this strategy of explanation, because economic and cultural processes are
obviously interconnected.

As Dicken, Peck and Tickell have written, globalization

processes “involve highly intricate interactions between a whole variety of social,
political and economic institutions operating across a spectrum of geographical scales.
They involve processes of both collaboration and competition and of differentiated power
relationships” (1997, 159).

Nevertheless, separating them out for the purposes of

defining globalization will help me show how globalization theory relates to this
dissertation work in Ukraine. I will then outline one of the key debates in globalization
research: the intersection between globalization and the nation state. Within that same

4

I will omit Jameson’s third aspect of globalization, communication, because it is not so much a variety of
globalization as the foundation upon which economic and cultural globalization rest. Without the changing
technologies of communication and transportation, the complex and rapidly changing business and social
transactions between countries and continents would not be possible. These new technologies of
communication also make it possible for new forms of identity to be produced that do not require face-toface contact (Gupta and Ferguson 1992).
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discussion I will show how identifications ‘smaller’ than the global (such as the national,
regional, or local) can be affected by globalization processes.

2.4.1 Economic globalization
It is generally agreed that the world economy of the past several decades since the
1970s Bretton Woods agreement has been globalizing.

This can be seen in:

the

centrality of a global financial structure which creates, allocates, and uses money; the
increase in the power of finance over production; the increase in the importance of
knowledge structure as a factor of production; the internationalization of technology; the
rise in the importance of transnational economic diplomacy; and the increasingly global
orientation of state economic strategies (Amin and Thrift 1997). Globalization is usually
associated with an increase in free trade, the rise of post-Fordist flexible accumulation,
increasing volumes and frequencies of cross-border economic transaction, and fluid labor
pools that migrate across international boundaries. Economic globalization also refers to
the increasing power of transnational corporations (TNCs) in relation to the state in
regulating the economic activities within its borders. Of course, the degree to which
globalization is at work is under debate. Gertler (1997) showed that capital, even in this
era of post-Fordist flexible accumulation, is not as mobile as some think.
Beyond its identifiable processes, globalization also involves the idea of a deeply
connected economic world, “a vision of the world market and its newfound
interdependence, a global division of labor on an extraordinary scale, new electronic
trade routes tirelessly plied by commerce and finance alike” (Jameson 1999, 56). This
idea often becomes a value: globalization is presented as a redemptive process through
which poverty will decrease as integration with the world market increases. Typical of
this viewpoint is the remark by the chief executive of Singapore Petroleum, who was
quoted in the New York Times saying that globalization “has to mean a better life for
everyone.” 5
It is this attitude that many scholars who write about economic globalization find
particularly reprehensible. They view globalization processes as oppressive to the poor
and as fraught with very uneven power relations.
5

October 26, 2001.
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For example, Daly interprets

globalization as a code word for “unfettered individualism for corporations on a global
scale” (1999, 31). Likewise, Slater argues that globalization is a form of economic
colonialism whereby the North uses neoliberal economics to gain power over the South
(1996, 281).

2.4.2 Cultural globalization
I take cultural globalization to be the cultural effects of the global intensification
and extensification of social relations across space.

Crudely speaking, cultural

globalization could be the unidirectional cultural transfer from the West to the non-West
through technology and media. This would be “Americanization” or “commoditization”
(Appadurai 1990, 295). However, I do not consider that cultural change could ever be so
flat, predictable, or uniform. Instead, the outcomes in the cultural realm of globalization
processes will be heterogeneous and multi-directional across space and time.

For

example, the transmission of cultural ideas through globalization processes could
promote a global culture while at the same time induce the rise of racist nationalisms that
react against those processes (Hall 1997). Appadurai notes that we see a conflict between
cultural homogenization (global culture) and cultural heterogenization (Hall’s example of
racist nationalism) (1990, 295). Featherstone does not see a world where a “global
culture” is forming, but he argues that individual cultures are being “globalized” through
their interactions with other cultures in the global system (1990).

2.4.3 Globalization, the state, and national identity
In recent years scholars have been preoccupied with how globalization interacts
with the state, and how it intersects with identifications ‘smaller’ than the global, such as
national or local. First, are we living in a globalized world without effective borders, so
that capital, labor, technology and ideas can flow freely, making the nation-state
obsolete? Second, are national, regional, or local identifications becoming increasingly
irrelevant in an era of globalization? Although there has been a heated debate in the
literature, I argue that the answer to both of these questions is “no.” The world is not as
globalized as some people think: the nation-state continues to hold relevance for much of
the world, and in many instances globalization can elicit responses that demonstrate the
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continued salience of national, regional, and local identifications. In short, globalization
produces a complicated set of responses that vary according to each particular situation,
such that it is far too soon to announce the creation of a borderless world with borderless
identities.

Furthermore, globalization should not be considered the opposite of

nationalism, because the two processes are far too complex and interconnected to be the
opposites of anything.
Globalization in its purest form would result in a Borderless World, as Ohmae has
written (1990). A borderless world would lead to the forced irrelevance of national
states. In this vein, Daly has argued that globalization is the “effective erasure of national
boundaries for economic purposes” (1999).

Likewise, scholars have also linked

globalization to the erosion of state autonomy and the weakening of “traditional bonds of
identity between individuals and the state” (Falk 2000, 5). It has been pointed out that
citizens are now turning to global civil society for many of the services formerly provided
by the national state, services which the state is either “loathe” or unable to provide
(Lipschutz 1992).
However, for each example of how globalization hollows out the nation state or
erodes national (or regional or local) identifications, others show that the nation state
continues to be strong and that other spatial identifications remain in place. For instance,
Hirst and Thompson (1995) have shown that in today’s world economy, national-level
economic processes remain central; nation-states continue to represent their populations,
and they serve as sources of legitimacy for new forms of international, regional, and
subnational governance. The state continues to perform such tasks as enforcing corporate
governance, producing and encouraging national knowledge networks, and providing
services such as social security, education, wage negotiations, and job training (Amin and
Thrift 1997). The national state should not be thought of as “an aging leviathan” or as a
shrinking entity, because it can use new technologies of surveillance to control to control
the social world more than it could in the past (Marden 1997). Cameron and Stein (2000)
acknowledge that the state faces new and powerful challenges, but they argue that it
continues to be an indispensable institution. They conclude that the state has the capacity
and the opportunity to make important strategic choices about its economic, social, and
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cultural investments. If globalization stumbles, how the state responds now will have a
significant impact on its capacity to respond later.
Globalization does not make the state obsolete, nor does it necessarily erode
national (or regional, or local) identities. The opposite may be true: the ideals of global
society may lead to struggles over identity and a sense of belonging. Arnason showed
that globalization can in fact strengthen or ‘reactivate’ the nation as a focus of identity as
“the national level of integration complements, conditions and counteracts the global
one” (1990, 225). While there is indeed tension between nationalism and globalization,
in some communities globalization processes have actually facilitated “new senses of
national identity,” and have not brought about the feared homogenization of culture
(Marden 1997, p. 58). A specific empirical example of this was described by Jenson,
who examined three nationalist movements in Canada to illustrate both how globalization
challenges states and nationalist sentiments, and how it creates “new possibilities for
nationalist movements to make claims for expanded rights, including those of
citizenship” (1995, 98).
Global processes of late modernity have bypassed neither Ukraine nor Ukraine’s
Protestant practitioners.

To the extent that Ukraine’s Protestants are engaging in

globalization processes through technologies that collapse the time-space continuum, and
to the extent that they are participating in a “global social movement,” the globalization
literature is directly relevant to my work. This dissertation contributes to the literature on
globalization in at least two ways.
First, the debates about the “end of the nation-state” and the “end of national
identity” run a bit extreme at both ends.

However, the processes that Ukraine’s

Protestants are engaging in do challenge their national identity and may challenge the
sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, although the Ukrainian state remains robust. What
does it mean for their national identity if Protestants in Ukraine find more in common
religiously with, say, Southern Baptists in the United States than they do with Ukrainian
Orthodox or Greek Catholic believers? Does their identity as part of a global religious
network serve as the medium through which they are resisting a hegemonic national
discourse?

As the Ukrainian state seeks to control the involvement of Ukraine’s

Protestant churches with ‘global’ Christianity (through taxation of international gifts, visa
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restrictions on foreign visitors, and visits of worship services to make sure no foreigners
are preaching) we see that the Protestants are still subject to the structures of the state.
This shows that the state has not been hollowed out by the global processes at work, even
if identities may be changing. 6
Second, this project contributes to the literature on global social movements.
Protestants in Ukraine are part of what can be called a global social movement that is
shaping and being shaped by globalization processes. Cohen and Rai write that “the
evolution and diffusion of the big global religions are vital parts of the process of
globalization” (2000, 11), and Beckford (2000) points out that religions that make
universal truth claims and desire to span the globe are in a unique position to be
influenced by globalization as they take advantage of globalizing technologies to spread
their ideas. Evangelical Protestant Christianity makes truth claims that it asserts are valid
in every part of the world, and Protestant activists work towards expanding their religion
globally. This dissertation shows that while Ukrainian Protestants unevenly accept the
global claims of their religion (and so ‘globalization’ may not be a perfect term to
describe what Ukrainian Protestants are involved in), they are savvy in adopting and
transforming certain globalization processes while rejecting others.

2.5 Transnationalism
Transnationalism is a term that is closely related to globalization in that it refers to
cultural, economic, and demographic processes that work across territorial boundaries,
through time and space. Scholars of transnationalism examine how social processes
under conditions of globalization operate (Bailey et al. 2002, 125). While globalization
emphasizes the stretching and deepening of global social processes, I take
transnationalism to refer to the complex social interactions between people at individual,
organizational, community, or national levels, that involves the transfer of people,
information, or money across national borders (see Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc
1995, 49). These interactions do not remain one dimensional, but become intricate webs
6

Shortly before this dissertation was submitted, Ukraine’s new president dismantled the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, opening up the possibility that government monitoring of religious activities would
further diminish in the future.
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of social relations operating at multiple scales. Furthermore, transnationalism should not
be seen as a mysterious process carried out by nameless individuals or the inanimate
forces of globalization.

It is a process carried about by identifiable social actors,

including what Sklair calls the “transnational capitalist class” (2001) and those who
Katharyne Mitchell labels “transnational subjects” (1997c).
Transnationalism has been used by social scientists in a number of different ways.
Here I examine five of them, showing how this project fits in with other work on
transnationalism. The basic structure is adapted from Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan
(2001): 7
(1). Transnationalism is a useful term to describe migration, and this is by far its
most prevalent meaning. Examples of scholars who study migration as a transnational
phenomenon abound.

They theorize transnational migration as a process by which

“immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link
together their societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1995,
48). Geographers who have examined transnational migration include Bailey, Wright,
Mountz and Miyares (2002), who study Salvadoran immigration to the United States.
They argue that “Salvadoran transnational fields emerge when Salvadorans construct
simultaneous daily lives across and between places of core, periphery, and periphery
states” (p. 126), and that these transnational fields are constituted, along with space-time
reactions and scale, through “the visible and invisible actions and experiences of daily
life” (p. 128). Lily Kong has examined how Singaporean transnationals in Beijing reimagine and negotiate their Singaporean national identity (1999). 8
Ukrainian Protestants, particularly Ukrainian Baptists, are active participants in
transnational migration networks. Although this aspect of transnationalism is not the
primary focus of the dissertation, all of the Baptist churches in the study have lost large
percentages (up to half) of their congregations as families have moved to the United
States, Canada, and other countries. The Baptists involved in this project maintain
relationships with many of their former members living in the United States, and a few of

7

For another take on transnationalism, see Steven Vertovec (1999), who describes six uses of the term, not
all of them overlapping with those laid out by Grewal and Kaplan.
8
See also a special issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies, including (Guarnizo, Sánchez, and Roach 1999; and
Popkin 1999; Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Ascencio 1999).
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the émigrés occasionally return for visits to family and friends. Others maintain contact
through financial gifts to the church. In Chapter Seven of the dissertation we see how
this migration process impacts how Ukrainian Baptists view the West and their own
identity as Ukrainians.
(2). As with globalization, the concept of transnationalism is often used to signal
the demise or irrelevance of the nation-state in a “borderless world.” In this case,
globalization and transnationalism are often used as synonyms, so the discussion in the
globalization section above about the continued relevance of the nation-state for
Ukrainian Protestants remains applicable here. Grewal and Kaplan argue that when the
term transnational is used in this way it suggests that cultures are more important than
nations, and that identities are tied more closely to cultures than to the nation-state. If
transnationalism trumps political borders then “flows of people and shifts in culture
appear to be almost inevitable and strangely ahistorical” (p. 665).
In response to these kinds of critiques, this study of Ukrainian Protestants
contextualizes transnationalism within its historical, geographical and social setting. The
transnational flows of money, people, and ideas that tie together Central Baptist Church
in Vinnytsia with First Presbyterian Church in Columbia, South Carolina exist within a
particular historical period and are subject to the political and economic realities of life in
our early twenty-first century world.
(3). Transnational can refer to a form of neocolonialism. This usage directly
overlaps the use of the term globalization, as described above, when transnational capital
is portrayed as trampling on and destroying local social or economic structures. Some
critics may wish to apply this label to the relationship between wealthy Western churches
and poorer Ukrainian ones. However, while the effects of Western churches sending
large amounts of money to Ukrainian churches are significant, this dissertation makes
clear that Ukrainian Protestants are not the unwilling recipients of these transnational
relationships.

In some cases they are the initiators, and at other times they act as

gatekeepers as they seek to control the nature of their relationships with Western partners.
(4). Transnational has been used to signal the “NGOization” of social movements,
as in “transnationalism from below” or “transnational women’s movements” (Grewal and
Kaplan 2001, 666), often used as an alternative to ‘global’ because of that term’s
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connotation of entering into new markets. 9 In these instances transnationalism becomes a
site of political engagement (Vertovec 1999). Although some transnational religious
movements, such as those described by Hervieu-Léger (1997) and Eickelman (1997), can
fit into this category, the transnational religious movement studied in this dissertation
does not. “Transnationalism from below” implies a grass-root, anti-establishment effort
extending across international borders.

The purpose of transnational Protestant

involvement in Ukraine is not to make a radical political statement or to carry out a
political agenda (although it has some political implications).

Rather, there are a

multitude of reasons why Ukrainian Protestants involve themselves in transnational
activities, be they spiritual, economic, or social.
(5). Finally, some authors are focused on understanding the power relations
inherent to any transnational relationship. As we geographically contextualize the studies
of global processes and “the actual movements of things and people across space”
(Mitchell 1997b, 110), we should be mindful that the concept of transnationalism does
not flatten out power relations. Massey has written about the “power-geometries of timespace” (1999). Mahler (1998) has identified three power-related scholarly tasks not
sufficiently developed in transnationalism literature: “(1) assessing whose interests are
served by engaging in transnational activities, (2) determining whether such activities
reaffirm and/or reconfigure ‘traditional’ relations of power and privilege, and (3) the
implications of transnationalism, particularly with respect to metanarratives of power” (p.
87).
This Ukrainian-based research contributes towards understanding the place of
power in transnationalism. The most obvious power imbalances in the transnational
networks studied here have economic roots. There are vast financial inequalities between
Ukrainian and Western churches. 10 Among other benefits brought by access to financial
resources is the ability to move freely throughout much of the world. Western Christians
can easily travel into many countries with their versatile passports and deep pockets.
9

The phrase “transnationalism from below” is also the title of a book edited by Michael Peter Smith and
Luis Eduardo Guarnizo (1998).
10
To illustrate: in 2002 a 325 member church in Lexington, Kentucky, had an annual budget of $640,000,
of which $75,000 was designated for missions outreach. That same year a small church of a similar
denomination in Nikolaev, Ukraine, collected barely enough to rent a meeting room, but could not pay their
pastor a salary.
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Ukrainian Christians can also travel, but their trips are typically funded by Western
partners and visas are regularly denied by the consulates of the destination countries. An
analysis of the voices heard here shows how these power imbalances are both resisted
and accommodated by Ukrainian Protestants.

In fact, this dissertation shows how

Ukrainians insert their own fields of power into the transnational networks as they seek to
define, control, and use the networks for their own benefit. One example of this will be
seen in Chapter Seven, as Ukrainians assert a spiritual privilege because of their material
poverty, thus reversing the assumed power structure in the West/Ukraine relationship.

2.5.1 Transnationalism: Emancipation and uneven distribution
In addition to the issues raised above, I wish to briefly comment on two additional
aspects of transnationalism. First is the celebration (in the transnationalism literature) of
liminality and in-between spaces of resistance and possible emancipation. Second is the
geographically and socially uneven nature of transnationalism as observed in Ukrainian
Protestant circles.
It is sometimes argued that transnational subjects use their positions of hybridity,
in-betweenness, and liminality to resist a hegemonic authority such as the state, with its
ability to establish such structures as migration laws and economic policy.
Transnationals often maintain close personal and economic ties with the home country, or
they create a hybrid identity that does not fit any mold that is given from the outside.
Other transnational groups resist “neo-liberal globalization” through protests against
organizations such as the World Trade Organization (Featherstone 2003).
An example of the celebration of hybridity in a non-transnational context is from
Homi Bhabha, who wrote that from a “liminal, minority position . . . emerges the force of
the people of an Afro-American nation” (1990, 296). Luin Goldring has written about
Mexican transnational migration as an opportunity for migrants to develop “alternative
power hierarchies” (1998, 167). For her, “transnational social fields . . . provide a special
context in which people can improve their social position and perhaps their power” (p.
167). Katharyne Mitchell warns that abstract celebration of travel, multiculturalism and
hybridity is premature (1997a; 1997b, 107). In fact, some transnationals – such as many
wealthy overseas Chinese – are not resisting hegemonic narratives at all, but are using
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their transient positions for their own economic gain and capital accumulation. Lily
Kong agrees that some transnationals occupy central, not peripheral sites (1999).
I raise this issue because Ukrainian Protestants seemingly stand outside of the
dichotomy (resistant to the hegemon or working along with the hegemon for personal
advantage). At a global scale, the participants in Ukrainian Protestant churches are not
competing with transnational migrants from wealthier countries in terms of capital
accumulation or economic gain, although limited economic gain appears to be part of
their motives for engaging in transnational activity. Moreover, these Ukrainians are not
resisting the state through their transnational activities, and some of their activities (such
as distributing humanitarian aid or contributing to the physical needs of orphans in a
state-run institution) can even be interpreted as supporting the state apparatus. On the
other hand, their transnational activities serve as a backdrop for resisting some aspects of
the government agenda. For example, an emphasis on multi-culturalism in Southern or
Eastern Ukrainian churches may serve to promote Russian language church programs
when in fact the official government policy is for the expansion of the Ukrainian
language in government and business life. Ong has responded to this dilemma:
In our desire to find definite breaks between the territorially bounded and the
deterritorialized, the oppressive and the progressive, and the stable and the
unstable, we sometimes overlook complicated accommodations, alliances, and
creative tensions between the nation-state and mobile capital, between diaspora
and nationalism, or between the influx of immigrants and the multicultural state
(1999, 16).
In my examination of transnational Protestantism in Ukraine, I wish to avoid looking for
resistance where none can be found, or finding complicity with ‘Capital’ or the ‘State’
when that complicity is absent. My research subjects have nuanced and variegated
relationships with larger structures that cannot be wholly defined as either resistant or
complicit.
A second point about the nature of transnationalism as practiced by Ukrainian
Protestants is its uneven nature. Although much of the unevenness is an outgrowth of
financial differences between Ukrainians and those from Western churches (this is
introduced above in the section about transnationalism and power), another aspect of the
uneven terrain is the way transnational opportunities are distributed throughout Ukrainian
churches. Access to the West is typically clustered among a few individuals in each
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congregation. In a typical Ukrainian Baptist church, for example, the senior pastor has
the most chances both to interact with foreigners and to control their access to the rest of
the church. This same pastor would have more opportunities for foreign travel than other
congregation members. He (and they are always men) will also be the person primarily
responsible for distributing material benefits of transnational contacts (humanitarian aid,
seminary scholarships, etc.) within the congregation. Another category of people in a
strategic position for benefiting from transnationalism are the English language speakers.
Language interpreters typically spend a great deal of time with foreign visitors and in
their own ways are gatekeepers in the transnational information network. The empirical
material in this dissertation explores this aspect of religious transnationalism, which I
suspect will be applicable to transnationalism in other settings as well.

2.6 Nationalism
In defining ‘nation’ I follow Anderson, considering it an “imagined political
community” rising from cultural roots and made possible by the intersection of a number
of historical events including the rise of print-capitalism, European colonialism, and
(later) the growth of global capitalism (1991). In this project, however, I focus on
cultural rather than political aspects of nationality.

Partha Chatterjee notes that

consideration of political nationalism to the exclusion of other forms of nationalism is a
serious mistake made by many scholars (1993, 5).
Nationalism is an ideology that promotes the nation as the ideal unit of political
and cultural life. Nationalism can be produced at many different sites by innumerable
agents, notably the state, nationalist intellectuals, institutions such as universities and
churches (such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine), and individual and
collective members of the nation. In the case of post-Soviet Ukraine, Wanner writes that
the state has created conditions “that inform everyday practices and in which cultural
production takes place” (1998, xix). She argues that specific sites at which Ukrainian
national culture is “articulated, contested, negotiated, and perhaps, institutionalized”
include schools, cultural festivals, the state calendar, and monuments memorializing
people or events of Ukraine’s past (p. xix). While this is true, I argue that cultural
nationalism is also produced at sites that on the surface may seem ‘non-national.’ If there
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were to be a state church in Ukraine, the leading candidates would be either the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) or the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church. However,
nationalist discourse, for better or for worse, is thoroughly embedded within Ukrainian
social life, and it also appears in what may seem to be unlikely places – such as in
Ukraine’s Protestant communities. This dissertation explores the complicated Ukrainian
Protestant response to nationalism, and the diverse ways these communities are
formulating their own visions of what an independent Ukraine should look like. In
general the nationalist (or anti-nationalist) attitudes of Protestants reflect the Ukrainian
region in which they live.
I would like to raise three points about nationalism in Ukraine that are informed
by Chatterjee’s insights about Bengali nationalism in The Nation and its Fragments
(1993). First of all, there is no such thing as a unified “Ukrainian nationalism.” Instead,
there are many nationalisms:

those that are hidden, unavailable, official, cultural,

political, everyday, resistant, hegemonic, borrowed, or imagined. Secondly, each of these
nationalisms intersects with the others and with social fragments that include gender,
class, ethnicity, regional or local orientation, religion, generation, political affiliation,
etc., to produce an even more complex field of nationalisms. Thirdly, it seems as though
the most visible contemporary Ukrainian nationalism is found in opposition to Russian
identity. Are there other elements influencing Ukrainian nationalism? If so, what do
they look like? The question for this dissertation is whether and how Protestants in
Ukraine construct their own nationalisms, and how these nationalisms incorporate aspects
of other more prominent Ukrainian nationalisms. Do Ukraine’s Protestants partition their
national identity into religious and non-religious spheres? These insights guide this
research on national identity in Ukraine, and help guard against searching for a
monolithic or uniform nationalism within Protestant communities. Here I seek to know
how the various spheres of Ukrainian nationalism are interconnected in these
communities.
Below I briefly review two streams of thought within the broad field of
nationalism studies: the relationship between nationalism and modernity, and nationalism
as produced in the lived experiences of national citizens.
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2.6.1 Nationalism and modernity
The notion that the formation of political nations coincided with the arrival of
modernity has been widely accepted, although the exact nature of the relationship
between nationalism and modernity has been disputed for half a century. Ernest Gellner
famously argued that nationalism appeared in Europe because industrializing people
needed to have a common language created and enforced by a national state to ensure the
smooth functioning of the economic and industrial system (1983; 1996). In this case
nationalism is seen as a practical mechanism that arose to promote economic functioning
and industrialization. Alternatively, nationalism has been presented as something that
arose in order to limit the deterritorialization of capitalism (Lloyd 1997). This second
interpretation fits into the globalization vs. nationalism debate, and can be deployed by
those who consider globalization and nationalism to be opposing forces. However, this
raises the question of whether people always produce nationalism because of an
economic motivation.
I argue with many others that there are also other contributing factors to the
development of nationalism. Gellner’s critics have long rejected the idea, and emphasize
non-economic components and motivations for the nationalist project that include
ethnicity (Kuzio 2001; Smith 1987) and political power (Breuilly 1996; Davidson 1994).
However, it seems clear that neither ethnicity nor political power stands alone at the heart
of national identity. In the Soviet Union, for example, nationality was considered to be
both an ethnic marker and a matter of opinion.

The 1926 Soviet census required

respondents to first give the nationality of their mother and then to identify their own
nationality, saying that “the determination of one’s nationality has been left up to the
respondent himself/herself” (quoted in Wanner 1998, 12). While ethnicity itself is a
socially constructed category, it does have material consequences that can make it
difficult for certain groups to be accepted as part of a nation. In Ukraine, for instance, it
has been difficult for people from certain ethnic groups (such as Central Asians or
Koreans) to be accepted as Ukrainian nationals.
Lloyd argues that nationalism (created to oppose capitalistic deterritorialization)
is formed through the state. The state produces modern citizen-subjects, just as it creates
institutions that allow the integration of the nation-state into the world economic system
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(Lloyd 1997).

Political aspects of nationalism are important, and the everyday

nationalism observed in Ukrainian Protestant churches intersects in complicated ways
with political nationalist discourse and government policies. Ukrainians live within a
political Ukrainian state and are subject to nationalist laws (enforcing the gradual
supremacy of the Ukrainian language) and media (such as state-owned television
stations).

However, while the state is an important focus of Ukrainian nationalist

thought, not all nationalism originates there. Some nationalist discourses are created in
their own domains, for example, discourses of folk culture and history.
In general, considering nationalism to be wedded to modernity creates interesting
problems, including the paradox that although our modern states depend on nationalism,
often nationalism asks us to express ‘premodern’ feelings that are sometimes said to be
rooted in ideas of ethnicity (Dogan 1997; Hobsbawm 1996).

This idea has been

popularized in accounts that the collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed ‘ancient
nationalisms’ to come to the surface again.

One author, for example, wrote that

nationalism in the post-Soviet period emerged “like steam from a pressure cooker”
(Khazanov 1997). Ukrainian nationalists popularly (but spuriously) invoke ninth century
Kievan Rus’ as the foundation of the modern Ukrainian nation.
A more tangible problem with linking nationalism and modernity is that if nations
came into being within a world system in which the national level was the most useful
way to organize economic, social and political life, it stands to reason that as our world
becomes increasingly integrated economically, culturally and politically, the validity and
future of the nation are put into question (Zelinsky 2001). Here discussions about
nationalism intersect with the discussions about globalization and transnationalism, in
which nationalism is simplistically posited as the opposite of globalism, an argument
dealt with above.

2.6.2 Everyday nationalism
This dissertation research has been carried out under the assumption that
nationalism is an ideology constructed in part through the daily lived experiences of
national citizens. Many scholars have written about how national elites construct and
employ a national identity through literature, the creation of national cultural institutions,
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and national political movements (e.g., Hroch 1996; Kamusella 2001). A number of
scholars have examined contemporary national elites in Russia and Ukraine (Haas 2000;
Molchanov 2000; Shulman 1999a, b; Smith et al. 1998). Kubicek blames national elites
for producing a weak national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine (Kubicek 1999), and other
scholars of nationalism in Ukraine rely on analysis of nationalist political parties and the
results of post-1991 elections to determine the success or failure of the development of a
Ukrainian national identity (Kuzio 1997b; Wilson 1997a).

While these official

nationalisms cannot (and should not) be cleanly separated from the nationalisms of
everyday life (especially since the people who produce them presumably live everyday
lives themselves), it is the latter nationalist articulations that have been underrepresented
in the literature on Ukraine (for exceptions see Arel 1996; Wanner 1998). Borneman
(1992) draws attention to the differences between ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationness,’ the
second being unarticulated but lived in everyday experience. Verdery (1996b) calls
‘nationness’ “the daily interactions and practices that produce an inherent and often
unarticulated feeling of belonging, of being at home. . . . To research it would direct
attention away from the noisy and visible rhetorics of nationalists and toward the
techniques through which receptive dispositions have been quietly laid down in those to
whom they appeal” (p. 229).
By choosing to examine how national identity is expressed in the lives and
practices of Ukrainian Protestants, this dissertation answers the call for studies of
everyday nationalism. Examples include churches that display a Ukrainian flag in their
worship halls, churches in which the Ukrainian language is used exclusively, and pastors
who enjoin members to pray for the Ukrainian president. Examining how Ukrainian
Protestants express nationalism in their actions as well as in their words provides a
complex picture of the extent and nature of nationalism in these church communities.

2.6.3 Ukrainian nationalism and transnationalism
Studies of Ukrainian nationalism have examined Ukrainian political parties
(Kuzio 1997b; Wilson 1997b), the distribution of Ukrainian language use (Arel 1996),
the Ukrainian reinterpretation of historical events, especially with respect to Russia
(Wanner 1998), and Ukraine’s relationship to Russia (Kuzio 1997a). I wish to contribute
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to this growing literature by situating Ukrainian national identity within a constellation of
other identifications, particularly regional and transnational. Earlier in the chapter I laid
out my contribution to the scholarly discussion of Ukraine’s regions. Another goal of the
dissertation is to find out if, within a given population segment, there is a relationship
between the extent and character of transnational involvement and the nature of
Ukrainian nationalism espoused.

2.7 Identity
A fourth major concept that informs this research project is identity. Identity is
notoriously difficult to define, and in fact there is no equivalent to the word ‘identity’ in
the Russian language. In English, the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology reports that there is
“no clear concept of identity in modern sociology. It is used widely and loosely in
reference to one’s sense of self, and one’s feelings and ideas about oneself” (Marshall
1998). The word is often attached to a descriptor word to refer to some more specific
kind of identity, such as “religious identity” (Batalden 1993), “Muslim identity” (Dwyer
1993), national identity, and so on. My understanding of the term is based on poststructural, anti-essentialist theories of identity formation. The most important point is
that there is no such thing as a stable, coherently formed identity, such as that formed
solely around race, gender, religion, or any other social structure. That said, I will make
five comments about identity:
1. The raw material for identity is formed within and through discourses, which
construct subject positions and initiate processes of subjectification.

For example,

‘Black’ identity was not possible until discourses of race were produced, ‘gay’ identity
was not possible to conceptualize until discourses of homosexuality were constructed,
and so forth.
2. Identity “is always defined in relation to and inhabited by what it is not” (Pratt
2000, 803). In this process the ‘other’ of any category (the constitutive outside) is at
work on both sides of the boundary, and is always leaving its trace on the category
(Natter and Jones 1997, 146). Anzaldúa says this in a way that is easy to understand:
Identity is not just a singular activity or entity. It’s in relation to somebody else
because you can’t have a stand alone; there must be something you’re bouncing
off of. The whole tree of the person is embedded in the world of TV, popular
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culture, film, commercials, malls, education, the world of information, even
computers and the Internet. When I try to identify and name myself it’s always
how I see myself as similar to or different from groups of people and the
environment. Identity is not just what happens to me in my present lifetime but
also involves my family history, my racial history, my collective history (2000,
240).
Moreover, the process of boundary construction must be continually maintained.
Geraldine Pratt calls on us to make boundary constructions visible, and to keep mindful
how those who are excluded are defined (1999, 164). These boundaries are not only
produced between individuals or social groups (such as Filipina domestic workers in
Canada – the group that provoked Pratt to think through the process of identity
construction). Boundaries are also constructed between national groups. In other words,
embedded in Ukrainian identity is the idea that it is not Russian, nor Polish, nor anything
else. Furthermore, the boundaries between Ukrainian identity and these others will have
to be continually enforced for Ukrainian identity to endure.
3. Individuals are subject to multiple discourses, and because we find ourselves at
different places with respect to each of these discourses (of sports, religion, politics, the
nation, etc.), we occupy multiple subject positions, or identities (Anderson 1996).
Anzaldúa writes that “identity is an arrangement or series of clusters, a kind of stacking
or layering of selves, horizontal and vertical layers, the geography of selves made up of
the different communities you inhabit” (2000, 238). I disagree with Castells, who argues
that most social actors in contemporary society organize meaning around a primary
identity that frames the others (1997, 7). While that may be true for some, human
identity is too transitory and complicated for us to assert that most people have a primary
identity.
4. Often identities are hybrid, meaning that multiple identities do not assimilate
evenly but produce a new identity that is a result of mixing, fusing, and creolization
(Bhabha 1994; Hall 1988).
5. Identities are always spatialized (McDowell 1999; Natter and Jones 1997).
Identities are constructed in space, and may change as the individual in question moves
from one place to another (Blunt 1994). This spatialization is profound when it comes to
collective identities, such as those organized around the nation.
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National identity is almost always predicated on the idea that there is a specific
piece of territory which belongs to the nation. Paasi writes that nationalism is “a specific,
strategic form of territoriality and the struggle for control over land and socio-spatial
consciousness” (1999, 5). The boundaries that must continually be enforced between
identities become dramatically spatial when it comes to national identity, and these
identity boundaries can be mapped out on the ground; they are presumably at least
somewhat aligned with the territorial borders of the nation-state (Newman 2001). This
process of boundary-construction makes national political communities possible, and if it
breaks down, the communities will deteriorate. Chris Brown (2001) links these ideas to
discourses of globalization. If economic de-bordering is related to the global political
order, and if political borders are weakening, then identity itself is put into question (p.
130). This fits in directly with the debate outlined earlier in this chapter about the
relationship between nationalism and globalization.
This anti-essentialist formulation of identity is used in this work on Ukraine, as
national, regional, and transnational identities are examined in several Protestant
congregations. This work contributes to the literature on identity in at least two ways.
First, this project provides an opportunity to investigate how identities are spatialized,
which in the case of the individuals involved is a complicated process. Their identities
are spatialized repeatedly and at various scales. Claiming to be Ukrainian asserts a
spatial identity, and here we see how that spatiality intersects with other spatial assertions
such as regional or transnational identity.

Secondly, this dissertation examines the

process of boundary construction and maintenance conducted by Protestants in Ukraine.
Boundaries are constructed, maintained, and also at times dismantled between ‘the West’
and ‘Ukraine,’ between ‘Protestant’ and ‘Orthodox,’ between ‘Western Ukraine’ and
‘non-Western Ukraine,’ and between ‘Baptist’ and ‘American’ churches in Ukraine.

2.8 Conclusion
The processes of religious transnationalism analyzed in the following pages are
rooted in the ideas and debates presented in this chapter, where I introduced the social
and intellectual context of this study of post-Soviet Ukrainian evangelicalism.

I

examined several theories of social life in the contemporary world: globalization,

29

transnationalism, and nationalism. I also considered the foundational concept of identity,
acknowledging that people can have multiple, shifting identities that are difficult to
define.
This is a dissertation about how the flows and connections of a transnational
world are produced by and embedded in the human relationships of daily life. I will also
show how events of the past can have a direct impact on how a group of people perceive
their own place in the world, and how they choose which aspects of a transnational
identity to accept, which to reject, and which to transform into something new.
Ukrainian evangelicals began the twenty-first century thoroughly enmeshed in a
transnational religious network, yet at the same time they are living with the legacy of
decades under repressive Soviet rule, a legacy that colors their interpretation of their
transnational partners and their experience of life in a transnational society. It is this
legacy that we turn to in the following chapter.

Copyright © 2005 Esther Grace Long
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Chapter Three: Research methodology
3.1 Introduction
This project is based on qualitative research carried out in eight Protestant
churches in four Ukrainian cities.

Ethnographic field methods included participant

observation in all churches, fifteen focus group interviews with church members, fifty
individual interviews, and three small focus groups of two or three people each. Most of
the findings presented here come out of the focus groups and interviews, although
Chapter Six also includes an evaluation of maps produced by focus group participants.
This chapter discusses a number of methodological concerns: (1) why ethnographic
research methods were the most appropriate choice for this dissertation, (2) how the
research design was structured (with an introduction to the research sites), (3) how the
fieldwork was conducted, (4) how the data was analyzed, and (5) how my positionality in
relation to the Ukrainian Protestants affects the research findings.

3.2 Ethnographic research methods and identity
Human identity is a complicated social construct. Scholars have shown that all
identities are the products of blending, creolization, and fusion (Hall 1988; Marshall
1998; Minh-ha 1996). They recognize that identity is complex and multi-layered, and that
identities are unstable, usually changing over time. Moreover, geographers contend that
identities are always grounded in and experienced through social space (McDowell 1999;
Natter and Jones 1997).
Although this project investigates the regional, national, and transnational
identities of Ukrainian Protestants, many of the research subjects do not consciously
identify themselves as national or transnational actors. Furthermore, like all people, they
inhabit multiple identities. One person may consider herself a Ukrainian citizen, an ethnic
Russian from Odessa, and a Presbyterian who participates in a transnational religious
network – and each identity is woven with the others into what can become a new
cultural form.
Ethnographic research methods are particularly suited for the study of complex
social constructs such as identity. By spending time – sometimes months or even years –
interacting with research subjects in their own environments, researchers can understand
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social life, relationships, ideas and convictions with nuance and depth. Examples of
researchers who have examined identity from these anti-essentialist viewpoints using
ethnographic methods include Claire Dwyer (1993; 1999; 2000), who studied the
construction of identity of young British Muslim women; Ruth Frankenberg (1993), who
examined the identities of white American women; and Janel Curry (2000), who
investigated the worldviews of people living in religious farming communities. These
authors based their analyses on a combination of participant observation ethnography,
focus group interviews, and in-depth interviews, and I did the same. Curry’s work is
particularly relevant to my own. In order to find out how rural Iowans envision
themselves within larger society, she chose five farming communities founded by
different religious groups; she gathered participants for focus group interviews from local
churches in each town; she conducted gender-specific focus group interviews; she
interviewed four individuals or couples from each community. Curry productively
analyzed the interview transcripts to answer her research questions.

3.3 Research design
For my own project I employed ethnographic research methods in eight churches
located in four different Ukrainian cities (See Figures 3.1 and 3.2). I spent about two
months in each city, dividing my time between the congregations there. I participated in
and observed congregational life while I also conducted focus group and individual
interviews with congregational members. The sites were selected to present both a
regional cross-section of Ukraine and a comparison of older, pre-Soviet churches with
new churches that had been started under the supervision of American missionaries since
1991. Ukraine’s regional variation is profound, and I anticipated that church members
from different parts of Ukraine would have different experiences of transnational
Christianity and different perspectives on Ukraine’s national identity. I also expected
that newer churches, particularly those founded by American missionaries, would see
their place in the transnational world differently than churches with a longer history in
Ukraine that extended back to the nineteenth century. All eight of the selected churches –
like most Protestant churches in Ukraine – have built extensive relationships with
organizations and individuals in the United States.
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Figure 3.1: Research locations
City (Region, language)

Historical church

New church

Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy

Central Baptist Church (ECB)

Evangelical Presbyterian Church

Central Baptist Church (ECB)

Nazarene Church

Central Baptist Church (ECB)

Evangelical Presbyterian Church

Central Baptist Church (ECB)

Greater Grace Church

(Southern Ukraine, Russian
speaking)
Vinnytsia
(Western Ukraine, mixed Ukrainian
and Russian speaking)
Kherson
(Southern Ukraine, mostly Russian
speaking)
L’viv
(Western Ukraine, strongly
Ukrainian)

Figure 3.2: Map of research locations

Cartography by Dick Gilbreath
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The first research site was Bilhorod-Dnestrovskiy, known more commonly by its
Russian name, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy. Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy is a small city of 52,000
inhabitants 11 on the western banks of the Dneister River estuary not far from where it
empties into the Black Sea. This city is one of the oldest in Ukraine – founded by the
Greeks and over the centuries being claimed by powers that included Moldovan princes,
the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, Romania, and the Soviet Union. BelgorodDnestrovskiy was formerly part of Bessarabia, a region within the Russian Empire and
then the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War, and was not administratively
attached to Ukraine until 1945, although many of the people who live there have long
considered themselves ethnically Ukrainian. Economically the area has a struggling
industrial component (factories include a large one that produces medical syringes);
vineyards dominate the agricultural landscape; and many local people rely on seasonal
jobs serving tourists in a nearby Black Sea beach town to supplement their annual
incomes.

Belgorod is part of the Odessa administrative region and Russian is the

dominant language heard on the streets and used in public and private life. Several years
ago one scholar observed that Odessa was in a state of transition from a weak Russian to
a mixed Russo-Ukrainian identity, but what that identity would look like remained a
major question (Pirie 1996). That question remains open.
The new church I focused on there was Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Evangelical
Presbyterian Church, a small congregation that traces its origins to a 1994 visit by
American missionaries to the city. This church is described in greater detail in Chapter
Five. The older church was the Central Baptist Church, the largest Baptist church in the
city and a member of Ukraine’s largest and oldest Baptist denomination, the Evangelical
Christian-Baptists (ECB). Most of the core members of this church grew up in Baptist
families that survived the years of religious persecution and had stories to tell of family
members who were imprisoned because of their religious activities during the Soviet era.
As in most of the cities I spent time, spending equal time with each church proved to be
an unrealistic goal, in part because of the logistics of attending services at different
churches that were usually all on one day of the week. In Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, most
of my participant observation time took place in the Presbyterian church, and it was only
11

This and other population figures cited in this chapter are reported in the 2001 Ukrainian census.
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towards the second half of my two-month tenure in the city that I was able to gain access
to the Baptist church and conduct interviews there. Another reason for the lopsided
observation time was that as relationships developed with people in one particular
church, it was difficult to break away from the activities and events of that congregation
to go elsewhere.
The second research site was the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia. Vinnytsia
(population 357,000) is the capital of Vinnytsia region (population 1.77 million) and as
such it has all of the resources that would be expected – government offices, universities,
a medical school, factories, large church buildings, markets, and a prized McDonald’s
restaurant. The surrounding province contains fertile agricultural land that produces
crops like sugar beets and wheat. Both the Russian and Ukrainian languages are used in
Vinnytsia, but neither dominates. Vinnytsia was long part of the Russian Empire and was
part of the Soviet Union as it emerged from the Bolshevik revolution and civil war.
Protestantism, particularly the Baptist tradition, is quite strong in Vinnytsia. As in
all four of the research sites, one of the case study churches here was the Central Baptist
Church. Vinnytsia’s Central Baptist is the largest Baptist congregation in Ukraine with
over fifteen hundred adult members. 12 The pastor is well known and respected in Baptist
churches across Ukraine, and people I met in various parts of the country, even nonBaptists, commonly knew of the Vinnytsia Central Baptist Church. The Baptist church is
so strong in Vinnytsia that there are several ECB congregations throughout the city in
addition to other Baptist congregations that are unaffiliated with the ECB. The city
boasts at least one large charismatic Protestant church and some other churches that
include the Vinnytsia Nazarene Church. The Nazarene church, my second case study
congregation there, had been in operation for about one year and was already attracting
about one hundred worshippers every Sunday. Most of my Vinnytsia research time was
spent with members of the Baptist church; I only gained access to the Nazarene church
towards the end of my two months in Vinnytsia and conducted only one focus group
interview and one individual interview there. That is the least coverage of any of the
eight churches in this study.

12

This figure according to the senior pastor in a 2002 interview.
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The third research site was Kherson, a city in southern Ukraine about halfway
between Odessa and Crimea near the mouth of the Dnieper river.

Like Vinnytsia,

Kherson is a regional capital, and has a similarly sized population (328,000) in a region
of 1.1 million people. Unlike Vinnytsia, in Kherson the Russian language strongly
dominates and the Ukrainian language is rarely heard on the streets. In fact, some people
in Kherson referred to themselves as “Russian” during focus group interviews. Although
Kherson is generally considered part of ‘Southern’ Ukraine rather than ‘Eastern’ Ukraine,
it has important features in common with Eastern Ukrainian cities, particularly the strong
affinity to Russian language and culture and the long history as part of the Russian
Empire prior to becoming part of the Soviet Union. In this study Kherson is used in place
of more prominent Eastern Ukrainian cities such as Kharkiv or Donetsk to provide a
regional comparison with churches in Western and Central Ukrainian cities.
The case study churches in Kherson were the Central Baptist Church (ECB) and
the Kherson Evangelical Presbyterian Church.

The Presbyterian Church (a sister

congregation to the one in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy) was my key to the city, since the
pastor of Belgorod Presbyterian had requested that the pastor of Kherson Presbyterian
invite me to do research there. I also had good access to the Central Baptist Church
through a research assistant who was a member there. The balance of time spent between
the two churches was more equal in Kherson than in the other three cities, although I did
spend more time with the Presbyterians than with the Baptists.
The final research site was L’viv, a Western Ukrainian city that famously boasts a
strong nationalist spirit. L’viv stands apart from the other three cities in nearly every
way. It is about twice the size of Vinnytsia or Kherson, with 732,000 inhabitants. The
Ukrainian language is the strong favorite for both public and private use, although there
continue to be some who speak Russian in the home. Of the four cities, L’viv has the
shortest tenure in the Soviet Union and was not part of the Russian Empire. As will be
explained in more detail in Chapter Four, L’viv was part of Poland until it was annexed
by Stalin before the Second World War, was occupied by Germany for most of the war,
and then was attached to the rest of Ukraine as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic in the USSR until Ukraine’s independence in 1991. L’viv is wealthier than the
other three cities, and because of its Hapsburg roots the architecture of the city center has
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more similarities to Krakow or Prague than Kiev or Moscow. An interesting feature is
that L’viv, so close to the Polish border, is a gateway city for Ukrainians who migrate to
the West (typically Poland) for agricultural or construction work. It was not uncommon
in L’viv to find people who used to live in Poland, or who had family members currently
working there.
In L’viv the two churches I studied were the Central Baptist Church and L’viv
Greater Grace Church. As with the main Baptist church in each of the four chosen cities,
the Central Baptist Church is a prominent, well-established congregation. Greater Grace
Church, on the other hand, is an evangelical church started in the 1990s by American
missionaries from a large independent church in Baltimore, Maryland. Greater Grace in
Maryland is a mission-minded congregation, and has ‘daughter’ churches in over 50
countries around the world, including four congregations so far in Ukraine. I spent more
time participating and observing at Greater Grace than at L’viv Central Baptist, but my
focus group interviews at Central Baptist were a bit more productive. Because of poor
attendance, I only held one successful focus group at Greater Grace, and I held two at
Central Baptist.

3.4 Fieldwork components
The actual fieldwork had three main components: participant observation, focus
group interviews, and other (mostly individual) interviews. Here I will explain each in
turn. An important component of any ethnographic research is participant observation, or
observing and participating in the communities that are being evaluated. Kearns argues
that observation as a research practice has been undervalued in geographic research, and
that in fact “all observation is participant observation” (2000, 104). A primary purpose of
observation as research practice is to achieve contextual understanding of the people or
places that are being studied. As Kearns explains, “the goal is to construct an in-depth
interpretation of a particular time and place through direct experience” (105-106).
During the process of participant observation, the researcher typically writes fieldnotes
which are the basis for coming “to grasp and interpret the actions and concerns of others”
(Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995, 13).
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Some research methods enable researchers to collect information about how
people answer specific questions in an interview or survey setting; in contrast, participant
observation allows us to evaluate identity as expressed through people’s lives.

By

observing and participating I could discover how transnational relationships, for example,
are produced within the context of daily life and everyday experiences. Verdery and
others have called attention to the merits of researching the nationalism of daily life, what
she calls ‘nationness.’ This is “the daily interactions and practices that produce an
inherent and often unarticulated feeling of belonging, of being at home. . . . To research it
would direct attention away from the noisy and visible rhetorics of nationalists and
toward the techniques through which receptive dispositions have been quietly laid down
in those to whom they appeal” (1996b, 229). 13 I do not know any other way to research
everyday life effectively than by participating and observing.
In each of my research sites one church became the primary location of
participation and observation, and I spent less time at the second church. What this
means is that of the eight churches, there are four that I know better than others: the
Presbyterian churches in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy and Kherson, the Central Baptist Church
in Vinnytsia, and Greater Grace Church in L’viv. The nature of participant observation
differed slightly at each church, but it boiled down to this: I sought opportunities to
spend time on a daily basis with people from the church; I attended worship services
regularly; and I participated in as many church-sponsored activities as possible. In
Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, for example, I ate lunch every day with the staff of the medical
clinic that the Presbyterian church runs. In Kherson and L’viv I played the violin each
Sunday with the church music team, which also meant that I attended weekly music team
rehearsals. In Kherson I spent one week as a full-time volunteer at the drop-in center for
street children sponsored by the Presbyterian Church.

In Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy,

Vinnytsia, and Kherson I joined at least one weekly small group Bible study led by
church members. I went on an evangelization trip to a remote village with a small group
from Kherson Baptist. I attended youth group activities including a picnic and a party
with the Greater Grace youth group in L’viv. At Vinnytsia Baptist I visited a class at
their adult Bible school and children’s Sunday school; I went to several meetings of their
13

See also (Paasi 1999; Thompson 2001).
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largest youth group and a prayer meeting frequented mostly by older women. I spent a
morning at a long-term care hospital with a team from Vinnytsia Central Baptist that goes
weekly to make and distribute sandwiches to the sick. I visited many church people in
their homes as they offered me tea and conversation. In Vinnytsia I lived with an elderly
member of the Central Baptist Church. In Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy and in Kherson I
stayed with American missionaries working at the Presbyterian churches there. These
housing arrangements were particularly helpful as I sought to establish relationships with
people in the various churches. In short: I tried to have daily encounters with church
people as I participated in the activities of their lives. The research product was a written
record of my observations and my interpretations of those interactions.
The second component of my research, and one heavily relied on in the
dissertation, was focus group interviews. A focus group is “a research technique that
collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher” (Morgan
1997, 6). The group is invited together because they have something in common with
each other (in this case, they are members of the same church and are in the same age
category). In an interview people respond directly to questions posed by the interviewer,
but in a focus group an advantage is that people respond to other group members. The
moderator will raise a question that she wishes participants to answer, and in the process
of answering it other topics may be brought up and group members may have a much
larger discussion about it and related themes. Interacting in a focus group allows for
people “to explore different points of view, and formulate and reconsider their own ideas
and understandings” (Cameron 2000, 86). This was an advantage for my research project
because the focus group discussions raised issues that I had not always thought of, and it
allowed me to gauge the relevance of my research questions to the lives of the
participants. Sometimes the questions generated very little discussion; at other times the
focus group members had a great deal to say to me and each other about the topics. I was
able to listen in on debates between church members, thus hearing a wider range of
opinions, and defense of those positions, than ever came out in individual interviews. On
more than one occasion I was thanked for bringing the participants together. They
appreciated having a forum in which they could talk with fellow church members about
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these issues. At least three focus groups should be conducted using the same basic set of
questions so that data can be compared and contrasted for more productive results.
For this project my goal was to conduct two or three age-segregated focus groups
at each church. I anticipated that the views held by young people about national identity
and transnationalism might differ greatly from those of their parents and grandparents
who lived most of their lives in the Soviet Union. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the goal
was generally met, although with greater or lesser success in each church. Where the
focus group is described as a ‘mini-group’ below, it generally indicates that a full focus
group was planned but that not enough people showed up to consider it a successful
group discussion. In the case of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian, there are very few
young adults who attend the church and who were eligible to participate in a young adult
focus group. The two men who came for the discussion were actually college students
whose parents attended the church but who themselves were studying in another city and
were home for the weekend. In other cases the failure of participants to show up for a
scheduled focus group can be attributed to a number of factors, most specifically the
method of subject recruitment. Some groups were recruited by me after I had already
established a personal rapport with the potential participants. These had a high rate of
attendance. Others, which also had a high rate of attendance, were set up by a respected
person of authority in the church (such as a pastor or youth group leader). The most
ineffective recruitment method was a general invitation given from the pulpit by the
pastor. Unfortunately, in two of the churches (Greater Grace and Central Baptist in
L’viv), this was the method suggested/implemented by the church pastor for recruiting
middle aged and elderly group participants, and those groups were therefore poorly
attended. At those churches I scheduled focus groups with young adults directly (without
going through the pastor), and so the young adult groups were much better attended.
While offering a financial incentive would have been helpful for recruiting participants,
cultural advisers uniformly recommended against introducing money into the researcherparticipant relationship in this context.
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Figure 3.3: Focus groups conducted
City
Baptist Church
New Church
Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy
• A focus group with • A mini-group with two
young adult women
young adult men
• A mini-group with two • A mini-group with two
middle-aged women and
middle aged adults (a
one man
man and a woman)
• A focus group with
middle aged adults
• A focus group with
retired adults
Vinnytsia
• A focus group of young • A focus group with
adults
adults of various ages
• A focus group of middle
aged adults
• A focus group of retired
women
Kherson
• A focus group of young • A focus group of young
adults
adults
• A focus group of middle • A focus group of middle
aged adults
aged adults
L’viv
• A focus group of young • A focus group of young
adults
adults
• A focus group of retired • A mini-group of two
women (although half
middle aged men
of them left part-way
through)
• A mixed-age (mostly
young) focus group at a
daughter congregation
of Central Baptist

The focus groups were conducted either at private apartments or at church
facilities. I served as the moderator and my English language questions were translated
into Russian or Ukrainian by a research assistant. The resulting discussions, except for
those in L’viv which were in Ukrainian, were not translated back into English because I
understood nearly everything that was said in Russian. Voices were captured on audio
tape and either transcribed in Russian by a native speaker research assistant to be
translated into English later by me or someone else, or they were translated directly into
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English from the Russian/Ukrainian audiotape by a research assistant and later checked
and edited by me. All of the transcripts were worked on by at least two, but sometimes
three people to ensure the most accurate possible translations.
In my focus groups, questions, most of them open-ended, were carefully chosen
and arranged with more general ones at the beginning and the more specific, focused
ones towards the end. As explained by Krueger and Casey (2000, 12), questions towards
the end of the group discussion tend to provide the most useful information. Focus group
interview questions (see Figure 3.4) covered each of the main research questions posed in
this project. They were arranged to begin with general comments that could open people
up for discussion and then hone in on specific aspects of regional/national identity and
transnationalism. Focus groups usually lasted about one and a half hours, but were as
short as one hour and as long as two hours. The same (or nearly the same) questions
were asked at each group so that there would be a basis for comparison across churches,
regions, and age groups.
Before explaining how the focus groups transcripts were analyzed, I will present
the third research component – individual interviews. Some of the groups listed above in
Figure 3.3 – the ‘mini-groups’ with only two people – can be considered in this category
because they were too small to be defined as focus groups.

In addition to those

interviews of pairs that primarily answered the focus group questions, I interviewed a
wide variety of church members and leaders (see Figure 3.5). The interviews were semistructured; that is, I had several questions to ask, but I let the interviewee take the
conversation in new directions if they chose. Usually the interviews began with an
opportunity for participants to tell the story of how they came to faith and became
involved in the church – their conversion narrative. Giving a ‘testimony’ (sviditelstvo) is
a common practice in Ukrainian Protestant churches. Many evangelicals have already
prepared a short presentation about their conversion that they share in church or during a
small group Bible study or prayer meeting. Others write theirs down for publication in a
church newspaper or magazine. Although this was not the primary methodology for this
project, some researchers have collected and analyzed Protestant conversion narratives
(both historical and contemporary) in Ukraine and Russia (Coleman 2002; Wanner 2003).
Allowing interviewees to begin by telling their testimony was a good way to break the ice
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and start conversation. It also provided an opportunity to find out what the subject
believed were the most important aspects of church life in contemporary Ukraine. From
this point on I usually asked (both pastors and lay people) questions about the history of
their congregation and about their views towards the West and its impact on their church
and on Ukraine as a whole. Most interviews, even in L’viv, were conducted in Russian
by me without an interpreter. Several interviewees chose to speak in English. Nearly all
of the interviews were audiotaped and then transcribed/translated using the same
procedures described above that were used for the focus groups.

Some of the

interviewees declined to be taped, and their responses were recorded on paper only.
Interviews lasted from between ten minutes (short testimonies only) to one hour or more
in length.

Figure 3.4: Focus group questions
1. Introductions: name, hometown.
2. Think back to the first time you went to your church. What prompted you to go and
what did you think about it?
3. What do you like the most about your church?
4. What are the two most serious/important issues that your church faces right now?
5. What are specific ways your church is connected to people & churches in other
countries? How has this contact has affected the life of your church? How do you
evaluate the role of foreign missionaries in Ukraine?
6. After receiving the maps of Ukraine that are being passed out, please mark on your
map your opinion of where the main regional divisions in Ukraine are located. In your
opinion, are Protestant churches in one region different from Protestant churches in
another region? Also mark on your map places in Ukraine where your church has
connections with other people or churches. How has this contact affected the life of your
church?
7. Do you think that Ukraine has a national religion? If so, what is it? To what extent (if
any) can your church be considered a Ukrainian church?
8. What would you like to see in your church in 20 or 30 years? What dreams do you
have for your church?
9. I need input from you about the evangelical churches in Ukraine and their position in
the country and in the world. Are there any important issues that I missed? Is there
anything about this that you have on your mind that you have not had a chance to say?
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Figure 3.5: Interviews conducted (in addition to mini focus groups)
City
Baptist Church
New Church
Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy

4

9

Vinnytsia

13

1

Kherson

3

7

L’viv

6

7

3.5 Data analysis
At the end of ten months on the ground in Ukraine and many more months spent
transcribing audio tapes and translating and editing the transcripts, I had accumulated
hundreds of pages of research documents:

fieldnotes, focus group and interview

transcripts, and other written materials such as church bulletins, advertising brochures,
and hard copies of church web sites. The contents of the documents were then analyzed
both in terms of what they said about themselves and also in relation to how they spoke
to the research questions. I followed the advice of Gillian Rose, who recommends,
among other steps, “immersing yourself in your sources”, “identifying key themes in
your sources”, and “paying attention to their complexity and contradictions” (2001, 158).
I read the transcripts several times, paying attention to repeated themes, contradictions,
and what seemed to be the most important ideas that the research participants were trying
to express. I read them again, this time focusing on what the research participants were
saying that related to the research questions – how did their comments and actions tell a
story about the regional, the national, and the transnational? The primary data, therefore,
are the words spoken by the Ukrainians involved in this study. This dissertation is based
primarily on content analysis of interviews and focus groups, allowing the research
subjects to speak on these pages. Throughout the chapters I provide direct quotations
from the interviews to support my analysis and to guard against misinterpretation. Since
my theoretical framework of identity construction is one in which identity is formed
through the negation of the other, there are many times in Chapters Six and Seven in
which I quote at length from church goers who speak about how they are not Orthodox or
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Catholic, they are not Ukrainian or American or Russian, they are not Baptists or new
evangelicals, and they are not from Western Ukraine or other regions of the country.
Chapter Six contains an analysis of maps created by the focus group participants.
This part of the dissertation relies on alternate methods than those described above. I
distributed blank outline maps of Ukraine’s administrative oblasts to participants at focus
groups, asking them to draw in the regional boundaries of Ukraine according to their own
interpretation. Most people drew a circle around several oblasts in Western Ukraine, and
several in the south, center, and east. To analyze the resulting maps I determined how
many maps categorized each oblast in a particular region. (For example, L’viv oblast
was put in a ‘western’ region in nearly all of the maps, but Vinnytsia was considered
‘western’ in only 12.4 percent of them. I then used the data in a mapping software
package to create chloropleth maps of Western Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, Southern
Ukraine, and so forth. I also made maps that broke the data down by city, so that I could
compare the boundaries of Western Ukraine as mapped by people from different
Ukrainian cities. This will be further explained along with the results in Chapter Five.

3.6 Positionality
This research project, like all research projects, has been impacted by the
researcher’s position in relation to the research subjects. That is, my gender, nationality,
and religious affiliation came with me into the field and affected how I related to the
research subjects and how they related to me. My identity also affected how I viewed
and interpreted the research material. In this section I will address (1) my positionality in
regard to the Ukrainian research subjects and (2) how that positionality affects the
research findings.
Early discussions of research positionality assumed that the researcher was either
an insider or an outsider to the social community being studied, although there was no
agreement about which position produced more reliable results. More than three decades
ago Roger Merton exposed the absurdity of the idea that one position was better than
another. At the time some Black scholars argued that only a Black person could properly
study Black communities.

Merton said that if it were true in the case of Black

Americans, it would mean that, for example, “only French scholars can understand
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French society and of course, that only Americans, not their external critics, can truly
understand American society” (1972, 13). He also critiqued the opposite view, that
“knowledge about groups, unprejudiced by membership in them, is accessible only to
outsiders” (p. 31).
Contemporary theorists acknowledge that the boundaries between “insider” and
“outsider” are difficult, if not impossible, to identify (Merriam et al. 2001, 415). Any
research, either within or across cultures, presents challenges that arise from gender, race,
class, religion, and other factors.

Ethnographers are commonly urged to carefully

examine their positionality, to situate themselves, their informants, and their research
findings within these larger fields, and to “write this into our research practice”
(McDowell 1999, 409). Michelle Fine recommends that “researchers probe how we are
in relation with the contexts we study and with our informants, understanding that we are
all multiple in those relations” (1994, 72). Of course the exercise is limited by our own
finiteness and fallibility and the complex nature of our social world. As Gillian Rose has
written, “assuming that self and context are, even if in principle only, transparently
understandable seems to me to be demanding an analytical certainty that is as insidious as
the universalizing certainty that so many feminists have critiqued” (1997, 318).
In the case of this research project I found myself both an insider and an outsider
in relation to the Ukrainian Protestants I met. I was accepted as a “believer,” and in some
cases I had personal friends who helped establish connections to specific churches. I was
also seen as an American – with all of the baggage that that entails. I was well off
financially compared to most of the participants. I was a single woman, and most women
my age in Ukrainian Protestant churches are married. I was well-traveled, whereas most
people I interacted with had never left the former Soviet Union, and could only dream
about international travel. I have always lived in a world where freedom of speech,
religion, and assembly has been the norm; until recently Ukrainian Protestants lived in a
world where those freedoms were usually in name only. Even my religious beliefs –
convictions about particular theological points or church practices – were different from
many of the people I interacted with in the churches.
There were times when my research subjects accepted me as one of their own. I
was nearly always asked shortly after initial introductions whether or not I was “a
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believer.” When I said yes, sometimes there were further questions to verify if I really
knew what I was talking about (“what kind of church do you go to?” or “do you have a
believing family?”).

Being identified as a believer helped give me access to

conversations and events that might otherwise have been closed. One young woman at
the Vinnytsia Baptist Church invited me to participate in her weekly small group Bible
study. After a few weeks she came to the place where I was staying one evening without
an invitation. She wanted me to record the story of her own spiritual pilgrimage. At
times in tears, she related how she had come to faith as a young girl against the wishes of
her parents, and she told me about the hardships and difficulties she had faced. This was
not the ‘testimony’ that every good Ukrainian Baptist has prepared as a public narrative
they can give on command for evangelism and exhortation. Instead, this was a story that
would only be told to a trusted listener. Although I was marked as an outsider by my
nationality, bank account balance, and life history, my religious faith helped set the
research subjects at ease with my presence in their communities.
There were other times when my research subjects clearly did not accept me as
one of their own. These moments reinforced the distance between us, and magnified my
identity as Other. One example is when I asked for permission to read the official church
history volume of one of the Baptist case study churches. Word came back that if I
wanted to look at the history book, I would need to explain to the pastor all about my
research – what information I had already found and where, and what I hoped to find in
the future. Then I would need to examine the volume at the church building in the
presence of the pastor or another church officer. The church leaders clearly perceived me
as an outsider and a potential threat to their church; perhaps if I had been more of an
insider I could have read their church history. (I refrained from reading the book on their
terms.)
Another incident further illustrates my outsider status. An elder at the BelgorodDnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church was born and raised in a nearby village. Although
Grigoriy converted to the Presbyterian church from atheism, his village was home to an
unregistered Protestant church (probably Baptist), and he was on friendly terms with
some of the church members. Grigoriy wanted me to come with him to the village to
visit the Baptist church. On a trip home to see his parents, Grigoriy met with church
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members to work out the details. The Baptists refused to meet with me, despite the fact
that Grigoriy told them I was a trustworthy fellow believer. My outsider status prevented
them from allowing the visit and trumped any potential insider benefits.
In the course of the field research I did what I could to avoid complaints against
me as an outsider. For example, I wore culturally appropriate clothes to church – skirts
and dresses only; no pants were permitted in Baptist churches. I refrained from drinking
alcohol. I learned Russian, and even a little Ukrainian. To minimize the appearance of
an economic gulf between us I seldom invited Ukrainian acquaintances to cafés or
restaurants, or even to McDonalds’ for ice cream. I also tried to avoid talking about my
personal purchases or financial habits.

In short, I tried to make the Ukrainians I

interacted with comfortable enough to talk freely despite our differences.
It is important to keep in mind that the pool of participants was in part selfselected. If a person did not like Americans they may not have decided to come to a
focus group – no one was forced to talk to me. Moreover, disaffected people who are
pessimistic about religion or pessimistic about life in general were also self selected out
of the study. If there is a pro-Western bias to the findings it may be because blatantly
anti-American church-goers declined an invitation for an interview or a focus group.
As a final note to this methodological chapter: while the names of the cities and
denominations mentioned in this dissertation are true, I have changed the names of all
research participants to protect their privacy. No last names are used, even of pastors or
other church leaders, and the specific name of each Baptist church has been generalized
to become the “Central Baptist Church.”

Copyright © 2005 Esther Grace Long
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Chapter Four: A history of Ukrainian evangelical churches before 1991
4.1 Introduction
Ukrainian evangelicalism was born in the steppe region of southern Ukraine when
the area belonged to the Russian empire. This chapter traces the history of Ukrainian
evangelical churches from the late tsarist period until the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. From their inception, these churches were shaped by state policies and resistance
to those policies. Throughout the decades of the Soviet regime, Ukrainian believers
endured the same political tumult as secular society, and they also faced persecution
aimed at them as religious enemies of the state. Even today, social life in Protestant
churches with pre-1991 roots reflects their history as relatively closed and persecuted
communities. Half of the churches examined in this dissertation are direct descendants of
the first Ukrainian evangelical groups examined in this chapter. The other four were part
of a large wave of new post-Soviet churches that will be considered in Chapter Five.
As explained previously, the fact that Ukrainian regions are a common feature of
contemporary Ukrainian discourse is a foundational assumption in my research design.
Here I show how the regionalism of today was born in the Ukraine of the past – how
current differences between areas around L’viv and other parts of the country have
developed out of the regions’ dissimilar historical backgrounds. Ukrainian regional
variations result from the distinct geopolitical trajectories of the different parts of the
country.

4.2 Nineteenth century foundations of Ukrainian Baptist churches
In the 1860s the Ukrainian Baptist movement was forming in rural areas of what
later became southern Ukraine.

Although Ukrainian peasants had recently been

emancipated from serfdom, they continued to work in menial agricultural occupations.
Some villages of the region were inhabited by German speakers – Mennonites who had
settled the area in the eighteenth century and had brought their Anabaptist version of
Christianity with them (Latourette 1941, 142). Most others, peasants and nobility alike,
practiced Orthodox Christianity. There was also a sizable Jewish minority. A few
Mennonites began giving Bible lessons (or the German Bibelstunden, Bible hours) to the
newly freed peasants who worked for them. Some of the peasants organized themselves
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into what they called Stundist churches.

This coincided with the rise of popular

education and literacy among Ukraine’s peasants, enabling them to read the first Bible
portions ever distributed into the Russian language in the 1860s. The first complete Bible
translated in Russian was not released until 1876 (Blane 1977, 389; Kolarz 1961, 283;
Sawatsky 1993, 320). Although parts of the Gospels were translated into Ukrainian in
1842 and 1862, the Pentateuch was published in L’viv in 1869, and the New Testament
in 1871, the entire Ukrainian Bible was not published until 1903. It was published in
Vienna, and not available to churches inside the Russian Empire at that time because of
opposition from the Russian Orthodox Church. 14
The first documented Ukrainian convert to the Mennonites’ faith was Fyodor
Onishchenko, an itinerant farm laborer from the village of Osnova, near Odessa, who was
working in the Nikolaev area, also in southern Ukraine. He converted in 1857 or 1858
and returned home, telling his friends and neighbors about his newfound faith. His
neighbor Mikhailo Ratushny was converted in 1860, and the two men were instrumental
in the early decades of Ukrainian Baptist churches. By 1861 a small church was formed
in Osnova with Ratushny as the preacher.

The church had 20 members by 1865,

including several from nearby villages. Two years later they had 300 adherents and
churches in three villages. Similar processes were at work in other villages, also by way
of contact with German Protestant settlers (Rowe 1994, 15-17).
At first the Stundists maintained connection with the Orthodox church, going to
the priest for marriages, funerals, and baptisms, services for which they had to pay. The
new religion was attractive in part because it was understandable (in their native
language, not the archaic ecclesiastical language, Old Church Slavonic) and did not
require the services of a priest, a representative of the established order which had
oppressed them as serfs. As they sought to free themselves from the priests, the priests
would call upon the police to harrass the Stundists, and persecution began. The Stundists
decided to separate from the Orthodox Church in 1870. In May of that year the Stundists
in the village of Osnova (home of Onishchenko and Ratushny) brought their icons to the

14

See the chapter on the “Bible” in the Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, a project of the Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies, http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com. Last accessed February 14, 2005.
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priest to publicly separate themselves from the parish, and to avoid accusations that they
were not properly respecting the icons (Rowe 1994, 17).
Another early Stundist, and a man who brought the Stundist movement closer to
the Baptist church than the Mennonites had been, was a blacksmith from the village of
Lyubomirka, near Yelizavetgrad, north of Odessa. Ivan Ryaboshapka came to faith
through discussions with his boss, a German Mennonite farmer. He acquired a New
Testament, began reading it to his neighbors, and his mill eventually served as a Christian
meeting place (Rowe 1994, 17). He became convinced of the necessity of believers’
baptism (as opposed to infant baptism). This same belief was spreading to the German
settlement of Alt-Danzig in 1864.

Thirty Germans from Alt-Danzig, along with

Ukrainian convert Yefim Tsymbal from the village of Karlovka, were baptised in 1869.
Tsymbal baptized Ryaboshapka in 1870, who in turn baptized Ratushny in 1871 (p. 18).
In this way the Stundist movement separated even further from the Orthodox church. 15
From 1884 there was a campaign to get village assemblies to declare the exile of
Stundists, and between 1889 and 1891 six Stundist leaders were sent into exile for five
years in Giryusy, a place where the soil was very poor and livelihoods were difficult to
maintain (Rowe 1994, 33). Thirty families were still living in exile in 1895 and 1901 (p.
38). Evangelicals faced measures such as fines and community labor as punishment for
holding prayer meetings and Bible studies. In 1885 some of the movement’s leaders
(including Ratushny and Ryaboshapka) had their movements monitored and were
confined to their home villages. Some stonings and violent mob acts against evangelicals
were reported in 1886 (p. 33).
By 1881 there were 1000 Baptists reported living in Kherson, Yekaterinslav and
Kyiv provinces.

The churches grew rapidly.

In May of 1882 three thousand

Stundists/Baptists lived in Kherson. By 1884 there were more than 2000 members of
Ukrainian Baptist churches, and by 1893 there were more than 4500 Ukrainian Baptist
members, plus children (Rowe 1994, 35). One of the churches in this study – Kherson
Central Baptist – is the oldest Baptist church in the city and a direct descendent of the

15

The Orthodox church baptizes infant children of church members, a practice rejected by Baptists, who
endorse adult believer’s baptism only.
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Baptists that were in Kherson in the nineteenth century. The Baptist community in
Kherson is among the oldest in the former Soviet Union.
The distinction between Stundists and Baptists is vague. Some churches that
began as Stundist eventually became known as Baptist; others called themselves
Evangelical, which was evidently a less strict group than the Baptists. Baptist churches
were organized into the Union of Russian Baptists (formed in Ukraine in 1884) under
founding president Johann Wieler. Wieler was exiled in 1886 to Romania (Rowe 1994,
38). The Baptist Union aligned Ukrainian congregations with the strict Baptist tradition,
meaning that communion was closed, and membership was only granted by adult
Baptism by faith, two tenets that have remained characteristics of Ukrainian Baptist
churches into the twenty-first century.

Near Kyiv the Stundists called themselves

“evangelical brotherhoods” and were independent congregations, without an association
(p. 39). 16
Baptist activity was largely illegal for 21 years until religious toleration was
proclaimed after the Revolution of 1905 (Kolarz 1961, 285). In 1894 an earlier (1883)
religion law began being interpreted more strictly. It was declared that the Stundists were
among “the most harmful non-Orthodox denominations” and they were banned from
holding worship services (Rowe 1994, 39). Many leaders were exiled, exiles were
extended for those already in exile, and some children were forcibly taken from
evangelical families to be raised in monasteries or by Orthodox families (p. 40). In 1894
the Bible society was banned from distributing Bibles in southern Ukraine (p. 41).
Restrictions against Protestant religious expression were not uniform. The Baptist
Union was permitted to hold its first conference in 1891, and church leaders also invited
representatives from Evangelical Christian congregations. Later conferences, also with
Evangelicals, were held in 1902, 1903, and 1904. Some of the Evangelicals asked to join
the conference, while keeping the Evangelical name. That was approved and in 1903 the
denomination became the Evangelical Christian-Baptists (p. 43). Other Evangelicals
decided to form their own denomination, and after a series of congresses approved the
All-Russian Evangelical Christian Union in St. Petersburg in 1911 (Rowe 1994, 54).

16

Congregations formed mostly of aristocrats in St. Petersburg called themselves “Believers of Evangelical
Faith” or “Evangelical Christians” by the 1890s (Rowe 1994, 38).
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Baptists and Evangelicals shared many tenets of the Baptist version of
Christianity, such as believer baptism by immersion.

However, one area of

differentiation was in church governance. Baptists used a congregational structure with a
clearly defined leadership of ordained ministers, while Evangelicals had Brethren roots,
thus rejecting the idea of an ordained minister. Instead they elected leaders out of the
congregation, although this changed over time. One of their pastors, Ivan Prokhanov,
was ordained to ministry in 1924 (Rowe 1994, 89).
The Baptist movement continued to grow in the early twentieth century. New
churches were opened. One of these was a mission church in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy,
begun near the turn of the century through the work of missionaries from nearby Odessa.
It was registered as an official church in 1908, and is one of the four Baptist
congregations examined in this dissertation.
Although foreigners were instrumental in introducing Protestant Christianity to
Ukraine both through the German settlers and active missionaries from other countries, 17
several authors have stressed that the Protestant churches in Ukraine should be
considered indigenous, or at least “naturalized and nationalized” (Blane 1977; Kolarz
1961, 245).

By 1897, 4.85 percent of the population of the Russian Empire was

Protestant (Latourette 1941, 142), and the Protestant population was especially
pronounced in Ukraine.

4.3 The political and social setting circa 1900
As seen above, Ukrainian evangelicalism began in what is now southern Ukraine,
but by 1900 had spread to central Ukraine (Kyiv) and parts of what is now Russia. To
complement the ecclesiastical history, we need to understand it in the context of the
political, economic, and social setting of the day. The largest denomination in Ukraine
today, the Evangelical Christians-Baptists, covers a territory that was held by separate
countries at the turn of the twentieth century. Parts of what is now western Ukraine had
17

Protestant organizations active in the Russian empire during the nineteenth century up until 1914 include
the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Evangelical Alliance, the Berlin Bible School, the Plymouth
Brethren, Evangelical Christians of Sweden (several denominations), the (British) Evangelical Continental
Society, American Methodists, the London Missionary Society, the Continental Mission of the Sunday
School Union, the Society of Friends, the Young Men’s Christian Association, the World’s Student
Christian Federation, the Deutsche Orient Mission and the American Bible Society (Latourette 1941, 143).
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been part of the Habsburg Empire ruled in Vienna since the 18th century, and before that
had been part of Poland, Austria, or Hungary. Eastern Ukraine (called the Left Bank) and
central Ukraine (called the Right Bank, in relation to the Dnieper River) was part of the
Russian empire. The Right Bank had been part of Poland until conquered by Russia in
1793; the Left Bank had been under the authority of Moscow since the Pereiaslav
Agreement of 1654, when the Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky placed Ukraine
under Moscow’s protection (and not the protection of either Poland or the Ottoman
Empire, the two other choices). Southern Ukraine had belonged to the Ottoman Empire
until the 18th century, when it was claimed by Russia.

These diverse histories set

Western and Eastern Ukraine onto quite different trajectories that would extend well into
the twentieth century, and their effects are still felt today, after the unification of
Ukrainian territory into an independent Ukrainian state. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, the differences between Eastern and Western Ukraine were dramatic, and could
be observed in terms of demography, religion, economy, and the character of the
Ukrainian nationalist movement. 18
In Western Ukraine, peasants were mostly Ukrainian, townsmen were primarily
Jewish and Polish, and bureaucrats of the Habsburg Empire were largely Germans or
German-speaking Czechs. The landowners and nobility were Polish, since Galicia and
Volhynia had been part of the Polish Commonwealth before being annexed into the
Habsburg Empire.

Most Ukrainians in this region belonged to the Greek Catholic, or

Uniate, Church. The church used Orthodox worship forms but fell under the authority of
the Roman pope. The Church had been formed in 1596 at the Union of Brest when four
Orthodox bishops wanted to unite (thus the name, Uniate) with the Catholic Church for
pragmatic reasons. The Uniate Church was not widely accepted in the region until the
seventeenth century (Himka 1990, 53). Most Poles and Germans were Roman Catholic,
and Protestantism also had a presence in Galicia and Volhynia. 19 In Transcarpathia, the

18

For an excellent explanation of the territorial formation of Ukraine from the beginning, see “Ukraine,
from imperial periphery to a sovereign state,” in (Szporluk 2000).
19
At the time of the Protestant Reformation, 25-30% of the Polish nobility in these regions became
Calvinist, although that was largely suppressed during the Counter Reformation (Subtelny 1994, 94). I
have not found any statistics about the extent of Protestantism in nineteenth-century Western Ukraine,
although Baptist and Reformed Churches were active in the area.
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Hungarian Reformed Church was quite strong among the ethnic Hungarians, and remains
strong into the twenty-first century.
Economically, Western Ukraine at the dawn of the twentieth century could be
considered a colony of the Habsburg Empire, providing food and low-cost labor for
wealthier parts of the empire. The peasants, while officially free (serfdom was abolished
gradually since the end of the 18th century), were quite poor. Galicia was considered one
of the poorest areas of the Habsburg Empire, with high population growth, low economic
growth, and a very small (almost nonexistent) industrial sector.

Most Ukrainian

immigrants to the United States prior to 1914 came from Galicia and Transcarpathia to
escape the dire poverty found there (Nahaylo 1999, 8).
In terms of a Ukrainian nationalist movement, Western Ukraine at this time was
considered by some “a bastion of Ukrainianism” (Subtelny 1994, 307). The Austrian
government allowed Ukrainians to form cultural and political societies, elect Ukrainians
to a parliament, publish Ukrainian-language books and newspapers, and educate their
children using the Ukrainian language. Officially, however, the region was becoming
even more Polonized than it had been in the past. Polish nationalism was on the rise,
Polish language and culture came increasingly to the fore (an example of this is that
Polish replaced German as the language of instruction at L’viv University in 1867), and
the Polish population increased. In 1910, 58 percent of the population of Galicia was
Polish and 40 percent was Ukrainian (even though the Ukrainian population had been
over 50 percent in 1849). The Poles continued to own most of the land and were
considered the most important part of the region’s population by the Habsburg state (p.
308).
At about this time Poles were instrumental in founding what eventually became
one of the churches in this study – Central Baptist Church in L’viv. A Polish Baptist
evangelist named Ivan Petrash moved to L’viv in 1920 or 1921. He worked with an
American missionary named Julia Savage and they founded the first Baptist church in the
city, a mixed congregation of Poles and Ukrainians. The church operated under the
authority of the Slavic Baptist Alliance in Warsaw. 20 Later in the twentieth century the
two ethnic groups separated into different churches.
20

This church history was related by the church pastor in an April 4, 2003 interview.
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The rest of Ukraine, meanwhile, belonged to the Russian Empire. The Russian
tsar and the Russian people commonly considered Ukraine an integral part of Russia
itself. In terms of ethnicity, most Ukrainians were peasants, although there was some
Ukrainian nobility. Most urbanites were Russian or Jewish. In Odessa, for example,
45.5 percent of the population were Russian in 1897; 34.7 percent were Jewish; 9.4
percent were Ukrainian; and 4.3 percent were Polish; with smaller amounts of Germans,
Greeks, and Armenians (Weinberg 1993, 11). Overall in imperial Ukraine, about onethird of urban dwellers were Ukrainian, and 11.7 percent of the population of the region
was Russian (Subtelny 1994, 274). Poles were economically dominant on the Right
Bank; Jews made up 8 percent of the population (12.6 percent on the Right Bank) (p.
276). Small portions of the population were descendents of settlers (mostly German)
invited to Ukraine by Catherine the Great in the 18th century, and among these were the
Mennonites who introduced Ukrainian peasants to evangelical Christianity.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was the dominant religion of Russian-ruled
Ukraine, and was under the authority of the Moscow Patriarch, which had effectively
been an arm of the Russian state since the eighteenth century. Of course, the Jewish
minority practiced the Jewish faith, and there were small numbers of Roman Catholics
and Greek Catholics. Protestantism also had a strong foothold here, both within foreign
communities and among Ukrainians.
The economy of Ukraine under Imperial Russia was in some respects better than
the economy of Galicia and the rest of Western Ukraine. Russian-ruled Ukraine was
considered the granary of Europe, and mines had been established in the Donbas (for
coal) and in Kryvyi Rih (for iron ore), although industrialization was limited. Odessa
was a bustling seaport and attracted Jewish and Ukrainian peasant migrants in large
numbers in the early 20th century (Weinberg 1993, 8). However, Ukrainian peasants
were very poor, having only been recently released from serfdom. By 1914, two million
Ukrainian peasants had migrated to the Russian Far East to work as laborers, many for
the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Others were moving into Ukraine’s
urban areas (Subtelny 1994, 262).
Ukrainian nationalism was weak in this part of Ukraine. Ukrainian language
books and plays, Ukrainian education, and Ukrainian nationalist organizations had been
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banned since the 1870s, because the Russian government viewed nationalist activities as
Polish interference (Szporluk 2000, 380). The government made some concessions to the
nationalists after the Revolution of 1905. Most revolutionary groups were based on class
(working against the economic oppression of the peasants, for example), not nationality.
As Bohdan Nahaylo writes, the Ukrainian nationalist movement was weak when the
Russian Empire collapsed:
Deprived of schools in their own native language, of knowledge about their own
history, and of their own cultural and religious institutions, many Ukrainians had
come to regard themselves as malorusy or Little Russians, in other words as a
regional offshoot of the ‘Great Russian’ people (Nahaylo 1999, 8).
As we have seen, at the beginning of the twentieth century Ukraine was far from a
unified territory in any sense. Ukrainian lands were governed by two different empires,
populated by people who practiced different religions, were educated in different
languages, were dominated by people of different ethnicities (Polish and Russian), and
were aware of themselves as ethnically Ukrainian to different degrees. This divided
history would persist throughout the years of Revolution and the First World War,
although attempts were made to unite them. Ukrainians would remain politically divided
until 1939, and the regional differences never disappeared.

4.4 Protestants after the Revolution
Europe, and Ukraine, plunged into the First World War in 1914; the Russian tsar
fell in March 1917. Western Ukraine was scene to some of the bloodiest battles of the
war, and Ukrainian territory shifted between Austrian and Russian occupation.
Meanwhile, efforts were being made to establish an independent Ukrainian state both in
Western Ukraine (one Ukrainian state was formed) and in the areas of Ukraine that had
been ruled by Moscow (three Ukrainian states were formed). The three Ukrainian states
formed in Central and Eastern Ukraine between 1917 and 1920 all failed, and eventually
succumbed to the Bolsheviks, providing the way for Ukraine to become part of the Soviet
Union. Western Ukraine was attached to Poland, as decided by the European powers at
the Treaty of Paris in 1918.
From the time of the Revolution through 1929, Protestantism grew rapidly in
Ukraine. Bolsheviks viewed the Orthodox church as a remnant of tsarist Russia, and for
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a few years supported Protestantism as a way of weakening Orthodoxy. Protestants were
living in a small window of religious freedom. Moreover, initially government officials
were too busy fighting wars and bringing about revolution to take interest in religious
affairs. The 1920s has been called a “golden age” for Soviet evangelicals. As they grew,
they expanded religious publishing and established seminaries and Bible schools. They
conducted missionary work and evangelism without fear of reprisals from the state. In
the Russian empire there were 105,000 adult members of Baptist and Evangelical
Churches reported in 1905. By 1920 the number had grown to 350,000; by 1929 it had
risen to 500,000. Including children and other non-baptized churchgoers, there were
approximately three million Baptist and Evangelical adherents in the Soviet Union on the
eve of Soviet religious crackdowns (Sawatsky 1993). Of these, a large number were
found in Ukraine, since Ukraine was the strongest center of the Baptist-Evangelical faith
in the Soviet Union.

Rowe estimates that there were about one million full church

members in Baptist, Evangelical and Pentecostal churches in 1927, five times the number
that existed ten years previously (Rowe 1994, 91).
Other Protestant groups besides the Evangelicals and Baptists also found the
1920s to be a period of rapid growth. These included Pentecostals and Seventh Day
Adventists. Ivan Voronayev, a former Baptist from Siberia, converted to Pentecostalism
when he emigrated to the United States. He traveled to the Soviet Union as a missionary
in 1921, founding a Pentecostal church in Odessa called “Christians of Evangelical Faith”
(Rowe 1994, 88). Through those who became Pentecostals under him a pattern emerged
of new Pentecostal congregations being formed from people who came out of existing
Baptist and Evangelical churches (p. 89). The Pentecostal movement spread across the
Soviet Union, but was concentrated in Ukraine. The German Mennonites and Lutherans,
however, declined rapidly during the post-Revolution years because of outmigration to
North and South America. 21

21

About 100,000 Mennonites emigrated from the Soviet Union by 1929; even more German Lutherans
emigrated. There had been 1.35 million Lutherans in the Soviet Union in 1923 (one million of them were
Germans); by 1926 only 900,000 remained (540,000 of them were Germans) (Sawatsky 1993, 321-322).
Mennonites had been prominent in Ukraine, Lutherans had not.
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4.5 The decline of organized religious life during the 1930s
During the 1930s, Soviet Ukraine faced the horrors of Stalinism, including forced
agricultural collectivization, liquidation of the kulaks (the supposedly rich peasants), the
imposition of high grain quotas to provide food for Russia and urban dwellers, massive
famine (3-6 million deaths), and the Great Terror, when all people who supposedly posed
a threat to the Soviet Union were executed or sent to labor camps. Ukraine was also
rapidly industrialized and urbanized. Churches and the clergy were hit especially hard.
By the Second World War, fewer than twelve Orthodox parishes were operating in all of
Ukraine. In Kyiv alone, which had boasted 1,435 priests and 1,600 churches before the
revolution in 1917, only two churches were operating (with only three priests) when
Germans occupied the city in 1941 (Davis 1995, 12). In the USSR as a whole, 80,000
Orthodox priests, monks, and nuns were killed by the late 1930s (p. 11). These figures
do not take into consideration the loss of large numbers of non-Orthodox churches and
clergy, including Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and Jews.
One estimate of the number of Protestants sentenced to Siberian camps, usually not to
return, is 22,000 (Rowe 1994). Many church buildings, including prominent cathedrals in
nearly every city, were destroyed. Others were converted to non-religious uses such as
storage buildings and theaters.
Mennonite settlements were destroyed during the period of dekulakization and
collectivization; many of the ethnic Germans were exiled to the Russian Far east.
Between 1929 and 1939, the number of Protestant evangelicals declined in the Soviet
Union to one-fifth of their previous number. High taxes were demanded of churches;
clergy were arrested; contact with believers abroad was limited and finally severed
completely in 1935; the Baptist Union ceased to exist by 1935, at which time all
Protestant leaders were in prison or killed; the Lutheran church collapsed in 1937-38; the
Mennonite church also collapsed at that time; the National Council of Evangelical
Christians was disbanded in 1930; the Pentecostal Union was banned (Rowe 1994, 100;
Sawatsky 1993, 322). The Soviet government “uncovered” espionage cases against
Baptists who they accused of working for Poland. There were other instances of Baptists
convicted of organizing mining or other industrial accidents (Kolarz 1961, 303).
Ukrainian Protestants were left with no pastors, few places to worship, and little
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communication with each other, let alone believers in other parts of the world. By 1931
at most ten evangelical churches in Ukraine remained open (Rowe 1994, 99). Bibles
were printed in 1928 for the last time in the Soviet Union until 1956 (p. 95). The
evangelical church of the 1930s Soviet Union became largely invisible, meeting in small
groups in private homes.
The greatest tragedy of the 1930s was the Great Famine of 1932-33, “the result of
a reckless collectivization and dekulakization policy and an even more reckless exporting
of grain in 1930-31 to acquire hard currency, combined with a mediocre harvest” (Martin
2002). 22 Since the decision was made to spare urban populations the brunt of the famine
at the expense of those in the grain-growing regions, and because Ukrainian evangelicals
were predominantly a rural, peasant population, they suffered severely at the time. The
loss of church members to hunger contributed to the decline of Ukrainian Protestant
churches during that decade.
One unplanned outcome of the events of the 1930s is that the divide between
Ukrainians in Poland and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union increased. The famine, the
purges, and all of the horrors of the 1930s meant that Soviet Ukrainians entered the era of
World War II after enduring a decade of terror that their Western cousins had escaped.
Western Ukraine was never part of the Russian Empire and had not been through the
Russian Revolution or its tumultuous aftermath of agricultural collectivization, purges,
and religious persecution.

Western Ukraine had a much more robust nationalist

movement, a longer history of nationalist institutions, and would have a much shorter
acquaintance under the Soviet regime than the rest of Ukraine.

These important

differences would persist throughout the rest of the twentieth century and into the era of
the independent post-Soviet Ukrainian state.
While Soviet Ukraine suffered through the 1930s, Western Ukraine – the Polish
provinces of Volhynia and East Galicia – remained a cultural battleground between Poles
and Ukrainians. The Polish government pursued a policy of confrontation with the
Ukrainians, bringing in Polish settlers after the First World War. The Greek Catholic
Church remained strong, and the Ukrainian nationalist movement gained momentum.
One of Western Ukraine’s Protestant organizations was the Ukrainian Evangelical
22

For a more nuanced explanation see (Martin 2001).
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Reformed Church, which had about thirty congregations and fifteen pastors operating in
Galicia in 1939. The Ukrainian nationalist spirit had evidently infused this body of
believers, who desired to be a nationalist church. They claimed Ukrainians of the past as
direct antecedents to their movement, including the philosopher Skovoroda (1722-1794)
and poets Ivan Franko (1856-1916) and Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), who once wrote
a poem memorializing the Czech Protestant reformer Jan Hus (Kolarz 1961, 272-273). A
few of these Reformed congregations survive in Western Ukraine to the present day.

4.6 The Second World War and the reshaping of Soviet Protestantism
The war changed the territorial makeup of Ukraine when Stalin moved West into
Poland.

The economy of the new lands annexed by the Soviets in 1939 was

predominantly agricultural, the Greek Catholic Church was pervasive, and the Ukrainian
nationalist movement was strong. The Soviet Union immediately added the Western
Ukrainian territories to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, sending in scores of
Soviet administrators, teachers, journalists and other workers to enable the transition.
They also began the process of agricultural collectivization in the newly annexed
territory. Church lands were confiscated, religious education in schools was banned, and
massive repressions were conducted against possible enemies of the state. These enemies
included 1.2 million Poles and 400,000 Ukrainians who were subsequently deported to
the Far East (Subtelny 1994, 456). The Sovietization of Western Ukraine was interrupted
by World War II. For a time nearly all of Ukraine became a German colony when the
Germans invaded the Soviet Union during the Second World War. 23 When the Soviets
recovered and sent the Germans into retreat (1943-44) they continued processes of
political and economic consolidation that had begun earlier.

Ukraine’s border was

established just west of L’viv, where it remains today.
The Ukrainian people, and especially Ukrainian Jews, suffered enormously during
the war years. Ukraine lost 5.3 million people during the war, and many more in the
war’s aftermath. This represents perhaps one in every six people who had been living in
Ukrainian territory (Subtelny 1994, 479). During the war Soviets exiled Poles, Crimean
Tatars, ethnic Germans (including Mennonites), and others to the Far East and Central
23

Portions of southern Ukraine were occupied by Romanian Nazis.
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Asia. After the war ended many of those suspected of collaborating with the Nazis were
killed, including former prisoners of war. The Soviet government also liquidated the
Greek Catholic Church 24 and implemented collectivization in Western Ukraine.
The long term significance of this period for Ukraine was the annexation of areas
that had been attached to Poland or Austria-Hungary since the 14th century. It also
permanently annexed Bukovyna from Romania and added to Ukraine Southern
Bessarabia, an area southwest of Odessa along the Black Sea coast that had previously
belonged to Russia and that included the city of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (another of this
project’s research locations).
In terms of the Protestant churches of Ukraine, the World War II era was
important for several reasons. First, churches under German occupation experienced a
brief moment of religious freedom and had time to recover from the purges of the 1930s.
Second, during the last years of the war the Soviets thawed towards religion in general,
perhaps because they realized that their suffering people needed a morale boost that the
church could provide (and thus help the country defeat the enemy). In October 1944,
Evangelical Christians and Baptists were encouraged to convene a conference in
Moscow; church leaders were released from prison to attend. They organized the AllUnion Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (ECB), an umbrella denomination under
which all evangelical groups were expected to register. In post-Soviet Ukraine a version
of that 1944 group remains the largest and most influential Protestant denomination.
Following that agreement, other smaller denominations joined the ECB; otherwise they
would not have been permitted to function as legal religious organizations in the Soviet
Union.

Of these the largest group was the Pentecostal movement.

In 1946 four

Pentecostal leaders met with ECB officials to draft an agreement whereby they could join
the denomination. In order to satisfy the Baptists, the Pentecostals agreed to refrain from
speaking in tongues and footwashing in public worship.

About 40 percent of

Pentecostals in the Soviet Union went along with that agreement and joined the ECB; the
rest went underground. The merger was evidently rocky: one person wrote that “there
wasn’t even a honeymoon period” (Durasoff, 1972 #763, 28, cited in Teraudkalns 1999,
227). The Christians in the Apostolic Spirit (the oldest Pentecostal denomination) and
24

See especially (Bociurkiw 1987).
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the Temperance Christians joined the ECB in 1947; Baptists in the Baltics and Western
Ukraine and Belorussia (new additions to the Soviet Union), also joined, as did about 70
Churches of Christ, in Ukraine. The Free Christians (Brethren) in Transcarpathia joined
in 1946. Methodists could not join, because they did not believe in adult-only Baptism.
In Latvia and Western Ukraine most Methodist church members were baptized and
joined a Baptist church (Rowe 1994, 117). The ECB was able to actively register
congregations until 1949; it also tried to provide Bibles and other Christian literature for
church members. The leadership was under considerable pressure from the state and
from congregations, and was accused of being “entrenched” and “authoritarian” (Rowe
1994, 116; Sawatsky 1992, 323-324). Some congregations chose to remain independent,
and operated underground until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

4.7 Post-war to Perestroika evangelicalism
The immediate post-war years were spent rebuilding Ukraine as an integral part of
the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Ukraine was purged (half of the party
leadership was replaced) and new members were incorporated into the rank and file.
Stalin died in 1953, and the Soviet government in Ukraine was immediately realigned.
The decision was made to strengthen the Communist Party in Western Ukraine and
recruit local party officials, instead of continuing to send in loyal outsiders from other
parts of the Soviet Union.
According to scholar Andrew Wilson, during the postwar years the processes of
Russification and Sovietization had a great impact on the population of Ukraine,
especially in the east and south, where urban areas aligned with “the official SovietRussian hybrid identity” (Wilson 2000, 148), and education was predominantly in
Russian.

In parts of Western Ukraine, however, Wilson reports that 90 percent of

children were educated in Ukrainian in 1989.
Economically, the postwar decades brought relative prosperity to Ukraine when
compared to the difficult years of the past. Politically, Ukraine was stable, thanks in part
to an active government that arrested political and religious dissidents. In the 1960s and
1970s up to 1,000 Ukrainian nationalist activists, most of them from L’viv or Kyiv, were
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held in Russian prisons. About half of all political prisoners in Russia at the time were
Ukrainian (Wilson 2000, 153).
During Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’ following the death of Stalin, many Christian
prisoners were released from the gulag and evangelical churches grew. At that time
problems within the ECB between Pentecostals and Baptists surfaced, and more
Pentecostals withdrew from the Union, forming unregistered churches. Even some nonPentecostal churches had trouble registering with the ECB, and so remained independent
(Rowe 1994, 132).
Khrushchev ended his thaw and implemented an anti-religious campaign between
1959 and 1961, banning unregistered churches, regulating all religious services, and
arresting various church leaders. By 1962, ninety-four evangelical activists (from the
entire USSR) were in prison (Sawatsky 1993, 325). Baptists reported that there were 200
imprisonments during the campaign, and Rowe has counted even more trials of Protestant
Christians from news accounts (Sawatsky 1994, 142). From 1959 to 1964 about half of
all registered churches were closed (including Orthodox).

Most monasteries and

convents were closed, and five of eight Orthodox seminaries were closed. In June 1961
the Komsomol newspaper announced that 500 places of worship had been closed in two
regions, and Baptists reported that 300 of their Soviet churches were closed in the first six
months that year. Included among them were almost all of the village congregations in
Kherson and Nikolaev, the historical heartland of the Ukrainian Baptist movement, and a
region that plays prominently in this dissertation (Sawatsky 1994, 138).
During this time of persecution the ECB leadership was torn between wanting to
faithfully administer a large Christian denomination and wanting to please the Soviet
government out of fear that their Christian work could be terminated completely. Many
pastors and church members within the ECB felt that their denominational leaders were
too concerned with following government rules and not concerned enough with carrying
on the life of the church. However, the fears of the leaders were not unfounded: in 1960
the national council of the Seventh Day Adventists was disbanded after refusing to
submit to the government (Rowe 1994, 139).
A reform movement grew within the ECB, but after failing to achieve their goals
of bringing about change within the denomination, in 1965 a group formed their own
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association, the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists.

Ukrainian

Georgi Vins was the most prominent member of this group. The reformers were upset
by, among other things, the decision of the ECB leadership that government rules
forbidding children to attend public worship be followed. The KGB is said to have told
Vins that “Children and young people belong to the government, not to you” (Rowe
1994, 146). The services of the unregistered groups were under constant surveillance.
Government agents would visit churches and report the names of children attending to
school officials. Some children were even removed from their homes to be raised by the
state (Sawatsky 1993, 326). Vins was arrested in 1974 (already having previously spent
several years in prison), exiled to the United States, and spent the rest of his life raising
awareness in the West of the conditions faced by Soviet Protestant believers.
Although maintaining churches continued to be difficult for unregistered groups,
during the 1970s and early 1980s the situation stabilized for registered congregations.
Leaders of the ECB became increasingly successful in bargaining for concessions with
their government handlers, arguing that otherwise more people would move to the
unregistered churches. During this time Christians in unregistered congregations became
a “shield” for the entire evangelical community, “bearing the brunt of the atheist attack
for twenty years until the advent of glasnost and perestroika” (Rowe 1994, 185).
By the mid 1980s Ukraine and the Soviet Union was beginning to change under
the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev.

He addressed deep problems of economic

stagnation through what he called perestroika, or restructuring. Economic restructuring
was carried out alongside a program of openness: political prisoners were released, free
speech rights were advanced, and in 1988 the Soviet government officially celebrated the
first millennium of Christianity in Russia. The occasion marked the end of religious
repression in the USSR. Protestants were allowed to print or import 100,000 Russian
language Bibles and 100,000 Ukrainian language Bibles, which had chronically been in
short supply (Sawatsky 1993, 333).
The denominational organization of Protestant churches in the Soviet Union
changed. In 1990, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Evangelical
Christians-Baptists declared themselves a union of national Baptist associations, although
they did not completely federalize until 1992 when Baptist associations in the newly
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independent states organized national unions (only Estonia and Latvia had done so in
1990). The denomination’s president and other officers were elected without government
interference (Rowe 1994, 223). At about the same time (1989), Pentecostals withdrew
from the ECB and joined with other Pentecostals to form an independent Pentecostal
Union. Others who left the ECB included ethnic Germans emigrating to the West (this
was especially so in Kazakhstan, which lost one thousand German Baptist families by
1990), and Ukrainians who emigrated to various Western countries.

Unregistered

Baptists in Ukraine formed the Fraternal Council of ECB Independent Churches of the
Southern Region, and were granted government registration in 1989 (224). The Council
of Churches (the reformers mentioned earlier) met openly in 1989. One of its leaders had
been living in hiding for twenty years (225).

4.8 Conclusion
At the close of the Soviet period, Ukrainian evangelicals had no idea that they
would soon enter a period of religious freedom, openness to the West, and rapid growth.
Instead, they were a tired group of people – scarred by decades operating within an antireligious state. Thousands of Ukrainian believers had endured prison or worse, and all
church members were in survival mode. They thought little about open evangelization
campaigns or mission work, and instead were focused on meeting the spiritual needs of
church members and their children. Communities were essentially closed systems, with
few new converts who were willing to join such a stigmatized group. Evangelical
churches were marked by strict rules of behavior and dress, and churches were ruled by
hierarchical systems of church government.
We also see that the Ukraine in which these long-suffering evangelicals lived was
a country with a varied regional history. Among other things, this meant that religious
life in western parts of the country was arguably more vibrant than elsewhere, perhaps
because the strict religious policies of the Soviet Union had only been in effect there
since the end of the Second World War. Despite the decades of religious persecution,
Ukraine remained the Bible belt of the Soviet Union, and was poised to become the
former Soviet state most known for religious tolerance, religious diversity, and religious
growth.
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Chapter Five: Ukraine’s evangelical churches after independence
5.1 Introduction
This chapter picks up where the previous one left off – at Ukraine’s independence
in 1991. At that time the existing evangelical churches faced a completely new set of
circumstances that opened them up to interaction with believers overseas and provided
them with the money and the free atmosphere in which to make changes in church life.
Simultaneously a new set of evangelical churches came on the scene. These were
founded on Western models by (mostly) American missionaries using (mostly) American
money. When Ukraine declared its independence from Russia in 1991, nearly every
aspect of social life changed. Religious life was particularly affected, as formerly strict
religious policies loosened to allow freedom of religion and the presence of foreign
missionaries on Ukrainian soil. This chapter examines the growth of evangelicalism in
post-Soviet Ukraine, a growth that occurred both in traditional Ukrainian churches which
outlasted the Soviet regime and in new churches founded primarily by foreign
missionaries and their recent Ukrainian converts. The following two chapters analyze
four traditional Baptist churches and four new churches and their members’ views
towards Ukrainian regionalism, nationalism, and the West. Here I will provide the
backdrop for that discussion, documenting the growth of evangelical churches in
Ukraine, explaining the place of transnational activity in those churches, and describing
congregational life in three of the case study churches.

5.2 Growth of religious organizations in Ukraine
Of special importance for processes of religious transformation in Ukraine is a
background of religious diversity that sets it apart from other post-Soviet republics. Both
Belarus and Russia are dominated by the Russian Orthodox Church.

In Ukraine,

however, there are three Orthodox churches that have not been able to come to agreement
for a merger. As a result, there is no one church for the state to support. Complicating
matters, Ukraine also has a large Catholic minority. The country has been called a
“model of religious pluralism among formerly socialist societies” (Wanner 2004, 736). A
history of religious diversity has set the stage for a degree of religious freedom that, more
than a decade after independence, has led to the growth of all religious faiths represented
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in Ukraine. These include traditional faiths such as the three main divisions of Orthodox
Christianity, two forms of Catholicism, and historical Protestant churches. Moreover, the
diversity of organized religious expression in Ukraine continues to grow. Figure 5.1
documents the growth of a wide range of religious communities registered with the
Ukrainian government. It is safe to assume that other religious groups, while present in
Ukraine, remain off of the list because they are unregistered.
Figure 5.1: Registered religious communities in Ukraine, 1994-2003*
Religion

1994

1997

1998

2000

2001

2003

Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate

5998

6816

7357

8403

8953

9952

Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

2932

3087

3143

3234

3268

3292

Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate

1932

1499

1880

2471

2760

3186

Evangelical Christians-Baptists

1364

1536

1652

1842

2033

2153

All Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostal)

798

802

854

975

1066

1240

Roman Catholic Church

588

712

732

770

798

840

Jehovah's Witnesses

458

255

281

312

371

536

Seventh Day Adventists

380

526

604

711

794

916

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church

289

1163

1060

988

1013

1107

Other Unions of Evangelical Christians-Baptists

204

102

120

244

282

317

Transcarpathian Reformed Church

91

98

98

101

104

106

Old Believers

80

45

48

53

55

63

Muslim communities

77

192

225

289

351

422

Jewish communities

66

83

88

119

194

231

Other Charismatic Churches

44

63

67

159

257

387

Church of the Full Gospel (Charismatics)

33

99

147

287

278

379

Other Protestant Churches

30

289

368

166

170

292

Hare Krishna

24

23

24

27

30

29

Pagan organizations

19

29

34

48

58

68

Other Eastern religious communities

18

29

32

37

40

54

Lutherans

13

33

34

58

61

70

Armenian Apostolic Church

9

Other Pentecostal communities
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
Other religious organizations
Total

12

14

15

15

20

43

46

246

304

434

9

17

30

31

31

12

65

80

108

114

146

15459

17610

19005

21693

23400

26271

Data compiled from reports of the State Committee for Religious Affairs, as published in
Ludina i Svit, 1994-2003.
* ‘Religious communities’ include places of regular worship, administrative centers of religious
organizations, monasteries, missions, and theological educational institutions.
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The arrival of religious freedom led directly to the development of transnational
linkages between religious organizations in Ukraine and religious organizations in other
countries. This is happening in virtually all types of organizations, from Orthodox to
Protestant to Jewish to Muslim. Although Ukrainian Baptist churches have a history of
interaction with the West that dates back to the nineteenth century and that continued,
albeit in a limited way, during the decades of the Soviet Union, the transnational
networking has flourished at a new level since the era of glasnost’ and Ukraine’s
independence in 1991. This transnational access has fundamentally impacted Ukrainian
religious life. For people involved in religious organizations in Ukraine, transnational
affiliations do not remain in the purely religious arena, but can affect all areas of life.
Examples of this include education, as more people study at religious colleges and
seminaries funded by international partners; economic, as jobs are created in church
construction, humanitarian aid, religious publication houses, and so forth; social, as
Ukrainians develop friendships and even establish families with foreign visitors; and
medical, through the work of visiting medical teams or through humanitarian projects to
send needy Ukrainians overseas for complicated surgical procedures. This phenomenon
is taking place in other post-soviet contexts. For example, Melissa Caldwell has written
about a network of soup kitchens sponsored by the transnationally oriented Christian
Church of Moscow, and how these kitchens provide not just material, but social, support
for needy Muscovites (2004).
In 1996 Mark Elliott, a well-known scholar of evangelical missions in the
countries of the former Soviet Union, published a list (Figure 5.2) of Protestant
denominations in the former Soviet Union (1996). Nine years later the list is obsolete
(after all, 1,000 new religious communities are registering in Ukraine every year), but it
provides a sense of the first Protestant churches to be active in the newly independent
republics, including in Ukraine. Of the five categories Elliott includes, the churches
examined in this dissertation fall into the first (Churches present since 1917), the fourth
(New churches), and the fifth (Unaffiliated churches). That last group can be considered
a variation of ‘New churches,’ since many in both categories were founded by Western
missions organizations.
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Figure 5.2: Protestant denominations in the Former Soviet Union, 1996
I. Churches Present since 1917 (regardless of official status)
Evangelical Christian-Baptist; Lutheran; Mennonite; Pentecostal; Seventh-day Adventist
II. Churches in Lands Annexed in World War II
Hungarian Reformed (Transcarpathia); Methodist (now active outside Estonia)
III. Reemerging Churches
Armenian Evangelical and Baptist; Brethren; Church of Christ; Evangelical Christian;
Molokane; The Salvation Army; United Pentecostal
IV. New Churches
Christian and Missionary Alliance; Christian Life Centers; Christian Reformed; Church
of God, Anderson; Church of the Nazarene; Estonian Christian Church; Evangelical
Covenant; Evangelical Free; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod; Nazarene; New
Apostolic; Pentecostal Holiness; Presbyterian; Wesleyan; Word of Life
V. Unaffiliated Churches (founded by Western and indigenous parachurch missions)
For example: Moscow Bible Church and St. George’s Church, Moscow
Source: (Elliott 1996, 19-20)

A common thread that ties the disparate collection of Ukrainian Protestant
churches together is their internalization of transnationalism. That is, even the historical,
Ukrainian Baptist churches are highly integrated within transnational networks of people,
ideas, finance and theological training. At the same time, these churches are now an
indispensable part of the Ukrainian religious landscape. Catherine Wanner has written
about what she sees as the likely future cultural influence of Protestant churches in
Ukraine. She predicts that their current magnetism “will grow and slowly influence the
practices, identities and understandings of community and morality” in Ukraine. She
thinks they will find “an audible political voice,” and that “over time, along with other
aspects of Western culture and ideology which are indigenously adapted to local cultural
values and practices, evangelical communities will contribute to the social fabric and a
new moral order in Ukraine” (2003, 285).
When the Soviet parliament declared freedom of religion on October 9, 1990, a
new era of church life began. 25 This freedom brought many changes to the established

25

This law was called the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations. It gave legal
standing to religious groups, allowing them to be involved in religious education, publishing, and charity. It
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Protestant churches, and opened Ukraine to receive missionaries from abroad.
Missionaries came from a wide spectrum of backgrounds, including some sent by
denominationally based churches (like the Southern Baptist Convention and the
Presbyterian Church in America), those sent by non- or inter-denominational mission
boards (like SEND International), and those who came independently or were sent by one
or two home congregations. Some of the missionaries partnered with existing Ukrainian
congregations, while others formed new independent churches.

Churches begun by

missionaries included all types of traditions: Charismatic, Baptist, Nazarene, independent
evangelical, Presbyterian, Methodist, and so forth. Also active were groups like the
Latter-Day Saints.
Gauging the number of foreign religious workers who came to Ukraine in the first
years after independence is difficult; also nearly impossible is determining the amount of
foreign currency that was sent or brought into Ukraine by missionaries and recent
Ukrainian Baptist emigrants during those years. In 1994 one source estimated that more
than 1,113 foreign missionaries were working across the former Soviet Union as a whole
(Schindler, Bedford-Adamski, and Elliott 1994); the figure cited in the same publication
increased to 3190 a year later (Miller 1995). In another source only 48 missionaries were
listed as working in Ukraine in 1994, but the figure rose to 463 by 2001 (Johnstone and
Mandryk 2002, 10). Most of the missionaries were from the United States, although
others came from a variety of countries including the Netherlands, South Africa, Canada,
and South Korea. According to the East-West Church and Ministry Report, the largest
non-indigenous missions organizations active in the countries of the former Soviet Union
in 1995 were Youth With a Mission, Campus Crusade for Christ, the Church of Christ,
and the Southern Baptist Convention (Meadows 1995, 10). By 1997 the Institute for EastWest Christian Studies had identified 561 Western and South Korean agencies working
in the former Soviet Union. Of those organizations, about 90 percent were Protestant and
the rest were Orthodox and Catholic. They reported that 5,049 Western missionaries and
557 South Korean missionaries were working in the former Soviet Union in 1996, but did
not have figures for individual republics. These included about 1,962 career missionaries

ended government funding of atheistic education, and removed the ban on religious education in public
schools (Glanzer 1999).
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(the rest were short-term)(Elliott 1997, 10). Between late 1991 and early 1993 at least 50
million Bibles were sent to Russia and Ukraine by American church groups (Ramet 1998,
266).
Ukrainian evangelicals fondly recall the early years of independence as the most
fruitful era of their churches, when large numbers of people would show up at minimally
advertised evangelistic meetings.

Of these, the most prominent large-scale

evangelization in Ukraine and Russia in the early 1990s was by American evangelist
Billy Graham and his organization, although others came as well. A New York Times
article from 1993 mentions Jack Finley, Morris Cerullo, and a charismatic preacher
named Bob Wilcox visiting Moscow (Schmemann 1993). As part of this project, young
adults interviewed in 2003 at a Baptist church in Kherson described being raised during
the first decade of religious freedom and the era of the large stadium-style evangelistic
events. Although they had been children ten years earlier at the time of the Billy Graham
work, in a focus group meeting they mentioned their church’s participation in the
Moscow event as a significant connection between their church and the West. Several
people from the church had traveled there to sing in the 7,000 voice choir, and one young
woman said that “many of the songs they sang there we now sing in our choir.”
Russian evangelical pastor Sergei Nikolev was involved in evangelism in Russia
in the early 1990s, even serving as interpreter for Billy Graham’s preaching tours there.
He later wrote about the immediate post-Soviet years in an American magazine:
When the Communists fell and the door was opened, we thought we needed only
a few years to convert Russia for Christ.
We started very intensive
evangelization. We preached to hundreds of thousands, started missions and
Bible studies, distributed millions of Bibles and Christian literature, and planted a
lot of churches (1998).
Ukrainians told me that the situation in their new country was much the same. Churches
could invite an American evangelist and on short notice fill a large hall with seekers. All
evangelistic activities were well-attended; churches were full and were multiplying.
Although the percentage of Ukrainians who identify as Protestants remains small,
especially when compared to the traditional Orthodox churches and the Greek Catholic
Church, the 1990s saw real growth. According to sociological surveys, in 1994 only 0.6
percent of Ukraine’s population considered themselves to be Protestant. That figure rose
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to 2.5 percent by 2001 (Krindatch 2003, 42). 26 The following chart (Figure 5.3) uses
information from Figure 5.1 to show the growth in the number of registered religious
communities from 1994 to 2003. The number of Protestant communities more than
doubled during that time period, which was faster growth than most other groups. 27 This
data also shows that Protestant churches make up about one quarter of all registered
religious communities in Ukraine. (See Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.3: Registered religious communities* in Ukraine, 1994-2003
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Data source: State Committee for Religious Affairs, as published in Ludina i Svit, 1994-2003.
*

‘Religious communities’ include places of regular worship, administrative centers of religious
organizations, monasteries, missions, and theological educational institutions.

26

Krindatch reported findings from a 1994 survey by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian National
Academy of Sciences and a September 2001 survey by the foundation ‘Sotsys i Deminitsiativi’, Kiev.
27
The only exception is the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which grew by 74%. The number
of registered Protestant communities grew 53%; Ukrainian Orthodox Church (both Moscow and Kiev
Patriarchates) grew by 40%, the Roman Catholic Church by 30%, and the Greek Catholic Church by 11%.
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Figure 5.4: Registered Religious Communities in Ukraine, 2003
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5.3 Ukrainian Baptist Churches adapting to the new era
At a Baptist church in Kherson I met a visiting American at a Saturday afternoon
wedding. Fred owns a construction company in Arizona and is a frequent guest of the
church. He has been to Ukraine about twenty times since the early 1990s, and my
Ukrainian host explained that Fred was the main financial sponsor of their church
building project, currently underway. Fred and his wife, Marge, had come to Ukraine for
a short visit with another American couple, first time visitors. Before the service Fred
came up to me to talk – evidently my Ukrainian host had told him a bit about my project.
He told me that he always tried to remind himself that “Salvation does not come from the
West,” and had written that phrase in the front of his Bible. We met up again after the
wedding, and he described his first experience in Kherson years ago, an experience that
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made him want to return time after time. This narrative, an excerpt from my field notes,
captures the heady atmosphere of the early and mid 1990s as remembered in 2003:
When the service finished, we were all told to leave the room so that the
wedding banquet could be set up. And please, a woman called out, due to the
difficult economic situation, only those with an invitation are allowed to stay. I
met up with Fred and Marge again in the foyer. The other American woman is
clutching a wedding gift in her hand. She somehow looks so uneasy, as if she’s
been put in a position in which she is culturally out of her comfort zone. I don’t
see anyone else with a gift.
Fred tells me the story of how he began his involvement here in Kherson.
A number of years ago he was involved with Josh McDowell Ministries on a trip
to Russia, but in the group there were thirty Americans and only one interpreter.
He was really frustrated that he couldn’t talk directly with the Russian people.
Then a friend in the States invited him to go to Ukraine with another
organization, based in Texas. On that trip there would be one interpreter for
each person. They came to Kherson, where they had contacts in the Central
Baptist Church. They were told to knock on doors in the Shuminskiy area of the
city, a section with about 100,000 residents and no known Protestant believers.
Fred was not a pastor or a trained evangelist (he owned his own construction
company) and this was really new to him. But he and his interpreter went door to
door and told people about a loving heavenly Father, and about a movie (the
Jesus film) that would be shown at the end of the week. He said that most people
opened their doors and invited them in for tea. Others stood in their
entranceways and talked for 45 minutes. Many people came to the film, and many
of them repented. When his train left at the end of his time in Kherson, about 150
people met at the station to see him and his group off. As the train departed, it
started out slowly, and the crowd of people moved along with it, many of the
people weeping. Fred wept, too, for the next several hours, and knew that he
would be coming back.
Fred’s work in Kherson is representative of the partnerships that many ECB churches
developed with Westerners at that time. It was short-term; he came back for repeated
short visits; he was a large financial donor; he never learned Russian; he brought friends
and family members with him; and he developed friendly relationships with people in the
church over the course of several years.
Most ECB church members that I met in Ukraine spoke of American groups who
had worked with them in a variety of evangelistic, humanitarian, educational, and
building projects.

It was not uncommon for large urban ECB churches to receive

hundreds of thousands of dollars from Western supporters, primarily for church building
projects. Most Ukrainian cities, and many small towns, now boast new Baptist church
buildings constructed primarily with Western funds and Ukrainian labor. Western short75

term teams came to work alongside Ukrainian Baptists at children’s camps, evangelistic
projects, English classes, medical ministries, and construction projects.

Some

missionaries worked within ECB churches for longer periods, helping establish Bible
colleges and seminaries (like Tavriskiy Christian Institute in Kherson) and other
ministries.
When I talked with young adults from various evangelical churches in Ukraine
and asked them their conversion stories, they often described their first visit to a church.
They had come with common stereotypes in mind, thinking that most religious people
were old babushki and that the church would not be relevant for young educated people
like them. They had been expecting to find a place filled with old ladies in black
headscarves, and instead found that young people also attended worship. An example of
this is Sergey, a young man in his 20s living in Kherson. He became a Baptist through
the influence of a Christian army commander while he was serving his mandatory
military tour of duty:
The first time I really encountered believers was when I was in the Army. Our
commander was a believer. And he told the soldiers regularly to come to God
because we’re young and God can change our lives and God would provide
everything in our lives and can help us live in a right way. And when he said that,
I perceived him as I could imagine Orthodox believers, and I understood that in
the church there should be old ladies and gentlemen in the church – that is, people
who were old. That’s how I understood life, that people who go to church are that
age. . . . And, of course, when I came and when I left the army he took us around
a bit and we were in Baptist churches and I didn’t think that it would be that way;
there were even young people. It was very interesting for me. That impression
was great and joyous, I understood that my prior understanding of the church had
been wrong.
Somber-looking babushki are still the backbone of many Baptist churches, but the
present leadership core consists of men who grew up in Baptist families in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s. Newcomers of the 1990s are an important congregational segment,
and in some cases make up half or more of a given church, particularly in urban areas.
These newer believers include people of all ages. In Vinnytsia I participated in two
women’s Bible studies made up mostly of new Baptists.

One group consisted of

grandmothers in their late 50s and 60s; the other group included young mothers, middle
aged matrons, and an elderly war veteran. These women came from both atheist and
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Orthodox backgrounds, and one woman had returned to the Baptist faith of her childhood
after living most of her life away from the church.
The young adult segment of Baptist churches, while bringing energy and
creativity to congregational life, poses a great challenge for the churches. These young
people were raised during the free era and have few personal recollections of the antireligious persecution that was endured by church elders. Young people who have entered
from outside the Baptist tradition have even less in common with church leaders. This
generational dichotomy has been difficult for many congregations, and will be examined
more fully in Chapter Seven.
I visited Central Baptist Church in Vinnytsia the first time on a Saturday evening
in October. I had traveled with my Ukrainian research assistant to visit the city for the
weekend, intent on making contacts that would open up Central Baptist to me as a
research site. The church was widely known by Baptists in other cities to be one of the
largest churches in the country, with about 1500 members. Since members include only
baptized adults, the actual number of people involved with the church is at least twice
that. We arrived on Saturday afternoon after a long day on the road and were guests at
the apartment of relatives of a Ukrainian Baptist woman, formerly of that church, that I
had already become acquainted with in the United States. After a quick but bountiful
supper we raced over to the church for the evening service. The building itself was
impressive: the main church hall had three balconies; skillful painting made concrete
columns look like marble from a distance; and extensive gold highlights reminded me of
the interior of an opera house. The entire front wall was covered by a mural of green
hills, flowers, and a mountain in the distance, with an angel flying overhead –
presumably a rendering of heaven.
The grand atmosphere of Vinnytsia Central Baptist underscores the central role of
the church building and worship services in Ukrainian Baptist life. Devout Baptists are
expected to attend all of the services, which in Vinnytsia were held Sunday morning and
evening, Wednesday evening, and Saturday evening. Most urban Baptist churches, this
one included, have more than one choir which rehearses twice a week for a couple of
hours at each rehearsal, preparing two or more anthems for each worship service (in
which the choirs sing on a rotating schedule). Other regular church activities include
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Bible classes for adults and children, prayer meetings, small group Bible studies, youth
group meetings, community service (such as serving at soup kitchens, children’s shelters,
or medical clinics), and evangelism in prisons (and orphanages, hospitals, and at youth
camps).
Some Ukrainian Baptists make extremely high time commitments to their church
activities. A lay youth leader at Central Baptist had gathered a team of eleven people to
help him in the ministry, including several full-time volunteers. Pastors have little time
off, and work often seems to take priority over family life. A deacon I met in Vinnytsia
works two jobs to keep his family financially afloat, sleeping only two or three hours per
night, but is unwilling to curtail his church obligations. In addition to his jobs he spends
several evenings each week at church for diaconal duties. One Presbyterian pastor, a
Ukrainian who had previously served as a Baptist pastor, complained that American
missionaries in Ukraine are teaching lazy habits to the upcoming generation of church
leaders by taking time off and only working a certain number of hours each day. He does
not approve of the forty hour work week and thinks that people should work as hard as
they can for the church. There is a very strong work ethic in Ukrainian Baptist churches
– people are expected to devote themselves physically and financially to the greatest
extent possible to the labor of the church.
Great care is put into planning, funding, and constructing church buildings that
are impressive, attractive, and functional. Marina, a young woman from a Baptist church
in Kherson, said that “we have a very beautiful building and when people come here they
can see that it is a real temple [khram], and they feel the presence of God here and it
affects them somehow.” Vinnytsia Central Baptist was typical of the Baptist churches in
this study in that its building was largely paid for by Christians in the United States, but
the actual labor was done by church members. When asked, pastors and church members
admitted that the building had been funded by people overseas, but they seemed edgy
about the question and never disclosed detailed financial information. Vinnytsia Central
Baptist was also typical of the four Baptist churches examined here in that raising money
for building projects (as opposed to human resource needs) was a central focus of its
international fundraising activities. In late 2002, for example, the pastors had recently
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returned from a fundraising tour in the United States to support the construction of a
Bible college adjacent to the church.
My observations of that first evening service speak to the diffusion of
transnational relationships into Ukrainian Baptist church life. Foreign visitors appear
regularly in the pulpit, pastors speak about the West, and choirs sing some of the same
anthems that are known to church choirs in the United States.
The first sermon of the night was given by a young assistant pastor from Florida,
his nationality immediately betrayed by his bleached blond hair, slick haircut,
and sideburns. His senior pastor back in Florida, he told the congregation
through a Russian interpreter, had already visited here in the past, and he himself
was very happy to do the same. His sermon was based on Romans 1:8-15, about
the importance of the gospel message. A few times he resorted to the line, “In
America. . .” For example, he told the congregation that Americans drink sweet
tea (and “just as the sugar is dissolved in the tea, so should the gospel be
dissolved into our lives”). In America, we use the phrase “24-7.” In America,
sometimes we think of teenagers as barbarians. The second sermon was given in
Ukrainian by an older man, so I understood little of it. I did catch him talking
about Canada at one point, and asked my helper Tanya about it later. She said
that he told people that Canada is the best country in the world, that it was one of
the first countries which accepted Ukraine’s independence and is quite simply just
a wonderful country. The young-looking choir sang songs that I know as
American hymns, but translated into Russian. A solo was sung by a young girl
with blonde hair, in Russian. There will be a marriage conference for two days
next weekend. Come meet for prayer at 6:30 a.m. some day this week. When the
service ended, Tanya and I went up to the front with Maksim (our host’s nephew)
to talk to the pastor, Viktor Sergeyevich. I thought it was a good sign [for me]
when I noticed his tie decorated with American flags. . . .
This passage illustrates how interaction with the West is woven into almost every aspect
of Ukrainian Baptist church life. In this worship service a visiting American preached
the first sermon (most services have three sermons); one of the Ukrainian pastors, newly
returned from a visit to North America, described the wonders of Canada from the pulpit;
the senior pastor greeted me wearing a tie covered with American flags. The next day
one of the Sunday morning sermons was preached by another American guest, a worker
with Gideons, the group that distributes Bibles worldwide. Other public reminders of
foreign friends observed that weekend (along with the building itself) included American
songs translated into Ukrainian and Russian as well as Western missionaries from two
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different mission organizations who worked in Vinnytsia and attended Central Baptist
Church. 28
As we will see in Chapter Seven, Ukrainian Baptists do not wholeheartedly accept
this omnipresent transnationalism in their midst, even though they have participated in its
development and embrace aspects of the transnational relationships. One thing, however,
is clear: Western (chiefly American) influence in Ukrainian evangelical churches is not
limited to those churches actually founded by missionaries. All of the congregations that
I visited of the country’s largest and oldest Baptist denomination are living a
transnational existence.

All of them are engaged with Western ideas, funded with

Western money, and assisted by Western missionaries.

5.4 New Protestant churches have arrived in Ukraine
One important missionary foray into the former Soviet Republics was initiated by
Russian deputy minister of education Aleksandr Asmolov in 1992. He invited religious
groups from other countries to come to Russia to teach religious ethics in public schools.
Asmolov wanted to give Russian children information about “the history of spiritual
culture” so that they could “freely choose any religion they want” (quoted in Woodward
and O'Brien 1993). This came about as a follow-up to a 1990 showing of Campus
Crusade’s Jesus film to a group that included “the minister or deputy minister of
education from almost every republic and country” of the Soviet Union. The education
leaders of fifteen republics and countries liked the film and asked that it be shown in their
public schools (Glanzer 1999, 289).
After a series of experimental “convocations” during which Campus Crusade
workers showed the film in a small number of cities, it became clear to the Campus
Crusade staff that a larger effort explaining evangelical Christianity in the former Soviet
Union was possible and desirable. American evangelicals formed an organization called
the CoMission to bring several thousand lay volunteers from more than 60 denominations
and mission agencies for one to two year terms to teach a course of Christian ethics in
public schools. They went to other former Soviet countries besides Russia; many also

28

The foreign missionaries at Vinnytsia Central Baptist were from the United States (2), Canada (2), South
Africa (1), and Finland (1).
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worked in Ukraine. Each volunteer needed to raise about $20,000, and brought with
them supplies (like Campus Crusade’s Jesus film) and money to pay Russian language
interpreters. Up until 1997 CoMission volunteers traveled to 52 cities in six countries of
the former Soviet Union, although their Protocol of Intention with the Russian Ministry
of Education was canceled in 1995 – largely because of opposition from Orthodox church
leaders (Glanzer 1999, 305).
CoMission workers traveled to the former Soviet Union to teach ethics in schools,
and in the course of their work some teachers and students converted to evangelical
Christianity. Two of the case study churches in this dissertation have core members who
became Christians through the work of CoMission teams in their Ukrainian cities. In
Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy, a group of interpreters converted to evangelical Protestantism
during a Bible study for the CoMission interpreters and their friends led by an American
volunteer, a retired Presbyterian layman from Alabama.

That 1994 Bible study

dramatically changed the life courses of those involved. Two are now pastors in a
fledgling Presbyterian denomination in Ukraine; one is the director of a Christian medical
clinic; one is a full-time translator of theological books from English into Russian;
another is the administrator of a theological seminary in Kiev; and the rest are active lay
leaders in their churches. After the Bible study ended and the Americans left Bilhorod,
the group decided to form their own Presbyterian church, about which more details will
be given later.
The missionary phenomenon across the former Soviet states did not go
unchallenged, although the backlash was more severe in Russia and Belarus than in
Ukraine. Ukraine already had a strong multi-religious history – with more than one faith
competing for the position as the dominant religion. Although during the Soviet Union
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) was the main religion, even then
there was more accepted religious diversity than in other republics. This softened the
impact of the arrival of post-Soviet missionaries. Orthodoxy was dealing with its own
inner divisions between the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates at the time, and the Greek
Catholic Church was reestablishing its existence and influence in Western Ukraine.
These traditional churches had enough occupying them without having to worry about
Western Protestant missionaries.
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An example of the anti-missionary ethos in Russia can be seen in an opinion piece
published in 1994 in the Moscow News. A non-Russian named Thomas Price wrote that
missionaries threaten “the very survival of Russia’s culture and the future of Russia as a
land in which moral and ethical principles will rule.” It is interesting that this strong
view was voiced by a non-Russian, but others, particularly stake-holders in the Russian
Orthodox Church, also spoke out against the work of foreign missionaries in Russia. For
example, Russian Orthodox Archbishop Anatoly (Kuznetsov) of Kerch wrote in a
Western journal:
Chaos occurs when different preachers – not only Christian – come to Russia with
a lot of money and hire stadiums, theaters, or similar facilities suitable for their
purposes, and advertise themselves, inviting people to meetings, services, and
talks. Often no denominational aims are mentioned. Of course, it is not just
atheists and agnostics who will come to these meetings but mostly traditional
Orthodox believers who are not qualified to judge denominational matters. We
know of cases where after such services and sermons people have been invited to
accept rebaptism and become members of a new faith. Such baptism into a new
faith of people who were traditionally Orthodox believers, who had already been
baptized but were theologically ignorant and did not understand what was
happening to them, has often taken place (1996, 22-23).
The Archbishop continues by condemning what he calls “proselytism” and asking the
readers to “leave our people in their own native Orthodox Church!” Archbishop Kerch
displays little faith in the ability of Russian Orthodox believers to understand and hold to
the teachings of their own religion.
Russia and Belarus passed laws limiting the rights of foreigners to evangelize on
Russian soil, and in 2002 Belarus enacted a strong law regulating religious activities (for
example, banning religious meetings in private homes). Laws passed in Ukraine were
milder, and generally Ukraine remained one of the former-Soviet countries with the most
tolerant religious atmosphere.

In December 1993 legislators in Ukraine passed an

amendment to regulate the activities of foreign religious workers.

It states that

“clergymen, religious preachers, teachers, other representatives of foreign organizations
who are foreign citizens and come to visit temporarily in Ukraine may preach religious
doctrines, administer religious ordinances, or practice other canonic activities only in
those religious organizations which invited them to come to Ukraine and with official
approval of the governmental body that has registered the statutes” (Triggs 1994). In
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other words, missionaries from other countries cannot come to Ukraine on their own, but
must be invited by an existing religious organization and work only on behalf of that
organization.
Although some foreign missionaries worked with established Ukrainian churches,
others came to Ukraine to start their own congregations. These post-Soviet Protestant
churches have some commonalties with the older Ukrainian evangelical churches, and at
times even collaborate with them on specific projects, but by and large the newer
churches are quite different from the more traditional ones.

These new churches

represent a wide variety of Protestant denominations and traditions, including
Charismatic, Baptist (often independent Baptist), and churches started through the effort
of denominationally based missions.
In line with recent patterns of church growth around the world in which
Charismatic churches have tended to grow faster than other forms of Christianity
(Hutchinson 1998), one of Ukraine’s largest and fastest-growing congregations is a
Charismatic mega-church in Kyiv, the Embassy of the Blessed Kingdom of God for All
Nations. The Nigerian pastor, Sunday Adelaja, started the church soon after graduating
with a journalism degree from the Belorussian State University in the early 1990s. He
moved to Kyiv to work for a television station and began the church in early 1994. The
church web site (www.word-of-faith-ch.org) claims that the church now has 17,000
members in Kyiv, 15 satellite congregations in Kyiv, 15 daughter churches in the Kyiv
district, and 70 daughter churches throughout Ukraine and in Russia, Moldova, Belarus’,
and Georgia. Another large Charismatic in Kyiv is Victory Christian Church (5,000
worshippers), also with an African pastor who studied in the Soviet Union, Henry
Madava, from Zimbabwe. Madava started Victory church in 1992 with five supporters,
and now the large congregation has opened thirty branch churches in Ukraine and in
Russia, Poland, Germany, India, and Angola (www.victorychurch.kiev.ua).
Other Ukrainian cities also have at least one sizable Charismatic congregation that
has begun worshipping after independence. For example, a large Charismatic church
with an African pastor meets every Sunday at a sports arena in Vinnytsia. Kherson has a
Charismatic church, Great Commission Church, whose pastor is a former Ukrainian
Pentecostal.

The church began in 1992 and now, according to its website

83

(www.gcc.kherson.ua), has more than 2,000 members, making it the largest evangelical
church in the city.

It is a member of the Independent Charismatic Christian Churches

Union of Ukraine.
A second category of new churches are relatively small, independent, often
Baptist churches started by foreign missionaries.

These are what Elliott has called

“unaffiliated” churches (see Figure 5.1) (1996, 19). L’viv, for example, is home to about
three independent evangelical churches. One of them still has an American pastor and
meets in the center of L’viv in a rented hall. The second church, with an all-Ukrainian
pastoral staff, has purchased and is in the process of renovating property in a former
factory. There are some American missionaries who attend the church, but who don’t
work in the church per se. The third is a new church plant (begun in 2002 or 2003) with
a team of Baptist missionaries from Texas working to draw in people living in a L’viv
suburb.
Finally, there are new churches started through the efforts of missionaries
representing established denominations from other countries. Many of these activities
take place at a relatively small scale, with just one or a handful of churches started by
each mission so far.

An example of this kind of work is the Nazarene church in

Vinnytsia. The Nazarenes describe themselves as a “Great Commission church and
Holiness church” with roots in the Wesleyan revival of the 18th century and the Holiness
movement of the 20th century (www.nazarene.org). According to the web site of the
American-founded denomination, the church has two missionary families (with Anglo
names) working in Ukraine. No Western missionaries are working at the Nazarene
church in Vinnytsia, but an American Nazarene missionary in Kyiv recruited a Ukrainian
man to head up a church planting team for that city. The new Ukrainian pastor, his wife,
and another Ukrainian couple moved to Vinnytsia in 2001 to begin work there. One year
later the congregation already had about 100 members and was continuing to grow. They
had bought their own property and had just begun construction of a new building. A
focus of the Vinnytsia Nazarene Church was ministry to drug addicts and their families.
The first time I visited the Nazarene church, I was taken by Vika, a young woman
of about 20 who had been raised in the Baptist church but had recently come through
several years of hard living, with a husband in prison, no job, and a child to support. She
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and her five year old son had been attending the Nazarene church faithfully since her
conversion a month before, and spent time at the church nearly every day of the week for
Bible study, prayer, worship, or some other event. She never suggested that she received
any financial or humanitarian aid from the church – it seemed to be spiritual and social
reasons that drew her to the group. One cold December Sunday I met her in the city and
we walked down a steep cobblestone street to the river, where the Nazarenes had
purchased a lot with an old (I assume pre-revolutionary) house in terrible repair. Until
they could finish constructing a new building (which they had already begun) they were
meeting in the original house. I described the worship service in my fieldnotes:
The ‘sanctuary’ is basically three small rooms that are laid out end to end,
with the walls knocked out in between them. Old wallpaper covers the walls, and
in places the plaster in the ceiling and moldings is cracked. A single light bulb
hangs down from the ceiling of each room. Folding chairs are set up in rows in
the center room and the back room, facing the ‘stage’, which is the front-most
room. A young man was standing there warming up his hands on the electric
guitar. On the front wall was a poster with John 8:32 written in marker (in
Russian): “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.”
I was told by Vika that many people in the church are ex-drug addicts. As
I sit and wait, I can’t help wondering, who are they? The man with the deeply
lined face? Which guys are in the treatment program right now? The young man
with the vest that says, “Local 670” on it in English? (humanitarian aid?) I
heard that they aren’t allowed to go anywhere but to church while they are in the
program.
While I was sitting in my seat waiting for the service to start, a man
holding a small child in a snowsuit came in the door and called out loudly,
“Praise the Lord!” A lady with her hair neatly put up in a French roll, with
extremely green eye shadow to match her pantsuit, was handing out little slips of
paper and pencils. “What are they for?” I asked Vika. “So you can write your
needs on it.”
The service started with the congregation singing several praise songs to
the accompaniment of the band up front. There was one guy on guitar, another
on bass guitar, an electric keyboard, and three women singing into microphones.
They were swaying and clapping along to the music, as were most of the people in
the audience. I didn’t recognize the songs, but everyone around me was singing
loudly, without words in front of them. In between songs one of the ladies prayed
into the microphone, and they put a ‘stadium’ effect on the sound system, so that
her voice echoed.
The pastor asked people who’ve had successes in their life to come up and
share them publicly. One man was almost hit by a bus this week, but it didn’t hit
him. God provided one of the worship leaders money when they needed it this
week. The Local 670 Union guy had had a high temperature, and said something
about drugs, but he is still alive and was praising God for that. The wife of
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another man had left him, and taken their son with her. Now, after his conversion
the son has accepted him again, and is grateful that God has changed his Dad. A
woman got a new refrigerator. A young guy was at a youth camp that was just
great. A pregnant woman (one of the worship leaders) had a high fever that
could have harmed her baby, but the doctor said that the baby is doing fine.
The worship style and physical appearance of the congregation at the Nazarene
church was quite different than at the ECB church in the same city. The Nazarenes had
adopted a worship style commonly called “contemporary” in Western churches (as
opposed to “traditional”). They had no choir, they replaced the piano with an electric
band, and they sang new songs instead of the early twentieth century hymns favored by
the Baptists. This kind of worship is increasingly practiced by young Protestants of
various Ukrainian denominations, but has not yet entered widespread use in Evangelical
Christian – Baptist churches in Ukraine. It is seen as Western and not ‘holy.’ The
physical appearance of the congregation also separated them from the ECB church. Most
of the women were wearing pants, makeup, and jewelry, all of which were forbidden at
the Baptist church. Some men were dressed in blue jeans, worship attire frowned upon
by Baptists. The Nazarene worship had a joyous, party-like atmosphere, a strong contrast
from the somber tone of the Baptist church.
Another example of a Western denomination actively starting new churches in
Ukraine is the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA), a conservative group that left the
mainline Presbyterian Church (USA) in 1973. Through their mission agency, Mission to
the World (MTW), the PCA has been working in Ukraine since 1994 and now has ten
churches in that country.

Two of these have already become ‘particularized’, or

independent. The other eight are at various stages of development, from a small Bible
study (two of them), to a mission church with Ukrainian pastor and a board of what they
call ‘proto-elders’ (they will become elders after particularization). Their churches form
a new Ukrainian denomination, the Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ukraine (EPCU),
which is run by Ukrainian pastors and elders of these Presbyterian churches. Their
churches are concentrated in Southern Ukraine (Izmail, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, Odessa
(2), Nikolaev, and Kherson), but with three in Kyiv, one in Kharkiv, and plans for more
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underway. 29

Several of the EPCU congregations began as Bible studies led by

CoMission workers in 1994, including the two Presbyterian churches in this study, in
Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy and Kherson. In their current church-planting strategy Ukrainian
pastors lead each new mission team, with an American ‘coach’ and other North American
missionaries in the background. At the time of the fieldwork for this project the Belgorod
congregation did not have an American church planter in residence, but the Kherson
church had four full-time American missionaries in addition to a Ukrainian pastor.
Several young men who attended seminary also worked part-time at the Kherson church.
The Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ukraine is an example of a small
evangelical denomination (fewer than 1500 members in all churches combined) whose
size cannot compare to the much larger Baptist or Charismatic movements, but which
contributes to the complex and growing mosaic of Protestant churches in Ukraine. The
flagship EPCU congregation in Odessa meets in a restored church building originally
constructed at the end of the nineteenth century by a Reformed congregation with French,
German, and Swiss members. French and German language services were held there
until at least 1914, but the Soviet government confiscated the property and used it for,
among other things, a puppet theater. In the mid-1990s, after MTW had begun work in
Odessa and a small congregation had been formed, some of the new Ukrainian
Presbyterians made contact with an elderly Reformed pastor still living in Western
Ukraine.

He wrote a letter on behalf of the Reformed denomination declaring the

Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Odessa to be the physical and moral heirs of the
Reformed church in that city. The Odessa Presbyterians were able to use that letter in a
court case, and the city gave the Presbyterians the Reformed Church/puppet theater
building with the expectation that the Presbyterians would renovate it.

MTW

missionaries were able to raise considerable funds in the United States, and by the end of
my fieldwork in 2003 the renovations were well under way.
The EPCU has opened a theological seminary in Kyiv in partnership with the
Ukrainian Evangelical Reformed Church (UERC), the denomination that gave the Odessa
Evangelical Presbyterian Church their rights to the old Reformed building. This other

29

By early 2005 the Kherson team had started an additional two churches in that city, led by Ukrainian
seminary students and their wives under the supervision of an American missionary.
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small denomination existed in Ukraine before the Bolshevik Revolution, and remnants
survived in several Ukrainian villages and towns during the Soviet era, mostly in the
western part of the country. Despite a long history in Ukraine, by the time of Ukraine’s
independence only a handful of Reformed churches existed outside of Transcarpathia (a
largely ethnic Hungarian region of Ukraine that had been strongly influenced by the
Protestant Reformation of the late 16th century). The Reformed Church’s closest foreign
partner is a Dutch denomination, the Reformed Church of the Netherlands (liberated),
which has been sending missionaries and financial resources to support Ukrainian
Reformed churches and the Evangelical Reformed Seminary of Ukraine. The seminary
was registered with the Ukrainian government in 2003 and relies on professors from the
Netherlands and the United States who teach modular classes several times a year for
men and women seminarians who also work part-time in their home churches.
One of my case study churches, Greater Grace in L’viv, falls outside these
parameters (large Charismatic, smaller independent, or denominational). It was started
by missionaries that were affiliated with the Greater Grace Church of Baltimore,
Maryland, a large independent congregation that has ‘planted’ over 100 churches in 54
countries. The team that started Greater Grace in L’viv was a mix of Americans and
Poles who arrived in the early 1990s. By the time I arrived in L’viv in 2003 the
Americans had all left, the church owned its own building, and it was more or less
financially independent from the American home base.

A businessman in the

congregation had helped them purchase a three story storefront building within walking
distance from the opera house. The church paid the utility bills with the profits from its
English language school – a business catering mostly to Ukrainians preparing themselves
to emigrate to the West. They also had recently opened a Christian day school for
children, although the school was not yet financially independent and only consisted of
kindergartners and first graders. Of the four new churches profiled in this dissertation,
Greater Grace was seemingly the most independent and mature. The church operated a
wide variety of ministries (e.g., an adult evening Bible school, a crisis pregnancy center,
an evangelistic mime team) and was continuing to grow in size. Attendance was about
150 people in early 2003, filling the worship hall to capacity. They were about to move
worship services off-site to a larger rented facility at the end of my stay.
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5.5 Relationships between the evangelical churches
The broad spectrum of evangelical churches in Ukraine encompasses most
Protestant ideologies and practices. Some churches believe in speaking in tongues, while
others forbid it. Some groups permit moderate alcohol consumption, dancing, and card
playing, while others prohibit them. Most churches in Ukraine believe in salvation by
free will and teach that salvation can be lost; others (such as Presbyterian and Reformed
churches) adhere to predestination and the doctrine of eternal security.

There are

differences in practices regarding baptism, communion, relevance of the Old Testament
to the Christian, and so forth.
While some of these theological and social differences are contained within the
more traditional Ukrainian churches and do not necessarily mark the divide between
indigenous congregations and Western church plants, one apparent distinguishing mark
of churches begun by foreign missionaries is their willingness to move away from
traditional outward signs of religious submission, particularly regarding clothing styles
and cosmetics for women. In most Ukrainian Baptist churches, for example, women are
required to wear skirts or dresses to worship services, and married women must cover
their heads with a scarf or hat. Women should have long hair, minimal makeup, and
minimal jewelry. Men must wear pants, not shorts, to church, and must have short hair.
These differences came to the foreground in 1994 when the CoMission Bible
study in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy was deciding whether to join the local Baptist church or
to form their own Presbyterian church. I asked the Presbyterian pastor and his wife, both
of whom were converted during that initial Bible study, why they chose to form their own
church and not become part of a more established organization:
Dmitri: By that time we already had some experience, and we knew what the
Baptist church was like. We were young Christians, but we knew the difference.
We knew that there we would have to wear scarves –
Lena: No makeup.
Dmitri: That this and that would be forbidden, that it was forbidden to dance,
drink alcohol and many other things were ‘forbidden, forbidden, forbidden.’ And
we didn’t want someone other than God to restrict our freedom. Do you
understand? And in that case we saw that Baptist church would restrict the
freedom that we already had in Christ.
Lena: [English] We already understood the difference between the Presbyterian
and Baptist church.
89

Dmitri and Lena shied away from the behavioral restrictions well known in Baptist
churches. Like the Nazarenes in Vinnytsia, they wanted to be able to wear any kind of
clothes, dance, and take part in other activities forbidden by the Baptists.
During the course of the decision-making process about which church to join, the
American pastor of one of the CoMission workers visited Belgorod. Although the
CoMission team had promised not to promote their own church, this visitor had not
made that commitment. The new Christians told him about their dilemma.
Dmitri: And when we said that we had visited Orthodox, Adventist, and Baptist
churches, but were not satisfied . . . he just told us, “Organize your own church.”
Do you understand? It was such a revelation.
Esther: [in English] It was the first time you’d thought of that?
Dmitri: Yes. That was exactly what we wanted, but it was something we were
even afraid to think about at that moment. . . . [And] when we talked with the
Baptist pastor several months later, we remembered what [the American pastor]
had said. He said that there is a possibility of starting a Presbyterian Church.
And we wanted our church, of which we would be members, to be Reformed or
Presbyterian. We knew a little about the Reformation then, very little, but we
knew people from that church and wanted to be like those people. Do you
understand?
Esther: [in English] You wanted to. . .
Dmitri: [in English] be like people from the Presbyterian church.
Esther: Okay, right.
Dmitri: [in English] Look like them. . . . [in Russian] Yes, we wanted to be such
people. And only then, later, when Peter Ford came for seven months – he had
lived in the Philippines, and he was from a Reformed church – only then we
learned for the first time about what was Reformation, what was Reformed
teaching, theology, we learned about Jean Calvin and so on. And there was a
moment when I believed and it was a joyous moment for me in my life. Because
I received confidence . . . that I am saved, that God loves me, and that God would
change my life. It was a wonderful moment. Of course, later I was assured of it
many, many times.
In this exchange Dmitri and Lena discuss the moment when they were standing at the
edge between the Western missionaries and the Ukrainian Baptist Church – a
denomination that to them represented a restriction of freedom. The church of the
American missionaries symbolized freedom – freedom from social rules of dress and
behavior, spiritual freedom (what Dmitri calls “freedom in Christ”), and freedom to
organize their own church from the ground up (the freedom to have agency in their
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future). These new Ukrainian Protestants chose to model their lives on the American
CoMission workers who lived with them for one year. Dmitri says repeatedly that “we
wanted to be like the people from the Presbyterian Church.” To “look like them,” to “be
such people.” Because of this choice, this small group of new believers founded an
Evangelical Presbyterian congregation in Belgorod.

They maintain a friendly

relationship with the Baptist church in town (and treat many Baptists at the Christian
Medical Clinic they subsequently opened), but they decided not to join that church.

5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the development of two strains of Ukrainian
evangelicalism in the post-Soviet era. The traditional Baptists come out of a multigenerational history that endured hostile government policy towards their religious
practices. During the past fifteen years people, ideas, and money from the West have
infused these churches, often creating new cultural forms and sets of challenging
circumstances that would not have been imagined two decades ago. The new Protestants
were converted to their churches by Western missionaries; most of the new believers
came out of atheist or nominally Orthodox backgrounds. These new churches are in the
process of being indigenized, as the leadership positions are being assumed by Ukrainian
church members and the Americans begin returning home.
Among questions raised by the contrasting histories of the two groups is the
matter of identity. Will their church members approach identity in different ways? Do
Ukrainian Baptists perceive their identity as Ukrainians differently than do members of
new churches?

Moreover, how does each group embrace or reject a transnational

identity? How do they perceive the West and participation in a transnational religious
community? The following chapter examines questions of regional and national identity
among these groups, and also divides them regionally, to compare the identities of
Western Ukrainians with those living elsewhere in the country. Then Chapter Seven
takes up the question of transnationalism, and that is where we see that the old church /
new church dichotomy comes into full effect.

Copyright © 2005 Esther Grace Long
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Chapter Six: Regionalism and nationalism in Ukrainian evangelical churches

We’re a totally Ukrainian church.
–Pastor Mykola, L’viv Greater Grace Church
We don’t think of our church as Ukrainian. . . . That’s the Orthodox Church. . . .Who
calls our church a Ukrainian church? We don’t even think of that. It is just a church of –
a Christian church. Baptist. We even speak in Russian.
–members of Kherson Baptist Church

6.1 Introduction
Evangelicals in L’viv and Kherson disagree about whether their churches are
“Ukrainian” or not. They disagree about what language to speak at church: the Russian
language dominates Ukrainian churches in the East and South; Ukrainian prevails in the
West, and a combination of the two languages is used in churches in the central parts of
the country. The evangelicals involved in this study also vary regionally according to
their views about the Ukrainian nation. Although nearly all Ukrainian evangelicals
represented here reject a notion of Ukrainian national identity that is expressed through
their religious faith (that is, if they espouse nationalism it is secular, not religious), L’viv
church goers were much more likely to express patriotic feelings than those from other
cities, and at times their patriotism was evident in their religious life. L’viv evangelicals
stand apart from those in the other three cities in their perspective towards regionalism
and Ukrainian national identity.
Is Stephen Shulman correct when he divides the country up into two halves, East
and West? He writes:
The structure of Ukrainian society is basically ‘bipolar.’ Geographic cleavages in
Ukraine reinforce ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic cleavages.
Predominantly agricultural Western Ukraine is composed mainly of ethnic
Ukrainians, many of whom are Greek-Catholic. Predominantly industrial Eastern
Ukraine is composed mostly of ethnic Russians or Russified (Russian-speaking)
Ukrainians, many of whom are Eastern Orthodox (1999b, 1012).
Catherine Wanner disagrees. She argues that “the fracturing of Ukraine goes beyond an
east-west dichotomy” and has divides “far more blurred than the national allegiances that
are assumed to follow linguistic lines” (Wanner 1998, xxvi).
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Wanner is correct – Ukraine’s regional variations are complex and varied.
However, the findings presented in this chapter show that within that diversity, the EastWest division remains relevant: there are real differences between churches in L’viv and
elsewhere in the country. The notion of ‘Western Ukraine’ is strongly held by the
Ukrainian evangelicals involved in this study, both those who live in western parts of the
country and those who do not.

I suggest that while it is an oversimplification of

Ukraine’s human mosaic to divide the country into two pieces, it can also legitimately be
divided into ‘Western Ukraine’ and ‘Everything Else.’ This chapter will examine how
Western Ukraine impacts Ukrainian Protestants in how they see their own national
identity.
Churches from all four cities and from both denominational categories (Baptist
and new churches) are considered jointly in this chapter because the location of the
church proves to be a more powerful variable than denominational type for explaining the
views of Ukrainian Protestants towards issues of regionalism and nationalism. In L’viv,
for instance, both Baptists and members of the Greater Grace Church, despite deep
differences in other areas, share common views towards Ukraine’s regionalism and the
Ukrainian nation. In the other cities it also held true that, in terms of questions of region
and nation, there were few discernible differences across denominational lines.
Although this chapter examines some potentially divisive issues for Ukrainian
churches, at the same time there is widespread agreement that matters of regionalism or
nationalism do not fundamentally disrupt relations between the churches. As Ruslan
from the Nazarene Church in Vinnytsia said, “There are no differences. God is the same.
What differences could there be?” Vika continued, “There can be difference only in
language. That is in L’viv and Lutsk where, for example, they speak pure Ukrainian. So
it is just formal differences. But in church, in spiritual matters, there’s no difference.”
That said, some tensions in these areas became apparent in many of the interviews. In the
same focus group interview in Vinnytsia, Tatiana, a young woman who recently came
into the church, expressed the frustration that she feels as a Russian speaker towards
those in Western Ukraine, particularly Western Ukrainians outside of the church:
Really, we can define these . . . regions just because there are strong language
conflicts. In the west of Ukraine they despise Russian-speaking Ukrainians. . . . I
traveled a lot around western Ukraine. Even when I spoke Ukrainian and
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accidentally said some Russian word, people were kind of hostile and said,
“Moskalka.” 30 People there are very aggressive toward Russian-speaking
Ukrainians, to say nothing about Russians. They are raised in a nationalistic
environment from childhood. And really it’s not just love for Ukraine; it’s simply
nationalism. They simply don’t accept – and even if we came there to bring them
the good news in Russian, they would be hostile toward us.
Although Tatiana’s heartfelt feelings against regionalism and nationalism were among
the most extreme I encountered in any of the interviews, and perhaps do not represent the
typical attitude of Ukrainian Protestants towards these issues, they illustrate the close
relationship between regionalism and nationalism in Ukraine and how those identities are
present within evangelical churches. Of particular note is that in this passage Tatiana
used language as a marker for national identity. Competition between the use of the
Russian and Ukrainian languages is a controversial topic in other social spheres, so it
comes as no surprise that the debate extends into the Protestant religious community. 31

6.2 Where is Western Ukraine?
Before examining expressions of regional and national identity through the results
of the ethnographic research, here I want to report how the research participants
cartographically conceived of Ukraine’s regions. Each focus group participant was given
a blank outline map of Ukraine’s administrative regions (oblasti) similar to the map in
Figure 6.1.

They were asked to draw on the map their own impression of where

Ukraine’s cultural regions were located – as few or as many regions as they felt
appropriate. The data on these maps represents a collective mental map of Ukraine’s
regions. In this section I analyze the maps to get a picture of how Ukrainians divide their
country regionally. Are some regions universally accepted? Are others less so? Does
the regional division of Ukraine vary according to the hometown of the participant?
Not all focus group participants turned in a map, and of the 108 maps collected,
only 89 contain information about Ukraine’s regions. The other nineteen maps have no
regional boundaries marked – perhaps the participants decided that Ukraine has no
30

Moskalka is a derisive term for Russians that derives from the word Moscow.
As Dominique Arel has written, language and nationality are often equated in Ukraine, and even in the
most recent (2001) Ukrainian census, Ukrainians answered the question about native language to reflect
their political preferences more than their actual language use preference (2002). In other words, in the
census the phrase ‘native language’ was often interpreted politically, with those in favor of an independent
Ukraine likely to select ‘Ukrainian’ regardless of what language they actually prefer to use in daily life.
31
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regional boundaries, they did not understand the task, or they simply did not wish to
participate in the activity. Only maps with understandable information on them are
considered here.
Figure 6.1: Ukraine’s Administrative Divisions

Although a wide variety of regional divisions can be seen on these 89 maps,
Ukraine was most commonly divided into four regions: West, Central, East, and South.
An alternate pattern divided the eastern two-thirds of the country into northern and
southern regions, with the West remaining the same as before. Some people subdivided
the regions into smaller areas (North Central, Southeast, Southwest, etc.). About onethird of the maps showed Crimea in its own region. Some maps left certain oblasts out of
any region in particular – they only marked regional centers (L’viv in the West, Kyiv in
the center, etc.) – and the other oblasts remained unattached.
By compiling the data from all 89 maps, we can see that Western Ukraine is the
area with the strongest regional identity. Seven oblasts are firmly in its grasp: L’viv
(96.6 percent placed it there), Ivano-Frankivsk (88.8%), Ternopil’ (87.6%), Zakarpatya
(85.4%), Volyn (82%), Chernivtsi (79.8%), and Rivne (76.4%). Nearly two out of three
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maps placed Khmelnitskiy in that region (64%).

Weak contenders were Vinnytsia

(12.4%) and Zhitomir (10.1%). (See Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2: Western Ukraine

There was much less agreement about the location of Central Ukraine. All oblasts
were considered ‘Central’ on at least one map, and no oblast was placed there on more
than 71 percent of the maps. The strongest Central oblasts were Cherkasy (70.8%) and
Kyiv (69.7%), although Figure 6.3 shows that three other oblasts were also placed in the
Center more than half of the time (Zhitomir 61.8%, Kirovograd 53.9%, and Vinnytsia
58.4%).
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Figure 6.3: Central Ukraine

There were also a wide variety of opinions about the location of Eastern Ukraine.
Some people placed the boundary between East and West much farther to the west than
others, who placed only the easternmost border oblasts in that region. In sum, there were
five oblasts grouped in Eastern Ukraine on more than half of the maps: Donetsk (82%),
Kharkiv (74.2%), Luhansk (80.9%), Dnipropetrovsk (68.5%), and Zaporizhya (59.6%).
(See Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.4: Eastern Ukraine

There were only three oblasts placed in Southern Ukraine more than half of the
time: Kherson (60.7%), Mykolayiv (60.7%), and Odessa (53.9%).

Crimea was

considered together with Kherson and the others on 36% of the maps. (See Figure 6.5).
Southern Ukraine is shown to be the weakest of the main four Ukrainian regions; each of
the southern oblasts was also at times considered to be in the eastern or central portions
of the country.
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Figure 6.5: Southern Ukraine

These maps show that there is not a uniform understanding of the territorial
makeup of Ukraine’s regions. Not everyone agrees that Vinnytsia, for example, should
be considered part of Central Ukraine. It is variously placed in the West, Center, East,
South, North, and West Central portions of the country. Despite the wide range of
responses, one region stands out as having the strongest cartographic identity: the West.
Western Ukraine is the Ukrainian region that the largest majority of respondents
identified, and they tended to agree about which oblasts were part of it.
When the regional maps are separated according to the hometown of the
participants, there are very few changes in the results. One difference is that people who
live in L’viv marked a smaller core area for Western Ukraine than did participants living
in the other three cities. In other words, L’viv residents placed some oblasts outside of
Western Ukraine that other Ukrainians would consider part of the region. An example of
this is Vinnytsia. Only two people out of the 27 L’viv respondents considered Vinnytsia
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to be part of Western Ukraine (7.4%), while nine of the 82 others (14.5%) put it in the
West.
This map data refutes Shulman’s statement that Ukraine is “essentially bi-polar”
in its regional divisions, with a Ukrainian language West and a Russian language East.
We see that on these maps most people divided the country into four or more cultural
regions. In this sense Wanner was correct when she stated that the division of Ukraine
“goes beyond an east-west dichotomy.” However, these maps are strong evidence that
the western Ukrainian oblasts are not categorized with the rest of the country in the minds
of many Ukrainian people. This cartographic data reveals that the majority of Ukrainian
evangelicals who participated in this study believe in the existence of a Western
Ukrainian cultural region and are in general agreement as to its location. I suggest that
Western Ukraine remains a distinct region in the minds of many Ukrainians, and the rest
of this chapter will show that the notion of Western Ukraine is present in Ukrainian
evangelical churches, and makes a real difference in the lives of Ukrainian evangelicals.

6.3 Regional identity in Ukraine’s evangelical churches
The maps analyzed above and the ethnographic research that will be explained
here show that Ukrainian Protestants do produce a regional scale in how they divide and
order space. For the most part, the strongest expressions of regional identity were found
in western Ukrainian churches. Church members in other areas were more vocal about
not being from western Ukraine than they were in affirmation of their own Ukrainian
region. For Protestants living in central and southern Ukraine, western Ukraine serves as
‘other’ for their image of a Ukrainian national identity as multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan.
That is, they believe that Russian is a valid language for the modern Ukrainian nation,
and they contrast their desire for a bilingual national identity with what they perceive to
be a monolingual Ukrainianism favored in the western part of the country.
Here I examine the strongest indicator of regional identity: language use and
opinions about language use in Ukraine. Then I examine the widely held belief that
western Ukraine is a site of traditional religious devotion when compared to other parts of
the country.
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6.3.1 The politics of language as a regional issue in evangelical churches
In the excerpt from the Vinnytsia Nazarene focus group quoted in the chapter
introduction, Tatiana identified language difference as the most significant conflict
between western Ukraine and the rest of the country. Language is always one of the first
topics to arise when Ukrainian regionalism is discussed, although Kuzio (1996) cautions
against viewing language as the central component of Ukrainian national identity. He
notes that one can be a Russian speaker and still be loyal to an independent Ukrainian
state. In Liber’s (1998) analysis of Ukraine’s regional variations he identifies linguistic
differences as one of three areas (in addition to political and economic) distinguishing
western Ukraine from the eastern and southern parts of the country. Regional divides
show up repeatedly in Ukraine, whether it be in language spoken or in the results of the
controversial 2004 presidential election (where western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine
generally supported different candidates.) However, language is the most visible marker
of the regional divide, and remains a divisive issue in Ukraine. Although Russian was
the state language during the years of the Soviet Union, and is still the language of choice
for about half of all Ukrainians, 32 since independence Ukrainian has been the country’s
official language. Now most schools teach all of their subjects in Ukrainian, Russian is
taught as a foreign language, and all official government business is transacted in
Ukrainian.
Unsurprisingly, the regional linguistic variation in Ukraine is reflected within
evangelical churches. In fact, to an outside observer of worship services, the only clear
difference between the Baptist churches in the various cities is language use: in L’viv
(western Ukraine) Ukrainian is spoken almost exclusively in the services, in Vinnytsia
(central Ukraine) a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian is used, and in BelgorodDnestrovskiy (southern Ukraine) and Kherson (southeastern Ukraine) Russian is used
with very little Ukrainian. The only Russian I heard in L’viv Central Baptist was in the
lyrics of an occasional choir anthem; in the Russian-speaking cities of BelgorodDnestrovskiy and Kherson, Baptist choirs likewise occasionally sang in the non-dominant

32

According to public opinion surveys as reported by Roman Solchanyk, between 43 and 55 percent of
Ukrainians used Russian as the language of convenience in the late 1990s (2000). See also (Arel 2002), p.
238.
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language, Ukrainian. The non-Baptist churches that I visited in these cities shared the
pattern of language use found in the Baptist churches. The Greater Grace church in L’viv
used only Ukrainian, and the Presbyterian churches in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy and
Kherson used only Russian. 33 Churches in Vinnytsia had the most complicated linguistic
situation of all the churches. Evidently in the past the pastor of Vinnytsia Central Baptist,
a man with a university degree from a prestigious academy in Leningrad, used to preach
only in Russian. Now he preaches only in Ukrainian. Each pastor at the church is
permitted to make his own choice regarding what language to speak from the pulpit. The
congregants seem to understand both languages equally well, and the language slides
back and forth repeatedly during the course of a service.
Although most Ukrainians claim to know both Russian and Ukrainian, I found
evidence that this is not always true among the Protestant community. When asked,
some Kherson Presbyterians were in disagreement about the correct pronunciation of a
certain phrase in Ukrainian (the Ukrainian equivalent of the French bon appetit).

A

L’viv shopkeeper in a Protestant bookstore could not remember the Russian word for
‘April’ when he tried to explain when a certain book might be in stock. At a Christian
education conference in L’viv to which people came from across the country, all talks
presented in Russian were translated into Ukrainian to ensure everyone’s comprehension,
to the surprise of some in the crowd. Two women from the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy
Presbyterian Church who attended the conference expressed their amusement and
frustration about having to listen to every talk twice, since they were bi-lingual, and
incorrectly assumed that all other Ukrainians would also be able to comfortably listen to
both languages.
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However, an independent Baptist church in L’viv, not one of the case study churches, is known as a
“Russian” church. More of the congregation are native Russian speakers than at other L’viv churches, and
Russian is used more often in their services than at other churches.
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6.3.1a The view toward language in Vinnytsia, Belgorod, and Kherson
Here I will further analyze the language issue by region, starting with evangelicals
living outside of L’viv. At a Kherson Presbyterian Church focus group several people
debated whether or not people living in western Ukraine understand Russian, and
whether or not they themselves understand Ukrainian:
Lina: But listen, they all [people in Western Ukraine] understand Russian. They
understand.
Nelya: No, they don’t understand in L’viv.
Sergey: They understand.
Nelya: Uh-uh.
Nadia: Yes! How can Ukrainians not understand Russian?
Woman: No.
[several talking at once – several remarks are inaudible].
Nadia: I’m a Moldovan by nationality and I’ve never studied Ukrainian but I
understand everything. Tell me any word. I understand everything in Ukrainian.
Nelya: You won’t understand the western dialect.
Lina: It’s true – it’s hard for us Russians to understand.
Woman: Right.
Lina: It’s hard, but there [in Western Ukraine], Ukrainians can understand
Russian.
Through this conversation these residents of Kherson are making a case for the validity of
Russian as a national language. They want Russian to be seen as a legitimate language
for Ukrainians to use in daily life. They want the two languages to be equal; they want
people in all parts of the country to be able to understand both Ukrainian and Russian
equally well. Lina, Nadia, and Sergey insist that all Ukrainians do understand Russian,
and it seems to be more important to them that all Ukrainians know Russian than that all
speak Ukrainian (they admit that as Russian speakers they struggle to understand the
Western Ukrainian dialect). In the context of the interview (more of which follows), this
conversation is a criticism of Western Ukrainian churches for requiring visiting preachers
to speak in Ukrainian, not Russian.
Yura, a former Baptist but now a young seminary student from the Kherson
Presbyterian Church, spoke of regional language differences as a difficulty in his own
ministry:
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First of all there is the problem of language, and in Ukraine there is an emphasis
on the importance of language. So when I visit Reformed churches in Western
Ukraine and when I come to a Reformed church 34 to preach, I preach in Russian
with my southern Ukrainian accent. Then they understand that I’m their brother
but they have a negative attitude toward my language.
At one level the western Ukrainians know that Yura is a spiritual “brother” and they
come to hear a sermon from him at church, presumably because they want to receive
religious instruction from him. However, as soon as he opens his mouth and speaks in
his native Russian with a “southern Ukrainian” accent they know where he is from. The
language marks him as an outsider. Despite the fraternal aspect of their relationship they
have a “negative attitude” towards his language. The listeners and the preacher are
different from each other – his language marks him as Other. At least, Yura senses that
his language marks him as Other and he is aware of his own Otherness. Here language
indicates a regional identity that differentiates western Ukraine from the rest of the
country, and at its core the regional marker has to do with national identity. Perhaps
Yura thinks that his audience is judging him as somehow less Ukrainian because of his
language and accent.
The following excerpt is taken from the same Kherson Presbyterian focus group
that debated whether or not all Ukrainians could understand Russian. Like Yura, they are
aware of a prejudice against the Russian language in western Ukraine. As before, we see
that they want Russian to be a valid language for the Ukrainian nation. However, they
don’t interpret their own claim to the Russian language as a nationalist move. Instead,
they are prepared to cede “nationalism” to the Ukrainian speakers, and because they
reject that version of Ukrainian nationalism, they claim to reject nationalism itself. They
especially reject a nationalism in the church that is based on the Ukrainian language.
First Nadia, an English teacher and ethnic Moldovan, downplays the Ukrainian aspects of
their church. Then Sergey, a former Baptist from central Ukraine who switched to the
Presbyterian church, talks about the expectation that visiting preachers to western
Ukraine will speak in Ukrainian, not Russian:
Nadia: We love all the nationalities and we’re always glad to see all and we never
emphasize that we’re Ukrainians and want to communicate only with Ukrainians.
34

Yura is talking about a congregation of the Ukrainian Evangelical Reformed Church, a denomination
referred to in Chapter Four. Yura’s seminary is a joint Presbyterian and Reformed institution, and thus
provides cross-denominational (and cross-regional) ministry opportunities.
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We don’t have something like that. We’re glad to communicate with all people
from different countries. It enriches us with experience. And, in general, a lot
more.
Lina: In one word we’re Christians.
Woman: We are brothers and sisters.
Sergey: But I came from – There are Christian denominations, even in Ukraine,
especially in Western Ukraine in L’viv, there you have to preach, if a man comes
from another church, he is obligated to, if he doesn’t preach in Ukrainian, he
needs to preach through an interpreter. And that is required by the members, by
those who attend that church. And that kind of nationalism [natsionalnost] –
Lina: There’s not enough love, it seems to me.
Sergey: But more, it’s just that they’re turned more to nationalism in language
and in traditionalism.
This exchange illustrates that these Presbyterians imagine western Ukrainians as different
from themselves: they are more nationalistic, more focused on the Ukrainian language,
more traditional in their religious beliefs (something discussed later), and do not exhibit
enough love towards others in Ukraine who do not share those views. The Kherson
group is uniform in their belief that western Ukrainians have rejected the Russian
language as a valid language for the Ukrainian nation. In return, they themselves reject
that definition of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, they add a spiritual level to the
discussion, saying that focusing on the Ukrainian language and disallowing Russian in
church represents a deficit of “love” and a focus on things that are not important.
Kherson Baptists agree with the Presbyterians that western Ukrainians are overly
concerned about Ukrainian language use and nationalism. Yura remarks that western
Ukrainians accuse the Russian speakers of living in Ukraine but “not know[ing] the
Ukrainian language like we should.” This small group of Russian speaking Ukrainians
downplays the importance of the Ukrainian language for Ukrainian churches. Tanya
continues, “When we have celebrations, holiday services, we have to sing in Ukrainian,
in Russian, in English, in Gypsy, in Hebrew. We really love this and it is a holiday for
us, when we sing in various languages.

For us there is no difference.”

She puts

Ukrainian on the same level as all other languages for use in the church, stripping it of its
special character as a national language. This group of Kherson Baptists is critical of the
western Ukrainian emphasis on using solely the Ukrainian language in church services.
When Nadia says that in their church they “love all nationalities” she is actually making a
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claim for a Ukrainian nationalism that is cosmopolitan, multi-lingual, diverse, and that
above all speaks Russian.
Before turning to what the L’viv evangelicals said about this language issue, I will
give one more example of a non-L’viv point of view, this time from Vinnytsia. Maksim
is a member of the Vinnytsia Central Baptist church and the thirty-something father of
three. He said that:
if people from here go to the west [of Ukraine] and preach a sermon in Russian,
then 80 percent of the congregation thinks about something else. If it is in
Russian. Because that region was under Poland until 1945, and they gave more
freedom for Ukrainian. Here, we have the expansion of the Russian language,
mainly in the eastern regions. That’s why the majority of the population here
speaks Russian. I know that it is a bit of a problem. I personally heard and
witnessed it, when people said, “Oh, here come these Russians.”
Maksim places the language issue in its historical context, remembering that western
Ukraine was not part of the Soviet Union until the era of the Second World War. Russian
was not an important language in L’viv until the russification and sovietization efforts of
the post-war period. Maksim realizes that when Ukrainians from other parts of the
country come to L’viv speaking Russian, they are thought of as “these Russians,” as in
“these Soviets.” Whether the L’viv listeners “think about something else” during a
Russian sermon because they don’t understand the language, or because they don’t want
to understand, remains unclear.
On the whole, the notion that regional language differences are an obstacle for the
Ukrainian Protestant church community is a common one in both Baptist and non-Baptist
churches outside of L’viv. These evangelicals tend to be more comfortable speaking
Russian than Ukrainian and they associate the Ukrainian language with nationalism. A
nationalism based solely on the Ukrainian language is something they wish to avoid and
they are trying to keep it out of their churches. Instead, they are in favor of a nationalism
that includes the Russian language.

6.3.1b The view towards language from within L’viv
All of the church services I attended in L’viv were conducted in Ukrainian, and
people I met in those churches took it as a matter of course that Ukrainian should be the
dominant language in a Ukrainian church. Of those I asked, few people outwardly
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attributed any importance to language as a marker of regional difference. They did not
seem to be interested in the Russian-Ukrainian language division. Others, however,
particularly at the Baptist church, did voice strong support for the mandatory use of
Ukrainian language at their church and for the distinction of western Ukraine as a
regional identity.
Vitaliy, a man in his mid-40s who teaches at the L’viv police academy,
recognized that Ukraine has regional differentiation. However, he did not even list
language as one of the features distinguishing Christians in other regions from each other.
I asked whether or not a church in western Ukraine would be different from a church in
eastern Ukraine. Vitaliy replied:
I think they are different, because churches are first of all people, and the
mentality of people differs depending on the place where they live, traditions,
their way of life. For example, the western region is more traditionally religious
and it’s harder here for the Protestants to grow. In the East it’s easier, because
they are in a more atheistic region. From one side, Protestants in the East and
West are going to be different from each other. But from still another side, if they
believe in Christ as the center of their life, then they will be able to understand
each other even if they are different. That’s what I think.
Regional differences may exist, but Vitaliy does not think they are spiritually important.
Instead of identifying language as the main difference between eastern and western
Ukraine, Vitaliy focuses on the regions’ previous histories with regards to religion.
Eastern Ukraine, which was under the Soviet anti-religious regime for a longer period of
time than was L’viv, is a more atheistic part of the country. Vitaliy thinks that because
people in L’viv have close ties to the traditional faiths (Orthodoxy and Catholicism), they
will be less willing to accept a new religion than those in atheist areas.
When I interviewed young adults at the L’viv Central Baptist church across town
they wanted to completely deemphasize regional divisions as significant in the church.
Instead, they argued that of more importance were the differences between traditional and
less traditional Protestant churches within all regions:
Kolya: The Baptist movement has many common things in Ukraine.
Miroslava: Kolya, maybe the culture. . .
Kolya: They only speak in Russian, but in general there are no big differences
and no differences in doctrines because the Baptist churches are centralized.
Miroslava: Sometimes there could be differences in the meetings.
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Artyom: No. Well, it is possible to find some differences [between traditional and
less traditional churches.]
Esther: So it doesn’t have to do with region, it is just differences.
Artyom: It is just differences.
The participants went on to talk more about those differences, what they see as largely a
generational divide that threatens the church. In the following chapter I will examine
their concerns in the context of transnationalism. However, despite disavowing regional
differences here, later in the interview other members of the group actually named a
“Western Ukrainian mentality” that is linked to the Ukrainian language. I asked them if
they considered their church to be a Ukrainian church:
Ihor: The thing is that people are not really welcome to preach in Russian, and
some people are really against that. Guests can get away with preaching in
Russian, guests don’t know the language, and okay, we can forgive. But if a
member gets up and starts preaching or singing [in Russian], then it’s a problem –
Bohdan: It is natural. Because here there are a lot of people and they have
children who just don’t know Russian. They may be able to understand in
general, but they can’t say anything in Russian and because of this and because it
is Ukraine and western Ukraine it needs to be in Ukrainian.
Misha: Also there is the influence of a “Western Ukrainian” mentality. They got
used to the pure Ukrainian language and some people who want to learn
Ukrainian come here from other countries to L’viv to study the literature and
language because there’s something special in the Ukrainian language.
These young people support the notion that western Ukraine is distinct from elsewhere,
and that language use is rightfully enforced by the church members. The Kherson
interviewees were not exaggerating when they said that they were not welcome to speak
in Russian in L’viv churches. In this excerpt, L’viv Baptists give two reasons for their
hostility towards the Russian language in church: First, their children do not know
Russian, and if a visitor speaks Russian then they will not understand what is said. They
suggest that adults understand Russian, but that the new generation does not. This is
perhaps an outcome of the new Ukrainian education policy that teaches all subjects in
Ukrainian, not Russian. The second reason given for enforcing a Ukrainian language
policy in L’viv churches is that “it is Ukraine.” Because they are a Ukrainian city, and
especially because they are a western Ukrainian city, Bohdan says that things need to be
in Ukrainian. He implies that there is no reason for Ukrainians to speak Russian, a
foreign language. Misha adds that they are under the influence of a “Western Ukrainian
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mentality” and that “there is something special about the Ukrainian language.” They
clearly articulate the existence of a western Ukrainian region and its effects on church
life.
The L’viv evangelicals have a completely different perspective on the relationship
between being Ukrainian and speaking Ukrainian than do those in Kherson and
Vinnytsia. The Kherson residents who participated in this project took offence at the
Ukrainian-only policy enforced in L’viv churches. L’viv believers, on the other hand,
wouldn’t have it any other way. To them, speaking Ukrainian is part of their identity as
Ukrainians in general and as western Ukrainians in particular. They will not be swayed
by their Russian speaking brethren, although if a visitor speaks Russian in church they
“can forgive.”
Earlier we saw how Sergey from the Kherson Presbyterian Church described
Christians in western Ukraine as “turned more to nationalism in language and in
traditionalism.”

He associates all three of those concepts with western Ukraine:

nationalism, the Ukrainian language, and traditional religious practices. Before moving
on to other aspects of nationalism in Ukraine’s Protestant churches (besides language,
which is both a national and regional issue), I want to briefly unpack the third idea that
Sergey tied to western Ukraine, that the region is known for “traditional religious
practices.”

6.3.2 Western Ukraine as a site of traditional religious devotion
The notion that Christians in western Ukraine are more serious about religion and
more traditional in their practice of it than those in other parts of the country came up
several times in interviews of people inside and outside the region, but in different ways.
One Protestant man in L’viv viewed the traditional religiosity of fellow western
Ukrainians as an obstacle to the growth of Protestantism. Recall that Vitaliy, the police
academy instructor and western Ukrainian native, said that “the western region is more
traditionally religious and it’s harder here for the Protestants to grow.” This reflects the
commonly-held belief that Protestant churches will flourish more readily in places where
there is less religious competition from other churches, and so are at a disadvantage in
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L’viv. L’viv is known as a stronghold of the Greek Catholic Church and, to a lesser
extent, the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches.
Members of the Presbyterian churches of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy and Kherson
also attributed more conservatism and religiosity to western Ukrainians, but they were
not only talking about members of traditional churches.

They even viewed other

Protestants in western Ukraine as being the most conservative in the country. A vivid
example of this is from a focus group interview with Presbyterians in BelgorodDnestrovskiy in the South. Galina, a senior citizen and church member, talked about
visiting other Protestant churches, including Pentecostal churches, on a trip to western
Ukraine:
In western [Ukrainian] churches there is stricter, firmer, stauncher faith, stronger
faith. That’s what I perceived, because when I was there I visited [churches].
When I went to church in western Ukraine a zealous lady at church gave me a
Bible in the Ukrainian language. They are really devoted – they even drink
mineral water, they don’t drink [alcohol] there. They are devoted and they work,
they evangelize, they always work, work. And because they work so much, they
told me, they build new buildings, then they will work even harder. “We always
need to work and work.” Here we don’t work all the time. To this point we work
very little.
Galina, a southern Ukrainian, labeled Protestants from western Ukraine strict, firm,
staunch, strong, zealous, devoted, and hard-working. This is in contrast with how she
portrays believers she knows in her own region, including herself, who work “very little.”
Nelya, a woman from the Kherson Presbyterian Church, held similar views about
Christians in western Ukraine, although she didn’t specify which Christians she was
talking about (Protestant, Orthodox, or Greek Catholic). For Nelya, western Ukrainians
are more traditional and rule-oriented than zealous and hard-working:
Oh, there in the West they have so many traditions! They don’t go [to church]
without scarves. You can’t wear lipstick or eye makeup, earrings. . . . It’s all
forbidden in church. There is no make-up. Hair is not cut, and everything. . . .”
Nelya’s list of restrictions resembles the list of rules followed at the Baptist churches in
her own, non-Western, city. In fact, Nelya herself is a former member of a Baptist
church in Kherson, a Baptist church at which women are expected to wear skirts or
dresses to worship and avoid excessive use of cosmetics. Married women are to attend
worship with their heads covered. Even though these rules are upheld across Ukraine,
Nelya attributes religious traditionalism primarily to the western part of the country.
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A member of the Vinnytsia Central Baptist Church remarked that people in
western Ukraine are generally “more God-fearing” than in other parts of the country.
However, perhaps because of their national-level organization and close ties with fellow
Baptists who live in all areas of the country, the Baptists I asked about this tended to see
western Ukrainian Baptists as more or less like themselves when it came to religious
devotion. Valentina, a member of the Vinnytsia Baptist Church and the wife of a retired
military officer, denied that western Ukrainian churches would be any more conservative
than her own: “We don’t have differences within our churches. We are all the same. All
churches in Ukraine belong to the Brotherhood. I also wanted to say that our pastors
keep to conservative, fundamental evangelism. And I accept conservatism.” Valentina is
proud of her conservatism, and unwilling to call any church more conservative than her
own.
In summary, there is somewhat of a consensus that western Ukraine is a more
religious place than other parts of the country. Vitaliy in L’viv finds it to be a region
where the traditional faiths of Orthodoxy and Catholicism are particularly strong; these
traditional churches pose a hindrance to the growth of evangelical churches. Nelya in
Kherson and Galina in Belgorod apply the traditionalism label to other Protestant
churches. They find that western Ukrainian Protestants hold traditional customs (somber
clothing, long hair, no alcohol) and are generally more zealous and devout than
evangelicals elsewhere. The non-L’viv Baptists, however, seem not to want to find
anyone more conservative than they are, since conservatism (fundamentalism) is an
important value in their religion. Thus Valentina in Vinnytsia said that they “don’t have
differences” in their churches, “they are all the same,” and that her pastors “keep to
conservative, fundamental evangelism.”

6.3.3 Regionalism conclusion
In Chapter Four we saw that regional variation, most notably between western
Ukraine and the rest of the country, has deep historical roots. So far in this chapter we
have seen that ‘region’ expresses itself in the practices and opinions of Ukraine’s
Protestants, most notably through the policing of language use in worship services and
views toward language politics, as well as by a casting of western Ukraine as a site of
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traditional religious devotion. Protestants from Russian-speaking churches (especially in
Kherson and Belgorod) used their chastisement of the language policy in western
Ukrainian churches to argue for a Russian language component of Ukrainian national
identity. They perceive the dominant Ukrainian nationalism as narrow and traditional,
and instead want a national identity that is diverse and cosmopolitan.
Western Ukraine looms large in the geographical imagination of most Ukrainian
Protestants, and from other studies we know that in this respect Protestants share the
views of most Ukrainians. Birch (1995, 1035) showed that ‘region’ exerts independent
impact on political beliefs in Ukraine, while Craumer and Clem (1999) also found that
regional variation has political implications, in their case on the results of the 1998
elections. Although Hesli’s research indicates that Ukraine’s regional polarization is
weakening over time (Hesli, Reisinger, and Miller 1998), this project with Ukrainian
Protestants shows that regional identity definitely remains in play among this population
subgroup.

Like Kubicek (2000), I found that regionalism persists as a feature of

Ukrainian life.

6.4 Nationalism in the evangelical Protestant churches of Ukraine
We have already seen that evangelicals from Russian-speaking areas have a
different idea of Ukrainian national identity than do those from L’viv. Probing the
question of regional identity revealed that Russian-speaking evangelicals from both old
and new churches want a multi-lingual national community; evangelicals in L’viv, on the
other hand, want a Ukrainian-speaking national community.

Here we will further

examine the idea of nationalism as it appears in Ukrainian evangelical church life.
Nationalism is not something that I ever heard Ukrainian Protestants talk about
unless they were answering a direct question, although of course their relationship to the
national state as a political unit and a geographical reality is something that all of them
negotiate in their personal lives and as members of a church.

For example, most

denominations are organized nationally, and have some sort of governing structure at that
level.

The Evangelical Christians-Baptists have central offices in Kyiv and ‘oblast

pastors’ who are in charge of the churches in each of the country’s 25 administrative
regions. The Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ukraine, a denomination with Ukraine
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in its name, has a national governing body which is a Presbytery of elders from each of
the churches that have been organized in Ukraine so far. All congregations from every
denomination are expected to register with the Ukrainian state and follow Ukraine’s laws
for religious organizations, which include obligations like procuring the proper visas for
visiting missionaries and filling out the paperwork to register Christian schools and
theological seminaries.
Apart from obvious elements such as a national church organization, relationship
to the Ukrainian state and use of the Ukrainian language for church-state business, I
observed Ukrainian Protestants demonstrate affection for their country and engagement
in civic affairs in all four cities, even in heavily Russified areas, and especially in newer
churches. Indeed, engagement with the civic state was much more prominent in newer
churches than in older Baptist ones. One of the most popular contemporary praise songs
in the evangelical churches I visited was a Ukrainian language song called “I Pray about
Ukraine,” which is a prayer for the future of the country. The song seems to tap into a
genuine love of country and raises questions about what it means to be a Christian
believer in Ukraine. One young Presbyterian told me that even non-Christians know the
song and sing it as a patriotic anthem:
Lord, I pray about Ukraine
Lord, I pray about the people
Forgive them, save them
Show us your mercy
Lord, I know you will be with us
In your temple under the skies
You gave your life for people
And wrote our names in the Book of Life. 35
This song was sung in Ukrainian even in the Russian-speaking cities of Kherson and
Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy. Although “I Pray about Ukraine” was occasionally heard sung
by young Baptists, I heard it more often in newer churches like the Kherson and Belgorod
Presbyterian churches and at L’viv Greater Grace. This song represents a desire to place
the Ukrainian nation under the protection and salvation of the evangelicals’ God.
Ukrainian evangelicals, especially those in new churches, are quite serious about their
role in society. They want to engage society and spiritually redeem it.
35

Author unknown; English translation of the Ukrainian by Olga Koch.
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People in newer churches were more likely than Baptists to discuss their practices
of praying for the government and participating in civic affairs. This statement was made
during a focus group with Nazarenes from Vinnytsia:
Ruslan: We pray for our president and our Parliament. And we believe that the
church has to influence the upper circles, and all the spheres. . . .And our church
is not one of those churches that just exists for the sake of existing. We have a
definite goal we are trying to achieve, toward which we are moving. We just
don’t want the government, and president and the world’s ideas to influence us,
but we try to influence and carry this light, God’s light, to the world. That’s why
we pray for our president and the Parliament. We also pray for the youth. We are
trying to reach the youth for God. . . . For example, youth in this town, not only in
this town, but also all over Ukraine, are drowned in sin, and not only the youth –
we are trying to reach all spheres of the population.
This attitude of civic engagement – concern for the spiritual well-being of all government
leaders in Ukraine, as well as for Ukraine’s youth – is quite separate in their minds from
their beliefs about nationalism (this group is one that was especially critical of western
Ukrainian hostility toward Russian speakers). They consider themselves part of Ukraine,
and they see themselves as in a position to influence “all spheres of the population.”
Greater Grace Church in L’viv, while differing with the Vinnytsia Nazarene
Church about language issues, shares with them a desire for civic engagement and
influence. Pastor Volodymyr at Greater Grace in L’viv mentioned several times in
conversation how his church hopes someday to have the children that are now going
through their Christian elementary school to become influential leaders in business and
government. During the course of an interview, Pastor Volodymyr, also the church
elementary school principal, asked me to
Pray for us to have a big influence in society in L’viv. That our kids will grow up
and become a part of the society and be . . . presidents of this country, mayor of
this city, and lawyers, honest people, you know, that . . . will change this society.
This is, I guess, the vision for, for L’viv. And also we have [a] vision . . . for [all
of] Ukraine.
Greater Grace and the Vinnytsia Nazarene church, where these statements were made, are
new churches without the same long history in Ukraine as the Evangelical ChristiansBaptists. For Greater Grace and the Nazarene Church, their reluctance to wholeheartedly
embrace nationalism does not equate to a disengagement from civic life. Indeed, they
desire to influence their country’s political and social future.
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Among Baptists there is more of a tendency to draw boundaries between the
spheres of ‘the church’ and ‘the world’ and to reserve church activities for religious life.
While I observed an affection for their country – for example, pride in the language,
customs, and physical land of Ukraine – Baptists were less likely than members of the
new churches to talk about sending church members to become government leaders, or
even reaching Ukrainian elites for Christ. However, they are not completely cut off from
political life: the pastor Vinnytsia Central Baptist church did make an announcement one
Sunday about an upcoming parliamentary vote that would directly impact church life, and
asked people to remain in prayer about it throughout the week.
Despite these denominational differences towards civic engagement, opinions
towards national identity and its place in the church vary more by region than by
denomination.

That is, as expected, Protestants from L’viv hold stronger national

sentiments – regardless of denomination – than do Protestants from elsewhere in the
country, and within that city members of the new church seemed more enthusiastic about
nationalism than those in the Baptist church.

The regional differences concerning

nationalism in the churches are stark. While Protestants from L’viv readily called theirs a
“Ukrainian” church and themselves “patriots,” Protestants outside of Western Ukraine
reacted to ‘nationalism’ as a bad word, and few of them were even comfortable labeling
their church as Ukrainian. As Pavel from Greater Grace Church in L’viv said, “When I
am proud that I am Ukrainian, that is patriotism. When I am going to kill you because
you are not Ukrainian, that is nationalism.”
While I did find strong regional variations – with western Ukraine closer to
endorsing (or at least accepting) nationalism in the church than others – overall there was
a pervasive anti-national spirit in Ukraine’s Protestant churches. This chapter began with
a quotation from Tatiana, of Vinnytsia’s Nazarene Church. She remarked that people in
western Ukraine “are raised in a nationalistic environment from childhood. And really
it’s not just love for Ukraine; it’s simply nationalism.” She views nationalism as separate
from love of country, and something that should be avoided in the church. She is not
alone in those convictions. The next section of this chapter examines what church
members in Vinnytsia, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, and Kherson had to say about a
Ukrainian church. Then we will return to the L’viv churches.
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6.4.1 Perspectives on a Ukrainian church from outside L’viv
Although some people in L’viv admitted that a few of their fellow church
members were nationalists, no one I spoke to at any church in any of the four cities would
use the nationalist label directly about themselves. Participants in the research project
clearly distanced their churches from having national characteristics (which I did not
define for them), and most, especially outside of L’viv, also denied that theirs was a
Ukrainian church. People in seven focus groups, including two in L’viv, drew my
attention to the multi-cultural aspects of their congregations. In their logic, it followed
from this that they could not also be considered national, because to them nationalism is
the opposite of multi-culturalism.

Another common reason given for evangelical

churches not being national or Ukrainian is that the Orthodox Church (or the Greek
Catholic Church) is already the national church, and there is no room for more in that
category. An excerpt from a focus groups at the Kherson Baptist church provides an
example of both of these responses in the same conversation:
Man: We don’t think of our church as Ukrainian.
Woman: That’s the Orthodox church. . . .
Yura: Who calls [our church] a Ukrainian church? We don’t even think of that.
It is just a church of–
Man: A Christian church. Baptist.
Ivan: We even speak in Russian. . . .
Tanya: I came here from Russia and here we have absolutely the same church.
There are no differences.
Esther: So are there any ways in which your church is national? . . . .
Ivan: Nations [natsii] generally don’t exist for us. The conductor of our choir is a
Moldovan and he came directly from Romania.
Tanya: He came from Romania and now we have a main director.
Man: So for us nations are not –
Woman: It doesn’t play a role.
These Baptists identify the Orthodox church as the Ukrainian church and their own
church as anything but Ukrainian.

It seems apparent that the reason they reject a

Ukrainian identity for their church is because they speak Russian and identify themselves
with the larger post-soviet world (here they mention Russia, Moldova, and Romania).
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Ivan, Tanya, Yura, and the others deny connections between their Baptist church and the
Ukrainian nation because people in their Southern city speak Russian, not Ukrainian, and
because their church includes members of various nationalities. They mention speaking
in Russian and say that their church is “absolutely the same” as the church in Russia.
They are unwilling to take on a Ukrainian identity that could compromise the multicultural and Russian speaking aspects of their church.
Their fellow Baptists in Vinnytsia agree. When one group there was asked if they
considered their church to be Ukrainian, Valerie, a young mother of three, immediately
said no. When asked why, she elaborated, “Probably because it depends on who the
members of a church are, not where a church is but of whom it consists. Our church is
international.” Others in the room began listing various nationalities represented in the
church, including Cuban, Jewish, Polish, and Chechen. The group rejected a uniform
Ukrainian identity in favor of one that is cosmopolitan and multicultural.
Earlier in the chapter I quoted from the Kherson Presbyterians criticizing the
western Ukrainian focus on the Ukrainian language. Recall what Nadia and Lina said:
Nadia: We love all the nationalities and we’re always glad to see all and we never
emphasize that we’re Ukrainians and want to communicate only with Ukrainians.
We don’t have something like that. We’re glad to communicate with all people
from different countries. It enriches us with experience. And, in general, a lot
more.
Lina: In one word we’re Christians.
Woman: We are brothers and sisters.
Here we see them separate a solely Ukrainian identity from a cosmopolitan
transnational/international identity that is linked to religion. Being “Christian,” being
“brothers and sisters,” means that they want “to communicate with people from different
countries,” not just their own. These evangelicals believe that being a Ukrainian church
would mean excluding other nationalities, something that is in clear opposition to their
idea of Christianity. I heard an American missionary to a Ukrainian Presbyterian church
teach from a book by the popular Minnesota pastor John Piper. Piper writes about the
diversity of the church as an integral part of the Christian life: “The ultimate goal of God
in all history is to uphold and display his glory for the enjoyment of the redeemed from
every tribe and tongue and people and nation” (1993, 222). He later adds that “by
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focusing on all the people groups of the world God undercuts ethnocentric pride and puts
all peoples back upon his free grace rather than any distinctive of their own” (p. 223).
At times the anti-Ukrainian perspective moved away from a multi-cultural
diversity argument to a purely humanistic view that claimed to ignore nationality
completely. Tatiana from the Vinnytsia Nazarene church said that people in her church
don’t “care what nationality people are.” Indeed,
We don’t even ask. We don’t care what color the person is, what his nationality
is, or what language he speaks. And this is one more thing I like about our
church, that we don’t look at a person’s appearance, but value him just because he
is a human.
Here Tatiana describes ignoring difference through focusing instead on a common human
bond. This is different from the diversity angle described by Nadia in Kherson, but
similarly stands in opposition to a specifically Ukrainian identity. The notion of the
Ukrainian church already being multi-national or at the very least, multi-cultural, even
before consideration of post-Soviet transnationalism, lays a foundation for our discussion
of transnationalism and transnational identities in the next chapter.
Besides rejecting a national or Ukrainian identity because it would preclude
multi-national diversity or be tied to more traditional religious faiths, the study
participants also raised other objections. Baptists in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy said that any
specifically Ukrainian church would have to have all services in Ukrainian, and they
implied that their church would be unable to fit that requirement. When asked what a
Ukrainian church would look like, a group of Baptists in Vinnytsia described a typical
Soviet era Ukrainian ideal: they said that a Ukrainian church would have activities like
reading Taras Shevchenko poetry during worship services and people wearing national
costumes. The rumor was going around in their congregation that Ukrainian Baptist
churches in Canada carried out these activities, holding on to the traditions of prerevolutionary Ukrainian villages when their forebears emigrated a century ago.
Finally, another Vinnytsia Baptist group was asked if there were any ways in
which their Baptist church was national.

Several of them said no, because before

considering themselves national, Baptists would have to make up a larger percentage of
Ukraine’s population. Andrey called their church “the leading church in Vinnytsia,” but
added that
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it’s not like that in all the other regions. But if to judge by the Vinnytsia church,
then maybe. I guess it has like five thousand people, right? So five thousand out
of a 400,000 population. And in Ukraine – no. Maybe in Vinnytsia, but not in
Ukraine. No way.
They consider their Baptist church to be the dominant church in their central Ukrainian
city, but still too much of a minority in the grand scheme of things to have any national
aspirations. The closest Protestants came to embracing a specifically Ukrainian Church
was in the prayer for Ukraine they sang in worship. As for embracing a coherent
Ukrainian Protestant identity – none of them even approached that.
Before addressing nationalism in L’viv, it should be pointed out that even in
Russian speaking churches away from western Ukraine participants made room for some
sort of cultural identity, although they didn’t call the church itself Ukrainian. At the
Kherson Presbyterian Church, one woman said that “Ukraine has its own mentality.” By
way of elaboration, she said:
Lina: Well, we have our own understanding of many things . . . Specifically, a
peculiarity of our culture is that it has its effect upon our church. And other cities,
or other countries have their own understanding. How can I say it properly? . . .
We have our own worldview about many things. It’s not like, for example, in
other countries . . . .
Nadia: Something that can be acceptable in our culture would shock someone
from another culture, right? . . .
Lina: And naturally it exists in our church. Do you understand? That which is in
our culture is in our church.
This exchange shows that even in areas that claimed to reject Ukrainian national identity
– perhaps because of its unwelcome emphasis on the Ukrainian language – evangelicals
acknowledged that their churches would be unique to that part of the world. Their
churches would be different from the churches in other countries because of the culture of
the people worshipping there. In other words – there is some kind of a cultural identity
recognized in the church, but not by the name of Ukrainian national identity.

6.4.2 Perspectives on a Ukrainian church from L’viv evangelicals
Stereotypes of western Ukrainians cast them all as staunch nationalists. Recall
what Vika said about people from that region:
environment from childhood.

“They are raised in a nationalistic

And really it’s not just love for Ukraine; its simply
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nationalism.”

This stereotype would lead one to believe that all L’viv natives are

nationalists, and that a nationalist attitude would pervade all social institutions. I thought
this might be true during my initial visit to Greater Grace in L’viv, when for the first time
in a Ukrainian church I spotted a Ukrainian flag displayed in the front of a church
meeting hall. However, I found that nationalism in L’viv churches is not uniform or
without contestation, and it is hardly the rabid nationalism that Vika suggested. A helpful
illustration of the contested nature of nationalism arose in a focus group at L’viv Baptist,
which at one point became a debate between two elderly women about the place of
nationalism in the church. Maria was a woman who had been born in Russia but had
lived in L’viv for decades. She provided the interesting perspective of a non-Ukrainian
member of a Ukrainian language congregation, and lamented the nationalism she saw in
the church. Valentina, a Ukrainian, disagreed with her, and appreciated the church’s
Ukrainian emphasis. This conversation is worth quoting at length as Maria makes a case
for a multi-lingual, multi-national church.

Maria speaks in Russian; the others are

speaking in Ukrainian. I am speaking in English with a Ukrainian interpreter, although
sometimes I speak in Russian.
Maria: We have many Russians who come and then they say, “What is this, a
Ukrainian church? Because no one [here] is speaking about God in Russian.”
We need to speak in both languages.
Esther: Do you agree with her?
Valentina 36 : Yes. Our church has no place for nationalism.
Maria: Sometimes it happens. There is a little nationalism. Because we don’t
speak much in Russian. I’ve even heard comments from the older brothers 37 that
we help Ukrainian believers, but not you Russian Moskali.
Valentina: But I know that God gave me a gift to bring people for repentance.
And most of them – Ukrainians – they say, why is everything here in Russian?
Are you Russians?
Maria: And Russians come with me and ask, “why is it only in Ukrainian?”
Valentina: But there are few of you Russians. Not everyone in the church would
understand. . . .

36

Or perhaps the third remaining woman at the interview. Several participants had already left to go to a
funeral.
37
Church members are customarily called ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ by others in the church.
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Maria: We need to have everybody in one church: Russians and Ukrainians, and
among us Armenians and Greeks. In all languages. Because the church is for
people of all languages. . . .
Esther: So you would agree that you have a Ukrainian church?
Valentina: Yes, it’s Ukrainian. And in Kiev they say that it’s a Ukrainian church,
but they’re more used to speaking in Russian, and their Ukrainian isn’t very good.
Esther: So you think that the churches in eastern Ukraine are not really
Ukrainian.
Maria: I wouldn’t divide it that way, who is a proper Ukrainian and who isn’t. I
think that they are either Christian, or they are Orthodox. Or Catholic. But I
wouldn’t divide things according to nationality.
Valentina: I agree.
Here we clearly see two contrasting visions for the church. One is national, where a
Ukrainian church service will be conducted only in Ukrainian, and people who speak
other languages can attend different churches. The other is multi-cultural, where both
Russian and Ukrainian languages are used.

Maria mentions Russians, Ukrainians,

Armenians, and Greeks as part of her multi-cultural church, and says that she wants all
languages spoken in church. However, the only other language besides Ukrainian that
she makes a strong case for is Russian. We can argue that what she really wants is a
church in which the Russian language is welcome and where it is an equal partner to
Ukrainian in the service. Maria wants a church in which Russian believers are treated
equally to the Ukrainians.

Her view is similar to the view of Protestants in other

Ukrainian cities where Russian is the dominant language, perhaps because she herself is a
native Russian speaker. We saw that Kherson church-goers resented the Ukrainian
language dominance of Ukrainian identity; Maria does the same. In fact, Maria has
decided that because of its exclusive nature, nationality is not a useful concept for the
church. Valentina, on the other hand, is one of the first people to openly call her church a
Ukrainian church in a focus group interview, even though she then goes on to agree with
Maria that people should not be categorized by nationality.
Others in L’viv, like Valentina, also labeled their church as Ukrainian. Kolya, a
church employee at Greater Grace and originally from Transcarpathia, and Vitaliy, the
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police academy instructor, agree that national elements have a natural place in their
church: 38
Kolya: Here we function as believers in Ukraine. We are in one Spirit, but we
have many national elements.
Esther: For example?
Kolya: We speak in Ukrainian. We try to speak in Ukrainian, because the [city]
authorities want us to and we do it, although we’re not saying that things should
only be in English or in Russian. If an American comes, we’ll fellowship with
him in English. If a Russian comes, then we’ll fellowship with him in Russian. I
think that we have many elements [of Ukrainian] that I could talk to you about,
but I can’t think of them. I think that I was in the Budapest church, and here I see
very many things. . . . But it doesn’t hinder our ability to understand each other.
Esther: [to Vitaliy] Do you also see elements of Ukrainian national. . . .?
Vitaliy: When I came I didn’t see any of them, but after I’d been here for four
years and Pastor Jason had left, and especially when we got a national pastor, then
I saw, for example, we sang songs for Christmas and Easter that were mostly
Ukrainian Christian national [narodniy] songs, for weddings we also sang
national songs. It is clear that national roots go deep, people want to sing their
songs, they want that –
Kolya: In their own language.
Vitaliy: Yes, in their own language. Of course some things from the Protestant
way of life crept in, but there are some national traditions . . . and it is impossible
to get rid of them.
Theirs was the most thorough exploration I heard of what national elements, apart from
language, that any Ukrainian Protestants saw in their church. They are also the only ones
who used the word narodniy in their description, a word that can be translated ‘national’
but includes connotations of folk culture. From their perspective, if the people in a
church have narodniy roots, then the church itself, even a Protestant one, will have
narodniy elements. Others at the Greater Grace church wanted to distinguish their
attitude, what they called patriotism, from a negative one they called nationalism. They
said that at Greater Grace patriotism, or pride in being Ukrainian, was more important
than nationalism, something they saw as a violent, hateful attitude.
Earlier I showed that new churches tend to be more civically engaged than older
Baptist ones. We see this again in how Greater Grace incorporates national elements into
the Christian school the church runs, although this is controversial within the Protestant
38

This interview took place in Russian out of consideration for my lack of Ukrainian knowledge.
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community more generally in Ukraine.

At the Ukrainian-wide Christian education

conference held in L’viv that spring, a woman from a Seventh Day Adventist church
expressed her opposition to a government requirement that the national anthem be sung
in all Ukrainian schools, including religious schools. I asked Pastor Volodymyr about
this later. He explained that because in the past the state apparatus persecuted the church,
now the Seventh Day Adventists are “still afraid . . . to sing the national anthem.” On the
contrary, at the Greater Grace school they sing the national anthem “gladly because, you
know, I am Ukrainian, and I’m really thankful to God that he gives us the freedom, and
I’m proud of my national anthem and I’m proud of my national flag.”
Participants in the young adult focus group at the L’viv Baptist church, on the
contrary, avoid calling their church a Ukrainian church. In accord with the statements
quoted earlier about a “western Ukrainian mentality,” these young people are more
comfortable calling their church a regional church than a national church. One man
remarked: “Our church in general is like many of the other churches in the western
region. We don’t have something really national but it is like most churches in the
western region.” This edginess towards claiming their church as Ukrainian or national
surprised me. It was not a shock in Russian speaking areas of the country, but in L’viv I
expected Protestants to be more eager to claim a national identity in their church. This
was not the case.
Thus far in the discussion of regional and national identities in Ukrainian
Protestant churches we have seen that the western Ukraine/non-western Ukraine division
remains a strong force in the national imagination. The related issues of language use
and national identity in secular society are also present within evangelical congregations
profiled in this dissertation.

While Protestants tend to avoid calling their churches

“national” or (outside L’viv) “Ukrainian,” they do incorporate aspects of Ukrainian
culture and even civic nationalism into their church life. The final theme of this chapter,
and one that has implications for both the regional and national issues, is how Protestants
perceive Ukraine’s traditional faiths.

123

6.4.3 Protestant view of a traditional national church
One reason evangelicals offered for why their churches were not national or
Ukrainian was that there was already a national church in Ukraine – the Orthodox church.
‘The Orthodox Church’ is seemingly a single entity in the national imagination, even
though there are three major Orthodox divisions that are not on friendly terms with each
other. Moreover, in western Ukraine the Greek Catholic Church predominates, but,
perhaps because of its years of being under the Orthodox umbrella during the Soviet
Union, in L’viv it is often mentioned in one breath with the Orthodox Church as one of
the “traditional churches.” Few of the Protestants I interacted with had much to say about
the Catholic church, so I focus here on their views towards Orthodoxy. In this section I
examine what aspects of Orthodoxy led my informants to label it the national church;
how they portrayed Orthodoxy and Orthodox identity; and their alternative views of a
Ukrainian national religion. In terms of the larger research questions, this portion of the
chapter addresses how and to what extent Ukrainian Protestantism either challenges or
accommodates aspects of a Ukrainian national identity such as a national church.
Most Protestants – including Baptists and non-Baptists, those from western
Ukraine and those from elsewhere – named the Orthodox church as Ukraine’s national
religion. Some, especially in western Ukraine, also mentioned the Catholic church as a
prominent Ukrainian faith. The only variation on this theme was from several individuals
in three Baptist focus groups (in both Vinnytsia and Kherson) who identified paganism as
the national faith, an alternative view I will examine a bit later. Those Protestants with
mainstream views listed all of the obvious reasons that Orthodoxy is the national faith: its
close relationship with the Ukrainian state, the church’s historical roots, and Ukrainian
traditions practiced in the church.
Kristina, a twenty year old student from Greater Grace Church in L’viv, spoke
about government ties to Orthodoxy. She said that Ukraine’s national religion is “the
kind of religion approved by the government, and what they show on television at
Christmas or other holidays. And the president goes to church, and this is government at
the national level.” Nelya, from the Kherson Presbyterian Church, mentioned that school
textbooks are now published under Orthodox guidance. Grigoriy, from the Belgorod
Presbyterian Church, also pointed out that school children are taught about the Orthodox
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church in school, are taken to church on class trips, and the teachers “make them kiss
icons.”
This perceived government blessing of the Orthodox church and close
relationship between the Orthodox church and the Ukrainian state highlights a material
difference between Orthodoxy and Protestantism. While the state and the Orthodox
church have a cozy relationship, Protestants have never had a good relationship with the
state; even in tsarist times Protestant activities were restricted. Of course, both Orthodox
and Protestant churches were persecuted during the years of the Soviet Union, but now
Orthodoxy is a mainstream religion and perceived to be close to the Ukrainian
government, whereas Protestants are often treated as outsiders and still have occasional
squabbles with the state.
Evangelicals acknowledge that most people see them as outsiders when it comes
to Orthodoxy’s relationship to Ukraine over one thousand years of history, but in several
focus group and individual interviews they stressed that Protestantism is not new to
Ukraine and has its own historical legitimacy. The Orthodox church’s deep Ukrainian
roots were mentioned by several study participants when they explained why Orthodoxy
is the “national religion.” Often it is a casual acknowledgment that people in Ukraine
have been Orthodox for generations, but occasionally people mentioned a specific
historical era or person that Orthodox history is based on. One Baptist from Vinnytsia
recalled that Ukraine’s Orthodox Church started in Kievan Rus. A woman from the
Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church likewise mentioned that Prince Vladimir and
Princess Olga brought Christianity to Ukraine from Greece. This historical pedigree
explains, in their minds, why Orthodoxy is a privileged Ukrainian faith.

But after

mentioning Kievan Rus or Prince Vladimir, they would then sometimes talk about
Protestantism’s own historical roots. Grigoriy, a former factory worker and an elder at
the Presbyterian Church in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, said that the Orthodox church does
not understand the Middle Ages, the time of the Protestant Reformation, from which his
own church arose.

Other Presbyterians explained that there have been Reformed

churches in Ukraine since the Reformation. Valerie, the dynamic Bible study leader at
the Vinnytsia Baptist Church, did her own research into the history of her city, and found
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that there was a Protestant church in Vinnytsia as early as 1570. 39 Many Baptists were
familiar with (and described to me) the history of their own churches in Ukraine from the
mid-nineteenth century.
While these men and women acknowledge Orthodoxy’s long history in Ukraine,
they are also staking a claim for Protestantism.

They want to emphasize that the

Protestant Church has its own equally valid historical claims to Ukraine’s people. To
further underline the historical legitimacy of the Protestant Church in Ukraine, Valerie
explains some connections between Baptist and Orthodox churches. They both have
similar traditions and rules for behavior, because, she points out, historically Ukrainian
Baptists came out of Orthodoxy:
Originally the Ukrainian Baptist Church came from Orthodoxy. We have some
Orthodox traditions. For example, women in our church cover their heads with
scarves like women in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Baptists wore only dark
clothes before. They couldn’t wear bright colors. They used to wear black
clothes. In the villages people even wore black scarves when they went to church.
It’s just a tradition. They couldn’t wear pants. Women wouldn’t wear lownecked dresses or short skirts. All this is connected with the traditions. . . . I was
in Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra 40 in Kyiv. There I saw written rules of behavior in
the church. . . . There’s nothing in it that we don’t have in our list. Our church has
exactly the same list of the rules for behavior in the church and on its grounds. So
these are all traditions.
Although as we saw earlier in this chapter, few of the research participants wanted to
label their church Ukrainian or national, they did want to emphasize their own church’s
legitimacy based on historical roots. Valerie, for instance, reported both on the long
history of Protestantism in Ukraine and, here, on the similarities between the Baptist and
Orthodox churches. Later she also said that the Orthodox and Baptist churches share
some similar foundational religious beliefs, since they both acknowledge the Apostles’
Creed. The fact that their Baptist church came out of the Orthodox church and has some
similar traditions helps validate it. The Belgorod Presbyterians emphasized that their
church grew out of an old Reformed tradition that was present in Ukraine hundreds of
years ago, thus giving it a special historical legitimacy not found in some other new
churches.

39
40

This has not been independently verified.
A famous Orthodox monastery.
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Views toward Orthodoxy are complicated and diverse.

Although Valerie

emphasized similarities between her church and Orthodoxy, few others went to such
lengths in support of the Orthodox church. They viewed turning to Protestantism as a
separation from Orthodoxy and a rejection of Orthodox religious beliefs.

Despite

drawing a firm boundary between their church and the Orthodox church, they exhibited a
deep respect for the Orthodox church at a certain level. This respect perhaps comes out
of personal and family history in Orthodoxy: many of the new converts to both the
Baptist and non-Baptist churches came to Protestantism via Orthodoxy or have
Orthodoxy in their background. In Ukraine, Orthodoxy is usually the first religion people
turn to in a time of spiritual need. As explained by Lydia, a physician and single mother
who entered the Presbyterian Church in the late 1990s from a fairly non-religious Soviet
background: “People here usually come to the Orthodox Church at a certain age. And
when something happens, some tragedy, the death of a loved one, then a person starts
going to church and turning to God.”
Grigoriy, the ex-factory worker and now Presbyterian elder, was somewhat
typical in this respect. He had been a good Soviet atheist as a child, but with an Orthodox
grandmother, to whom he partially credits his salvation:
I was sure God didn’t exist. I believed what I was taught. But I think a lot was
done by my grandmother. She was an Orthodox believer. Every evening she
prayed for me, for my brother, for my mother, for my father. She prayed before
going to bed. It was always, every day. . . . I think that her prayers were heard
because she was an Orthodox believer. She had a very close relationship with
God. She did a lot of good things for the people, and she did that with no selfinterest.
Pastor Volodymyr of L’viv Greater Grace Church started attending the Orthodox church
as a young man. After seriously studying the Bible on his own when he was a university
student, he decided that he should make the church his professional career. He thought
that it would be
better for me to be a priest, maybe go to some kind of academy or maybe even go
to the monastery to be a monk. Or just be in monastery and be by yourself and
study Bible, pray to God, and be like a better person. And I start thinking about
this. And it take [sic] me another year and I was, in 1994 I was almost ready to
go to monastery. Just, I need someone [to] lead, and if there was someone in my
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life to tell me, you know, “Go!”, I will go. But in 1994 my friend come [sic] and
invite me to [Greater Grace] church. 41
Lydia, Grigoriy, Vitaliy and Pastor Volodymyr were only four among many people I met
who converted to Protestantism after spending at least some time exploring Orthodoxy.
Although none of these four were Baptists, I did meet some Baptist converts with
Orthodox backgrounds.
Perhaps because of this close personal relationship with Orthodoxy, a large
number of the Protestants I spoke with made sure to mention positive qualities in addition
to anything negative when asked about Ukraine’s traditional faiths. For example, Pastor
Mykola at Greater Grace voiced respect for Orthodox and Catholic priests that he comes
in contact with at interfaith meetings in L’viv:
I don’t have any presumption against them. I know they may have little [sic]
different and strange doctrines, but okay. I know that they preach the gospel, they
try to teach people the right things, so I want to honor that, you know? 42
Valentin, a port worker and deacon in the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Baptist Church,
emphasized that Orthodox church-goers are normal people and some are real Christians:
But our attitude is that they are not our enemies. If we can say so, they are not
our enemies; they are ordinary people just like us. Many of them are sincere
believers. I can’t even have a slight remainder of hostile attitude toward them.
Let them serve the Lord if they think so.
This general respect towards believers in the Orthodox Church was widespread among
Ukrainian Protestants.
Nevertheless, Protestants had many criticisms of Orthodox teaching, principally
about the doctrine of Scripture and the doctrine of how people can relate to God. A main
theme in what Protestants told me is that they do not consider most Orthodox people to
have a high respect for the Bible. While Valentin, as we saw above, thinks that there are
sincere believers in the Orthodox church, he added that people who go to the Orthodox
church “do not want to know the Scriptures.” Pastor Dmitri, a former pathologist and
pastor of the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church, found that there “was very
little food” at the Orthodox church in terms of serious biblical teaching. Evgeniy, a
young Baptist in Kherson who used to attend the Orthodox church, similarly found that:

41
42

Pastor Volodymyr gave the interview in English, just as it is written here.
Pastor Mykola also gave the interview in English.
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Nobody in the Orthodox Church told us anything about the Word of God. I
hadn’t read the Gospel. In that church I did only those things that other people
did. I just followed the rules established in that church. . . . Now, of course, I
understand that it was stupid and ridiculous to do all that. The Word of God
doesn’t require so many things. I also got to know that the Orthodox Church
breaks both the Word of God and God’s commandments. It was also a shock for
me.
Evgeniy’s journey into an evangelical church led him to doubt the Orthodox church – he
came so far as to believe that the Orthodox church teaches doctrine contrary to a correct
interpretation of the Bible.
Even more pervasive than the skepticism towards the Orthodox view of the Bible
was a frustration towards Orthodox teaching of how people can relate to God. This
seems to be one of the principal reasons people left the Orthodox church for
Protestantism – that in Orthodoxy God is distant and mysterious, but in Protestantism
God can be known intimately. As Dr. Lydia said:
I felt like I had to come and know him closer, but it was impossible to do so in the
Orthodox Church, because when you come there, you are separated. And you can
ask some saint, praying to him for someone. There are many barriers. And here
[at the Presbyterian Church] it is like I can be driving and praying, walking and
praying, and at home I can pray. I don’t have to go to church to do it. Though I
go to church, but still, there is direct communication.
Lydia felt that she couldn’t come close to God in the Orthodox church like she could in
the Presbyterian church. Vitaliy, the police instructor and former Orthodox believer in
L’viv, shared Lydia’s views, and expressed disappointment in the Orthodox emphasis on
doing good works to achieve God’s favor. In the Orthodox church, he said,
it is very hard to believe that you can easily come to know God. And it’s hard for
these people to believe that. Very hard. It’s hard to believe that you can come to
God easily. People think that to find God you need to go down a very difficult
path, and you need to do something to earn it. That’s the way it is with most
people. And the traditional churches support this.
Pastor Dmitri in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy expresses it with more theological terminology.
When he “became a believer” in 1994 he came to realize that
Jesus is a personal Savior. In Orthodoxy God and man are very distant from each
other. A human is here. He’s sinful, insignificant, miserable. He’s nothing.
He’s sinful. And God is there. He is holy. And that is true, but it’s like 50
percent of the truth. And the second 50 percent is that this great God came to
earth and became as miserable as me, even worse, to take my sins on Himself.
And it was very important for me that I felt, I saw, that this God didn’t come to
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[my wife], but he came to me, personally to me. He is my Savior. It was a
special time.
All of these examples underscore how far out of the Orthodox fold evangelicals have
come. They may respect the Orthodox church because of family history or because of
certain church customs that they approve of, but their core theological beliefs are
incompatible with Orthodox teachings.
We can now re-ask a relevant question: Does Ukrainian Protestantism challenge
or accommodate a national church as an aspect of Ukrainian national identity? While
most Ukrainian evangelicals do consider the Orthodox church to be the national church
of Ukraine, their disagreements with the church trump any desire they may have to be
part of it. They seem to have accepted that their own national identity will not include an
Orthodox component. Interestingly, no one expressed disappointment in being outside of
a national faith, and those outside L’viv held their anti-nationalistic views quite strongly.
One interesting alternative view of Ukraine’s national religion was heard in three
different Baptist focus groups, where paganism was identified as the national faith.
Participants told me that Ukrainians were pagan before they adopted Christianity, and
they were aware of a pro-pagan organization that is trying to revive worship of Ukraine’s
indigenous deities like Yarylo, Veles, and Smaragd. The organization is called RUNaV,
short for Ridna Ukrainska Narodna Vera (Native Ukrainian People’s Faith) – and
according to some from Vinnytsia, is supported by “people with higher education” and
spread “in teacher training colleges, humanitarian universities.” This pagan organization
is evidently active in Vinnytsia. According to Yura, the pastor of Kherson Central
Baptist Church, Orthodoxy itself is tied to paganism. Although “real Orthodox believers
are even close to us in their faith,” Yura said, “most people just observe rituals, and
paganism is in one line with the Orthodox church. The church and paganism are literally
entwined. People don’t even notice it.” He then explained in some detail how certain
Orthodox festivals have pagan roots.
These Baptists are making two points here, both meant to discredit Orthodoxy.
The first is to show that the ‘real’ Ukrainian religion is paganism. The Orthodox church
would then lose its purchase as the country’s ‘original’ national religion. The second is
to link Orthodoxy with paganism. If the church is actually based on paganism, then a
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good Christian should not trust any of their teachings. Instead, seekers should turn to
other, more trustworthy faiths, like the Baptist church.

6.4.4 Nationalism conclusion
The themes of nationalism and religion are frequently connected by scholars of
both religion and nationalism. People have written about such topics as the relationship
of church and state (Daniel and Durham 1999; Evans 2002), violent clashes of religious
nationalisms (Juergensmeyer 1993; 1996; Marty 1997), and the relationship between
religious institutions and national sentiments (Verkhovsky 2002). A standard way of
relating religion and nationalism is to see religion as an inspiration for nationalism, and
religious institutions as being repositories for national identity. Anthony Smith writes
that many “past and contemporary nationalisms can be seen as reinforcements and
revivals of premodern religious traditions of particular ethnic communities” (2003, 16).
He gives the example of The Tale of Bygone Years, a twelfth century chronicle in the
land of Rus’ in which “religion constitutes the main strand” of history, and that history is
later drawn upon for a sense of Russian national identity. The Russian Orthodox Church
has often been cited as an institution that represents a component of Russian national
identity, as when Peter Duncan called the Church “one of the principal centres of Russian
nationalism in the Soviet Union” (Duncan 1990). Another example is in Britain, where
Protestantism is typically seen as a foundation for national identity (Claydon and
McBride 1998).
This formulation of national identity being connected to a dominant faith does not
represent the nationalist views of many Ukrainian Protestants. Indeed, perhaps Ukraine
as a whole is moving away from this type of nationalism. Andrew Wilson, a British
scholar, has written a great deal about contemporary Ukrainian nationalism. On the
question of a national Ukrainian church he writes that:
At various times in the past the distinctive characteristics of local religious faith
have been a factor, sometimes the key factor, in creating a sense of distinct
Ukrainian identity. The period since 1991 has not been one of those times. . . .
Nationalists have constantly bemoaned the failure to create a united national
Church, without, however, stopping to think whether Ukraine really needs one
(2000, 234).
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The nationalist sentiments expressed by Ukrainian evangelicals have few connections to
mainline Orthodoxy or Catholicism. Those evangelicals who do claim to be “Ukrainian
patriots” seem to have no trouble holding nationalist views while adhering to a minority
faith.
Even those evangelicals who claim not to be nationalists have opinions about the
Ukrainian nation and their place in it. Outside of L’viv, Protestants are vehemently
opposed to incorporating national elements into their faith, and are reluctant even to
depict their churches as Ukrainian. This anti-national behavior actually represents a
belief that the Ukrainian nation should include a Russian language component. A civic
nationalism seems to be developing in some Protestant churches, but for the most part
this phenomenon (represented by flags in churches and prayers for the president) is found
in new churches, not in the older Baptist ones which are still suspicious of the state. For
those who wish to consolidate a Ukrainian national identity, there are several challenges
that would need to be overcome in order to fully engage Ukrainian evangelicals in the
national project:
•

Nationalism is perceived as a concept about ethnic or national exclusion. Nationality
was used as an ethnic marker in the Soviet Union, and had little to do with political
community, imagined or not. Ukraine’s Protestant church members back away from
the idea of connecting the Ukrainian nation with their churches because as diverse
communities they do not want to create a church only for people of one ethnicity.
Their evangelical doctrine also teaches that “The Church” should include people from
all nations and not focus on any one group. Furthermore, evangelicals from Russian
speaking areas of Ukraine are not interested in a Ukrainian identity that excludes the
Russian language.

•

Ethnic and language diversity in Ukraine, a legacy of Soviet and other history, has
resulted in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Protestant congregations.

Each of the

evangelical churches included in this study have congregations drawn from various
backgrounds. In addition to a Ukrainian congregational core are other members with
roots elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Russia is the most common alternate
country of origin, but there were members from countries scattered across Eurasia.
This diversity contributes to a reluctance to be a church that excludes non-Ukrainian
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congregation members. People outside of L’viv were the most concerned about this,
probably because as Russian speakers they felt the most threatened by a Ukrainianonly nationalism.
•

Interactions between Ukrainian evangelical churches and American missionaries
create a tension between transnational and national identifications. We will examine
this more closely in the following chapter, but one example of this tension at work is
that some churches have developed reputations as “American” churches, and for them
it is particularly challenging to develop an independent Ukrainian identity.

•

There is a historical relationship between Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian nation.
Ukrainian evangelicals acknowledge this relationship and believe that it precludes
them from fitting in with traditional Ukrainian identity. Those evangelicals with
nationalist views tend to adjust their own national identity to omit Orthodox or Greek
Catholic religious beliefs.

•

Ukrainian Baptists believe that their identity as believers is more important than any
earthly identity associated with nationality or region of origin. They put everything
into one of two categories – the church and the world – and the church is infinitely
more important. We will investigate this dual framework in the next chapter.

6.5 Conclusion
Regionalism is a component of Ukrainian evangelical church life. While a tidy
East-West dichotomy oversimplifies the nuanced and complex aspects of social life in
Ukraine, this chapter has shown that Western Ukraine persists as a discrete region in the
minds of at least one subset of the population. At a basic level, Ukraine’s regional
differentiation can be observed in that the dominant language spoken in churches varies
regionally, as does the degree to which church-goers incorporate aspects of a Ukrainian
national identity into their church life. In L’viv, not only is Ukrainian the exclusive
language at the two case study churches, but church members identified their churches as
Ukrainian, a step that was rejected by church members in the other three cities.
We have seen that attitudes towards Ukrainian nationalism have a strong regional
component. Members of L’viv churches (as opposed to those outside of L’viv) are much
more comfortable with a nationalism that exclusively uses the Ukrainian language.
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Indeed, evangelicals from Kherson and even Vinnytsia were quite vocal against the
Ukrainian language agenda and made their own case for a national identity that
incorporates the Russian language and pan-Soviet national backgrounds.
However, we also saw that something beyond regionalism was at work in how
evangelical churches responded to nationalism. Although both L’viv churches used the
Ukrainian language in their services almost exclusively, and people in both churches
labeled themselves a “Ukrainian church,” members of Greater Grace were more willing
than members of the Baptist Church to use the political symbols of the Ukrainian nation
at church. Greater Grace was the only church of the eight case study churches where a
Ukrainian flag was displayed on the premises – and in this case, at the front of the
sanctuary.

Church members proudly taught their children the national anthem and

purposely built up ideas about Ukraine and the future of Ukraine among their people. I
did not observe any of those elements at the L’viv Baptist Church, and the debate that
took place in one of the focus groups there is evidence that the congregation does not
agree about the extent to which they should embrace a Ukrainian national identity.
Overall, members of the new Protestant churches were more hospitable to civic
nationalism than were members of older Baptist churches. I can speculate along with
Pastor Volodymyr of Greater Grace that people in older Protestant churches such as
L’viv Baptist are reluctant to sing the national anthem or publicly honor the Ukrainian
flag because of their fear of the state that was bred during decades of persecution. The
people of Greater Grace do not have that fear because the religious persecution did not
directly affect them, as their church began only after Ukraine’s independence and during
the time of religious freedom.
Another area in which we see a difference between new and old evangelical
churches is in relation to transnationalism. This chapter did not explore whether the
emphasis that Russian-speaking members of new churches placed on multi-nationalism
and diversity was in any way connected to their views about missionaries and the West.
The claim that the reason new churches wanted a Russian language nationalism was their
unique relationship to the West is contradicted by some of the data. For instance, older
Russian-speaking congregations that were not founded by missionaries shared some of
the same views, and the Greater Grace Church in L’viv is both pro-Western and pro-
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Ukrainian language. However, the way Ukrainian evangelical churches perceive the
West and their relationship to a global church is an important one and is the main theme
of the following chapter.

Copyright © 2005 Esther Grace Long
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Chapter Seven: Transnationalism in Ukrainian evangelical churches
It’s very important that there be connections around the world, that we know each other
there and in other places. We receive greetings from people there and it is like being
there.
–Maria, L’viv Baptist Church
And I must say that our brotherhood strictly watches that the Western liberalism won’t
get to our churches. The pastor sets certain limits that young men shouldn’t have long
hair, chew gum; girls shouldn’t wear makeup, shouldn’t wear pants. They should keep
the Christian rules that are written in the Bible. And he watches it strictly. And we are
thankful to him for this.
–Lidiya, Vinnytsia Baptist Church

7.1 Introduction
The West is an integral part of evangelical church life in post-Soviet Ukraine. As
a source of money, missionaries, and other resources – and as a destination for Ukrainian
church members permanently moving out of the country – the West is loved, hated,
credited with helping Ukraine, and blamed for causing problems in the Ukrainian church
and in the country more generally. It is a place of freedom, wealth, sin, and opportunity.
‘The West’ has no firm definition, but as used by Ukrainian evangelicals it refers to a
place outside of Ukraine that includes Western Europe, Anglophone countries like
Australia and Canada, and of course (and especially) the United States. This chapter
analyzes Ukrainian Protestants’ views towards the West, including towards Western
churches and missionaries and the transnational processes they are involved in, and is
organized according to church type. I found that involvement in transnational activities
and attitudes towards them does not correlate with region in Ukraine but is related to
denominational type. That is, Baptists in Kherson are likely to view the West similarly to
Baptists in L’viv, and members of the Presbyterian church in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy
share some perspectives about the West with members of Greater Grace in L’viv. We
will explore the reasons for this pattern later in the chapter. The first half of the chapter
examines transnational issues with respect to Ukrainian Baptist churches, while the
second half covers these themes with respect to Ukraine’s new Protestant churches.
The research questions that guide these inquiries interrogate the place of
Ukrainian evangelicalism within a large and active transnational network. I seek to find
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out how self-awareness of a transnational identity contributes to, or undermines, regional
and national identifications. I also seek to find out what differences there are between
members of older Baptist churches and newer evangelical churches, and between people
of different generations, in how they approach matters of transnational identity.
The American missionaries I encountered in Ukraine held to an evangelical
version of Christianity that emphasizes spiritual rebirth, dependence on the Bible, sharing
the faith, and Christ’s death on the cross as “the only way to salvation” (Noll 2001, 13).43
Similar beliefs are taught in evangelical churches around the globe, and have been
portrayed as an “American Gospel.” In their book Exporting the American Gospel:
Global Christian Fundamentalism, Steve Brouwer and his co-authors write that
While the leaders of the new Christian faith come from various nations, the
message is predominantly American. When believers enter a church in Africa,
Asia, or Latin America, they participate in a form of worship that can be found in
Memphis or Portland or New York City. Perhaps it will be Pentecostal, or
Southern Baptist, or a ubiquitous charismatic product marketed by Bible schools
in places such as Tulsa and Pasadena. These Protestants disseminate beliefs that
can comfort middle-class businessmen at a prayer breakfast in Rio de Janeiro and
inspire the poorest of the world’s would-be consumers at a Bunnke crusade in
Lagos (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose 1996, 2).
I do not wish to debate the legitimacy of calling this version of Christianity “American.”
Instead, I question the view that evangelical Christianity is a homogenizing force, leaving
little room for local adaptations and interventions. Instead, this chapter will show that
Ukrainian evangelicals do not hold a uniform view towards the West or the Western
missionaries in their midst. The religious ‘product’ of American missionaries is carefully
evaluated by Ukrainian consumers before aspects of it are incorporated into Ukrainian
churches. The transnational religious networks of which Ukrainian Protestants partake
are not wholly endorsed by the participants, and have uneven impacts on the ground.
In each focus group discussion, and in most individual interviews, participants
were asked about their views towards missionaries working in Ukraine and about the
impact the West was having on their church. Responses to these questions indicate what
the churches’ relationships were like with foreigners; often the resulting conversation
delved into financial relationships with the West, opinions about church independence
43

Noll credits British historian David Bebbington with articulating these key elements of evangelicalism
(1989). A similar list of characteristics was developed by George Marsden (1991, 4-5).
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and dependence, and participants’ general feelings about the West.

Most of the

evangelicals had at least something good to say about Western influence or foreign
missionaries at work in Ukraine, although the depth of goodwill was considerably
shallower in older Baptist churches than in the new churches. Often a Baptist would
compliment some aspect of having international partners before launching a critical
discussion of the partners or of the West more generally. These criticisms should not be
interpreted as complete opposition to the process of transnationalism itself, because
Ukrainian church leaders continue to actively seek out international financial and
ministry partners. Nor should we assume that the initial compliments towards particular
missions organizations or missionaries were disingenuous attempts at setting the
American interviewer at ease, because there were positive comments about specific
foreigners in nearly every interview conducted. However, overall fewer Baptists had
close relationships with foreign missionaries than did members of new Churches, and
those Baptists who did have close relationships with Westerners tended to have more
positive things to say than those who only knew of missionaries in general.

7.2 Ukrainian Baptist churches and transnationalism
Views towards transnationalism in Ukrainian Baptist churches fall into a broad
spectrum from joy and thankfulness for Western friends and ministry partners to fear and
disappointment in its processes and outcomes. Sometimes missionaries are considered
beloved friends; other times they are portrayed as outsiders who do not understand
Ukrainian culture and who represent the evil ‘West’ – a place from which dangerous
forces come to threaten the spiritual well-being of the Ukrainian Baptist Church. Baptist
pastors were more negative about this than most Baptist congregation members, although
middle-agers who grew up in the church were as a rule more critical than new converts or
young people towards missionaries and the West.
Profound ambivalence towards missionaries, the West, and the process of
transnationalism itself was expressed in many of the interviews. Two men from different
churches exemplified this attitude. Both said outright that while they did not oppose
having foreign missionaries in Ukraine, they did not really understand why the
missionaries were coming. According to Bohdan, a young Baptist from L’viv, there are
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more believers as a percentage of Ukraine’s population than there are believers as a
percentage of the population of the United States, which makes the presence of American
missionaries in Ukraine counterintuitive. 44 This statement tells us what he thinks about
the United States (it is a place with few Christians) as well as what he thinks about his
own country (it is a Christian nation). His logic undermines the entire foundation of the
mission-sending enterprise in Ukraine.
Viktor, an older man from the Baptist church in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, said that
missionaries have not brought anything new to Ukraine and are not needed, except for
their money:
Financially I think [missionaries] helped a lot. But spiritually I don’t think so, but
it’s my personal thoughts. Let’s say Americans. When they come, let’s say for a
conference, or some meeting, or even just a service in the church, the people that
come are interesting. He would say the sermon and it would be interesting and
exciting. Or he would say some idea that we hadn’t seen before through the
Scripture. But for some reason, it’s my personal attitude, maybe many people
look at it from a different point of view, but for me personally they preach what
we already know well. . . . It seems to me that they don’t bring anything new. . . .
But well, if they have a desire to come and serve, let them do it. Honestly, we are
happy for them. No matter who comes with whatever purpose.
Viktor is not impressed by the missionaries he has seen. He has a laissez-faire attitude
(“let them do it”) but feels that the missionaries are not bringing any real spiritual benefit
to the Ukrainian church, although the inflow of cash is appreciated. To some extent this
kind of ambivalence was expressed at nearly all of the interviews and focus groups
conducted in Baptist churches. On the one hand missionaries are a help, some of them
are loved dearly, and they should keep coming. On the other hand they are not needed,
they have not given anything new, and the criticisms get even more specific and hardhitting from there. The next two sections evaluate in more detail the positive, then the
negative, views Baptists hold towards religious transnationalism and the West.

44

If Bohdan means that there is a higher percentage of Protestant believers in Ukraine than in the United
States, he is misinformed. Although the number has fallen in recent years, in 2002 approximately half of
the U.S. population considered themselves to be Protestant. Of those, 31% attend church weekly,
according to one research report (Smith and Kim 2004). Ukraine’s Protestants make up only 2.5% of its
total population (Krindatch 2003, 42).
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7.2.1 Baptists and their positive perceptions of religious transnationalism
One indicator of how Baptists perceive religious transnationalism is their attitude
towards foreign missionaries working in Ukraine. Each of the four Baptist churches
profiled has had interaction with Western missionaries, some to a greater extent than
others. As explained in Chapter Five, at the time of the fieldwork for this project there
were foreign missionaries living in L’viv and Vinnytsia who were affiliated to a certain
extent with the Baptist churches in those cities.

In the past Kherson had several

missionary families living there who were well acquainted with the Baptist church in this
study. No missionaries lived in Belgorod to work with its Baptist church, but like all of
the others, the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy church had previously hosted various short-term
teams from North America or Western Europe and so had some basis for evaluating the
role of missionaries in their country.
Positive responses to missionaries ranged from the basic “Thank God for
missionaries” to the more specific “Glen, who opened the Bible Institute, is a star.” Ivan
in Kherson said that “When our missionaries Glen and Chris with their families lived
here we loved them very much.” The following excerpt from a focus group of middle
aged Baptists at the Vinnytsia Baptist Church illustrates appreciation for the missionaries
with a hint of caution mixed in. Participants compliment missionaries in general without
mentioning anyone by name, but also imply that not all Baptists have positive opinions of
those who come to Ukraine:
Alex: We thank God for missionaries. We receive literature through missionaries.
They come and preach here. And the Word is opened through them.
Svyeta: They are doing God’s ministry.
Irina: And are helping us.
Alex: We don’t know about other churches, but it is great in our church. Praise
God. And we thank God for missionaries. And none of us is against them here,
right? . . . .
Julia: On the contrary, we are glad to see them. And want them to come here
more often.
Alex’s remark that “none of us is against them here, right?” can be interpreted as an
acknowledgment that not all Baptists share their positive opinion.
Nadia, an elderly woman at the same church and an adult convert, also expressed
her positive opinion of missionaries, but like Alex, she hinted that there were sometimes
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problems. She remarked that “These missions bring us positive things. And God helps
us not to accept the negative. But in missions I never saw negative. Videos, attitudes,
accepting, worshiping God, everything is according to the Gospel.” Although Nadia
“never saw negative” things with missions, she also said that “God helps us not to accept
the negative.” That is, God helps them not to accept the negative things that missionaries
bring into the life of the church, whatever those negative things might be. For Nadia, the
benefits of having missionaries outweigh the costs.
Nadia and Alex were not alone among the Baptists interviewed for this project in
their positive, but guarded, opinion of missionary work. Several others included criticism
of Western influence in the church along with compliments for the work missionaries
were contributing to their churches. At a fundamental level the Baptists I spoke with
seemed happy that missionaries were investing materially and spiritually in their country,
despite possible problems.
At the focus group of young adults at the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Baptist Church
one woman commented about missionaries: “I say, let them come.” She especially
wanted foreign Sunday School teachers to come and share experiences with the Sunday
School teachers at her church. One of her fellow church members appreciated the prayer
support provided by missionaries: “I think that they also pray, and I know that those who
come here provide a lot of prayer support. And I think it’s God’s will for them to come
and do just that.”
Upon occasion Ukrainian Baptists expressed tender and even familial affection
for Western missionaries. While I saw this more often in the new churches, at times a
Baptist church member would also speak about their strong admiration for missionary
contacts. Zhenya is a forty-something mother of three and an adult convert at L’viv
Baptist Church. She is Russian, and met her Ukrainian husband when he was in the army
and stationed in her Far Eastern city. Together they converted to the Baptist church when
they still lived in Russia, and subsequently moved to L’viv around the time of Ukraine’s
independence. Zhenya said that she had accepted Americans as “older brothers and
sisters” unquestioningly until recently.

In fact, she seemed to look on American

Christians as superior to Ukrainian believers:
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I just look at Western Christians like, you could say, as family. There are older
people in the family, brothers and sisters, who are wiser and stronger, and they
can teach those who are younger. I always accepted those who came with
missions as older brothers and sisters. Even though some of them are younger
than me, but I thought of them as older brothers and sisters who could take your
hand and walk together with you.
Zhenya’s feelings changed a bit after the onset of the U.S. war in Iraq, when she learned
that many American Protestants supported George Bush’s foreign policy decisions. She
was astounded that people she looked up to and thought were older and wiser Christians
could support the Iraq war. Despite her disappointment, however, she still considered
American Christians to be family.
One of Zhenya’s pastors, Oleksandr, has duties that include fundraising trips to
the United States and close interaction with Westerners visiting the L’viv church. When
describing the process of reconstructing their church building, he counted cooperation
with brothers and sisters from many countries a joy:
Brothers and sisters from overseas helped us . . . . with finances a bit. They
helped with their presence, with their literature. They often came to visit. When
we restored this House of Prayer, many groups from America and Germany came
to help us, who even worked here in the church. They brought tools with them,
they brought some money. It was a great joy for us, that there was someone to
share joy and labor with, that together we could build a House of Prayer. If you
could have seen this House of Prayer ten years ago, you would be shocked.
Oleksandr was grateful to the American and German groups. Unlike Zhenya, he did not
describe them with adoration or familial love, but as partners in labor. However, Pastor
Oleksandr did not want all of the credit to go to those from overseas. It is “first of all,
God’s blessing. Secondly, it is the help of our friends, and also our own labor, and the
answer to our prayers. Altogether – God’s blessing which gave that result.” He puts God
first in the hierarchy, then three entities share the secondary place: friends (from abroad),
the hard work of Ukrainians themselves, and their own prayers.
At the Kherson Baptist Church, Yuriy put this in perspective, saying that
international relationships were more difficult than the internal connections with other
Ukrainian Christians, despite a spiritual connection between believers in the West and in
Ukraine:
Our internal connections are more important for us because they’re closer to us.
It’s natural and we feel more natural. Western connections are also important
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because we’re related spiritually, but it’s a little bit more difficult in terms of
communication and a different culture.
Yuriy senses that no matter how close he may feel to a Western Christian because of a
spiritual bond, the relationship will always be different from the relationship with a
fellow Ukrainian believer. There is a sense of community (perhaps a sort of national
identity?) within the Ukrainian church that trumps spiritual connections with Christians
who live in other parts of the world.
Views towards missionaries came into sharper focus when the Baptists described
specific qualities they appreciated in the missionaries, qualities such as sacrificial living
(a high value in Ukrainian Baptist society), strong faith, and willingness to work hard.
Living patiently under circumstances of material hardship is a common reality for
Ukrainian Baptists, and it is a quality they admire in particular missionaries who
purposely live under similar circumstances while working in Ukraine. The Ukrainians I
interviewed felt that American missionaries in Ukraine were making big sacrifices to live
in their (poor) country when they could be living in a rich one. It is clear that they
perceive the West to be a land of plenty. In their minds, people who live in Western
countries live in abundance. Peter and Zhenya (the Ukrainian-Russian married couple in
L’viv) described spiritual aspects of the economic imbalances when I interviewed them in
their apartment:
Peter: But in general we are impressed by those people who come with missions
as people who give up their vacations, leave their families, spend their money and
come here to help, to preach.
Zhenya: Life here is harder than in America.
Peter: They always come and say, “Oh, it was so hard for you to believe in God
here!” I always say to them –
Zhenya: For us it’s not as hard as it was in the past. Maybe they mean right
now–
Peter: Or there were difficulties there, maybe.
Zhenya: Because there were always fines or something, it was a big battle.
Peter: I always tell them that they are the giants of faith, because for us it is
easier, it is hard and we can only hope in the Lord. . . . For you it is harder
because you have everything, life is easier. You have more temptation and need
to resist it. To stand firm. So it’s not clear yet who the giants of faith are.
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Zhenya and Peter believe that it is spiritually easier to live in a poor country than a rich
one. A Christian in Ukraine has to trust God for everything, and is not tempted to depend
on wealth instead.

Financial prosperity is seen by this couple and by others as a

spiritually treacherous condition. In this line of thinking, Ukrainian Baptists who are
poor have no choice but to depend only on God. Zhenya and Peter admire missionaries
for their willingness to make personal sacrifices to come to Ukraine. Peter even calls the
Western missionaries “giants of faith” because they live faithful Christian lives despite
having a materially easy way of life. This is an interesting stance: Western Christians are
admired because of their ability to stand firm despite living in a wealthy place; the West
itself is criticized because of the perceived prosperity that people there enjoy.
At a focus group with young adults at the Kherson Baptist Church, I asked the
participants to react to the phrase “American missionary.” Their first responses also had
to do with sacrifice:
Valera: Praise the Lord we have him. [quiet group laughter] May he minister
furthermore.
Oksana: Really. Praise the Lord that he had a desire to come here. To us. They –
Marina: and leave his life there that was much better and sacrifice many things to
come to Ukraine. One missionary who often comes to Ukraine – what is his
name? I can’t remember.
Woman: Steve.
Marina: He starts Christian music schools in Ukraine. And when he and his
family came to Kherson for the first time their taxi cab broke down and then they
spent much time to get to the place they needed. Finally when they got there they
got stuck in an elevator for two hours. And Steve decided not to take his family
to our city anymore. To work here means to be a hero a little bit. [group
laughter]
Although they joke about it, these young people believe that life is “much better” in
America and they call missionaries “heroes” because of the material sacrifices they make
to live in Ukraine. Their expectation is that Americans would not want to leave a
materially comfortable life to stay for any length of time in Ukraine. This passage not
only speaks towards their views of America (rich and comfortable), but it also speaks
about the image these Ukrainians have about their own country (poor and difficult).
However, unlike missionaries who come to Ukraine for a short time, these young people
were born in Ukraine and live there permanently. Using Marina’s logic, that means that
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their heroism might even surpass the heroism of Steve, the American missionary. I think
it surprises and pleases them that Americans will leave lives of plenty to live and work in
Ukraine, but at the same time they mock the visitors for struggling with taxis that break
down and elevators that get stuck. Perhaps they are also embarrassed at the failures of
their own land.
In the case of an American missionary named Glen who worked in Kherson from
1992-1999, members of the Baptist Church have only good to say, but once again we see
them honoring the simple life. Tanya responded to a question asking the group to
evaluate foreign missionaries working in Ukraine:
It depends on the missionary. If it is somebody like Glen, then it’s a star, of
course. He revolutionized things. Nothing that he did can be repeated. He
opened the Bible institute, thanks to which we can now have many educated
teachers and competent preachers and Sunday school teachers. He really did so
much. He became an example of how to sacrifice by how he lived here with his
family, with his children. He even lived like all of us, without his own car, using
public transportation. He was a really simple person.
This passage shows deep respect and admiration for Glen, and it also shows that one
characteristic the Ukrainian Baptists particularly admired was Glen’s willingness to live a
materially simple life at the same level as most others in the church. Tanya says that he
“lived like all of us.” Sacrifice is an important value to Tanya and other Ukrainian
Baptists. Perhaps the respect for sacrifice is rooted in the decades the church struggled
during the Soviet period, but it also likely goes even farther back in history to the roots of
the Ukrainian Baptist church as a movement of Russian Orthodox peasants. Orthodox
Christianity places a high value on suffering as a pathway to sanctification, and these
Baptists have inherited those ideas.
Besides admiring Americans for making material sacrifices, Ukrainian Baptists
mentioned several other qualities that they appreciated in missionaries. Zhenya (L’viv
Baptist) spoke of the love that an American team showed for each other, and desired that
same attitude within her own church:
Well as for culture, there’s this kind of influence: If in the church – I, for
example, really liked it when Glen Walker’s team 45 started coming here with the
medical mission. I saw how the team, how they relate to each other in a Christian
way on the team. I really liked that. I was just amazed, I saw the love which
45

This is not the same Glen referred to in the previous paragraph.
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shows that we are in Christ. I really liked that and to this day I dream that we
would also have that, that people would unite not with traditions . . . but with the
love of Christ. Where the love of Christ is you have the church, you have
Christians.
In this case Zhenya’s compliment about the American medical team is also a criticism of
her Baptist church: that people in the church are more concerned about traditions than
they are about showing the love of Christ to others. Zhenya grew up an atheist in the
Soviet Far East, and came into the church after moving to L’viv with her Ukrainian
husband. Perhaps being somewhat of an outsider frees her to voice these criticisms of the
church.
Besides these admirable qualities of American missionaries, Baptists appreciated
specific ministry skills they had learned from the Westerners. Valentina, an older woman
at the Vinnytsia Baptist Church, followed the example of Americans and learned how to
raise funds for her ministry. The concept of asking other Ukrainian church members for
financial contributions was a new one (forbidden during the Soviet Union) and
recommended by missionaries. Another example is that a young woman at the BelgorodDnestrovskiy Baptist Church said that missionaries “taught us to interact with children
that aren’t accepted.” While I did not ask a follow-up question to ascertain exactly what
children she was talking about, I assume she meant ministering to children with mental
retardation or special health needs. (There are two orphanages for these kinds of children
near her church). At that same interview one of her fellow church members said that they
planned to open a Christian youth club in their town, and they got the idea from an
American magazine. Even Dima, a fairly anti-American and patriotic youth leader at the
L’viv Baptist Church conceded that his youth group had benefited from American
materials:
Right now we are using a lot of literature and study books from the West. Right
now the leadership team is studying – I’m leading the lessons – a course on youth
leadership by Doug Fields and Rick Warren and Saddleback Church in
Carolina. 46 . . . . There are things which have certainly helped us. Now the things
we’ve gleaned from there have really helped our youth. Recently we have been
having growth in the youth group and it is in great part due to that Western
material.

46

The church is actually in California.
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One of the authors Dima cites, Rick Warren, wrote the popular Purpose Driven Life
(2002) that has swept evangelical churches in the West in recent years. Time magazine
called Rick Warren one of the 25 most influential evangelicals in America in 2005. L’viv
Baptist is engaged in some of the same literature, trends, and ideas as churches in the
United States.
Dima immediately continued: “Honestly, I always try to be a patriot. I don’t
really like the influence of the West, but I have to say that in these ways it has been a big
blessing.” Here Dima portrays the influence of the West as a challenge to patriotism. A
fellow L’viv resident (but member of a different church, Greater Grace) defined
patriotism as being proud that he is Ukrainian. Later we will see that Dima himself
defines patriotism as having Ukraine “the first country in my mind.”

He ties his

patriotism to his stance against emigration. Dima is proud of his country and accepting
Western influence in the church is difficult for him because of his strong sense of
patriotism, but nevertheless he finds some of the specific ministry tools a blessing.
The most extreme case I found of a Baptist church member emulating Americans
was Marina at the Kherson Baptist Church. Marina speaks English and has been one of
her church’s main English interpreters for the past several years, thus having a great deal
of interaction with Americans who visit Kherson. She has become close friends with a
number of Americans, and aspires to move to America to study in a Bible college there.
She is hoping that her many American contacts will help her reach the funding level she
needs to come to the United States. In the meantime, Marina acknowledges that she has
adopted some American habits such as eating with a fork in her right hand and using
American cosmetics (a friend in Texas sends her Mary Kay and Clinique products
through the mail). Marina told me that her friends think she does not behave like a
Ukrainian, and that her “understanding of life was half-American.” When pressed for a
specific example, she said that Ukrainians are not flexible in their behavior and that she
wants to emulate American flexibility. Ukrainians “think . . . their traditions are, uh, very
important and [there is] no other way to do that. So, I think Ukrainians should be more
flexible.”

In other words, the American value of flexibility stands in opposition to the

Ukrainian value of tradition. Marina does not want to be bound by Ukrainian traditions,
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but wants to be free to make decisions without having to bow to what is always expected
of her.
Many Baptists appreciate the preaching skills of visiting American pastors.
Valentina, a retired woman who attends L’viv Baptist, said that American and Canadian
pastors preach at a “high level,” and that people in her church, other than the pastors,
“don’t have that spiritual level.”

Her friend Maria implied that American pastors are

more educated than Ukrainian pastors, and that usually (but not always) leads to better
sermons:
The congregation listens to the foreign preachers more attentively, and with more
interest. They know history better – and I love and study history anywhere I can
get it, so that I can say something to someone. So it’s good when they come, but
some of those who come also preach poorly.
Most American pastors are good preachers, then, but at times offend because of not
knowing or following cultural practices. Maria related the story of an American pastor
who talked about his alcoholic son from the pulpit and offended his audience. Specific
sins like that should not be talked about in public, and especially not from the pulpit!
(Maria was shocked). Similar incidents of American preachers revealing too much about
their sinful lives were also reported at the Vinnytsia and Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Baptist
churches.
Education is a sensitive topic in Ukrainian Baptist Churches, since for years
Baptists were routinely denied admission at institutes of higher learning for political
reasons. Baptist pastors did not attend seminaries or Bible colleges but became qualified
to preach through their upright living, baptism, and membership in the church (Harris
1996, 8). Today’s young adults are the first generation of Ukrainian Baptists to have
open access to colleges and universities, and the educational disconnect between them
and their parents and grandparents at times leads to dissatisfaction on their part and
worries on their parents’ part. I will discuss Baptist youth and the generational divide
later in this chapter, but here note that not only are visiting missionaries viewed as highly
educated, but that the opposite is also sometimes true: that Ukrainian pastors are seen as
uneducated.

Kolya, another one of the youth leaders at L’viv Baptist Church, is

concerned about what he calls the “professional level” of the church ministers. While he
does not compare them to American ministers, we already saw that Maria at the same
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church made that connection. An urbane cosmopolitanism is desired by this group of
college-educated young adults, part of what is likely the first generation of educated
Ukrainian Baptists ever. Kolya says that “leaders will need to be taught and to be on a
professional level and they need to be able to represent our church well in the society.”
Another young man adds that church leaders need to be educated at a Bible college or
university and “then they will be able to preach well.” According to a third person at the
focus group, “preachers with high education could preach on good and serious topics, and
it goes to the heart of the people.” Uneducated preaching would be satisfactory for a
village church, but in the city of L’viv:
the level should be higher, because more people with high education come here
and they are more intelligent. They are seeking God and it is good for them to see
that the believers . . . can be educated, too. . . . they must be able to give the Word
of God at a deep level.
Kolya and his friends consider high education a necessity for leaders of an urban church.
There is little sophistication in their argument that highly educated people are “more
intelligent” than those with a simple village education. We begin to see a possible
rupture in the unity of Ukrainian Baptist churches as a result of the massive post-Soviet
societal changes.
In a personal interview Kolya’s brother, Dima, said that he wants to attend
seminary either in Prague or Dallas, Texas. Education is valued in Ukrainian Baptist
churches. It is linked closely to transnationalism because of the seminaries and Bible
courses led by foreign missionaries in Ukraine, and also because foreign pastors are
generally seen as more highly educated than a typical Ukrainian Baptist pastor.
Before moving on to clearly negative portrayals of missionaries and the West, I
will end this section by quoting Valentina, an elderly woman who attends L’viv Baptist
Church. Valentina thought that an American guest, especially one who was “a believer”
would have easy access to all American missionaries, and may even know them
personally. She asked me to telephone the missionaries Glen and Greg she had met from
North Carolina. When I told her that I would first need to know their last names and the
name of their city, she seemed undaunted:
But call them, and tell them thank you! And hello. Tell them that we love them
very much. We are waiting for them. They have done a very big work here,
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God’s work. . . . And tell them a very big thank you, blessing, and hello from the
church.
Valentina obviously loved the two Americans who had visited her church, but her
knowledge of them was limited at best. She knew their home state, but not their last
names or how to get in contact with them.

She is not one of the gatekeepers of

transnationalism at her church, and views the Americans through rose-colored glasses.
Baptists’ positive opinions of Western missionaries give the impression of polite
support overall with moments of warm affection and love, although even here we see
caution about some aspects of the transnational interactions. Dima pointed out that
transnationalism challenges his Ukrainian patriotism. Bohdan thinks missionaries are
useless, and Viktor thinks they are only useful for their money. Maria likes the sermons,
but was shocked by the scandalous story of an alcoholic son told by a visiting American
pastor as a sermon illustration. In the following section we will more closely examine the
negative remarks Baptists made about missionaries and the West, gaining a much more
nuanced picture of their attitudes towards transnationalism and of how religious
transnationalism is impacting their churches and lives.

7.2.2 Negative perceptions of transnationalism
Ukrainian Baptists are deeply engaged in transnational activities, and, as seen
above, have affection for certain missionaries and appreciate aspects of their transnational
relationships. However, they also have a great deal of criticism for missionaries, Western
churches, and their effects on Ukrainian churches. Overall, this criticism centers on
perceived corruption in the West and how it may negatively impact the Ukrainian church.
In what follows I will first examine how the West is portrayed as a place of liberalism
and modernity that could potentially corrupt the Ukrainian church. Then I will look
specifically at criticisms of missionaries in Ukraine who are seen as ignorant of
Ukrainian Baptist traditions and rules, and who are critiqued by Baptists as being
disrespectful of their culture and independence.
Most Ukrainian Baptists, and certainly the church leaders, strongly value
theological and social conservatism. As Evgeniy, the pastor at the Vinnytsia Baptist
Church, said:
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The most important issue is to hold the church on a godly foundation, that we will
be faithful to the apostolic principles of faith. This is what we concentrate on.
It’s really hard to hold the church as different forces have an influence on it. We
are for the Gospel, the Gospel that the Apostles preached. We do not modernize
the Gospel. We do not try to adapt it to the world. We proclaim the Word of God
to the world. We keep to the fundamental principles of faith. This is probably
what makes our church different from other churches that appear nowadays. But
we keep to that foundation.
In individual and focus group interviews, Ukrainian Baptists like Pastor Evgeniy often
talked about something they called “the world.” This is similar to Augustine’s civitas
terrena, the earthly city “against whom the City of God must be defended” (Augustine
1998, 5). The world is everything that is outside of the church, and Ukrainian Baptists
consider it a great threat to the church. The West and the world are not the same thing,
but the West brings Ukrainian churches closer to the world, and Western churches are
portrayed as having succumbed to the temptations of the world to a greater extent than
have Ukrainian Baptists. This association of the West with the world is primarily a
condemnation of secular Western society, but even religious life in the West is at times
portrayed as tainted. As we will see, the Western church is labeled as the source of
liberal theology which Ukrainian pastors seek to keep out of their church. Criticism of
the West and of Western missionaries represents a conservative stream of thinking in
Baptist Churches that is mostly, but not completely, located within the middle and older
generations, among those people who lived through years when the Soviet government
placed strict controls on the church and when the outside world had very little
opportunity to influence the church.
A group of middle aged members of Kherson Baptist Church labeled the West as
the source of liberal theology that is “sneaking in” to the Ukrainian Church, and also as a
source of loose behavior that people in the church, especially young people, imitate. The
church pastor, Yuriy, was a participant in this group, and strongly links the West to
liberalism and license:
Unfortunately in Ukraine the church has definitely felt the influence of the West
because a liberal theology started to sneak in, and the life of the church, how to
say it? Liberty – in the negative meaning of this word – appeared. Because
freedom – I understand that there should be liberty and openness. But just, we are
a special people (narod), and especially now in this time if there is freedom, then
– how to say it – “feather and fuzz are flying all around” as we say.
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When asked to be more specific about the kinds of freedom that were negatively
influencing the church, Pastor Yuriy mentioned music (presumably contemporary
worship music that resembles popular rock music in style). Another man in the group,
Igor, said that now believers wear the same kinds of clothing that he used to see when he
was part of the criminal world. Pastor Yuriy continued with more about how Baptist
youth are imitating the American way of dress and worship style:
I’ve been to America and I’ve seen how they dress there and what kind of church
services they have and everything that takes place. But here it’s not accepted for
people to wear shorts to the service, and our youth challenge some with it.
“We’ve seen what they do and we’ll do the same thing.” . . . . And I say that there
is also a liberal theology, a bit of liberal theology.
As the senior pastor of a prominent Baptist church in his city, Pastor Yuriy is one of those
who have been especially active in the processes of transnational religious practice in
Ukraine.

His church and the Baptist community in Kherson at large host various

American groups annually, and in the past received money towards their new church
building. Pastor Yuriy has even visited the United States and has observed American
Christians in their home environment. His criticisms of the Western church have to do
with the way American Christians dress and the theology that they hold to. These two
themes of freedom (or license, as it could be translated here) and liberal theology were
repeated many times in conversations with Ukrainians about the West.
At the Vinnytsia Baptist Church the middle aged focus group participants
expressed similar opinions, introducing as a topic of conversation the notion that the
Bible is preached properly in their own church, but is perverted in many other countries.
They believe that Ukrainian believers have superior morals and a more correct theology
than believers in the West. The Vinnytsia Baptists are pleased that their own pastors will
not hesitate to correct a visiting pastor who speaks in error. At their church, Andrey said,
the Word of God is not perverted yet. Because it’s a problem in the world now. It
is preached from one Bible. But it is perverted by interpretations and so on. Praise
God that the most important issue for the whole world and humanity is that it is
not yet perverted [here] as in other places. For example, in many countries it is
not preached the way it should be.
Irina added:
Even when people come from America, or one of the brothers preaches and
something is wrong, “Stop brother. Look how it is in the Bible. That’s what is
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written.” There are situations like that. They even correct a brother who comes
from Australia or America.
Irina is pleased to report that her church does not blindly embrace every foreign visitor or
new religious teaching. She places herself and her church on high moral ground within
these transnational relationships. They receive visitors from abroad, but they also control
what influence the visitors can have on the beliefs of people in the congregation.
Irina’s pastor, Evgeniy, also said that foreign churches often do not hold to the
same standards as his own church. For Pastor Evgeniy, the most important quality of a
church is to stay on a “godly foundation,” to not allow “the world” to negatively
influence the church. When asked if the international interactions of Ukrainian churches
are creating any problems, he replied:
The problems really exist. Because the churches that come from there (from the
West) are not always fundamental. There are lots of liberal churches and
missions that adhere to independent, liberal principles. They bring disharmony.
And our churches (some of them) do not try to keep to that foundation built by
our forerunners. This foundation is the Gospel, evangelical principles. We build
our church in accordance with God’s commandments. And now they want to
introduce know-how. All this brings the church closer to the world. It does not
lift the world to the church level, to the level of morality God calls us to, but the
church goes down to the world. And then it becomes difficult to distinguish the
church from the world. You can hardly tell the difference. Of course we are very
concerned about that. Such a problem exists in Ukraine.
For Pastor Evgeniy, qualities that should be condemned are liberalism and independence,
both of which move the church closer to ‘the world.’ He values a separation between
church and world, and when Ukrainian churches imitate Western churches they lose that
distinctiveness. Pastor Evgeniy is making a case that Ukrainian churches tend to be
superior to Western churches. Ukrainian churches are “fundamental;” they are built on
the historical foundation established by previous Christians. These churches are at a high
level of morality, and they keep God’s commandments. Liberal churches, on the other
hand, include many Western churches and even a few Ukrainian churches (who have
been swayed by foreign liberals). The arrival of liberalism has brought “disharmony” to
religious life in Ukraine. These churches are “independent,” and they do not want to
follow the lead of older Ukrainian churches.

They are not built on God’s

commandments, but are built on “know-how” – expertise that comes, perhaps, through
professional education. These liberal churches are at a low moral level – at the world’s
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level, and are in fact indistinguishable from the world. Here ‘the world’ is everything
that is not ‘the church.’
Bohdan is a twenty-two year old whose parents joined the L’viv Baptist Church
when he was a child. Although young people I interviewed tended to speak more
positively about the West than older people did, Bohdan was an exception. He is critical
of new churches started by American or other foreign pastors because people in those
churches “want to live with their feet in the modern world.” To Bohdan and many others,
the “modern world” cannot and should not enter the church, nor should the church enter
the world. The two realms need to remain separate.
Bohdan was also critical of the West because he thinks that Ukrainian Baptists are
not as devout as they were in the past, and he views openness with the West as part of the
problem. According to Bohdan, the church’s relationship with the West attracted people
who were not real believers. They came because they thought they would receive money
or they wanted to use the church to achieve special consideration for easier emigration:
In general . . . I personally don’t much like the influence of the West. I think, my
opinion is, that it isn’t a good influence. Because when . . . there was the Soviet
Union, and the church was in bad shape, then believers were real believers. . . .
And when the Soviet Union collapsed, when Ukraine became free and
independent, faith became fashionable or prestigious. And many people began
coming to church. On the other hand, many people started going to church just to
be able to emigrate abroad. . . . I also know some people who were in church just
so that they could leave for the USA. And also, humanitarian aid began.
Bohdan sees openness with the West as one reason for the diluting of the Ukrainian
Baptist Church as people came to church because of the material gain they hoped to
receive there.
Another major area of criticism against the West is that Western missionaries do
not always follow the traditions and culture of Ukrainian Baptists. Bohdan complained
about Western-oriented new churches in Ukraine: “We have our own traditions, and
these traditions don’t mean anything to them.” The defense of traditions and culture was
also prominent in what Bohdan’s pastor, Volodymyr, had to say about the West. Pastor
Volodymyr’s comments are instructive especially as they relate to his view of Ukrainian
Baptist culture and how it is impacted by processes of transnationalism. He appreciated
missionaries who “don’t come to change our culture or to teach us, but to help.” He
admired missionaries who wanted to partner with his church without telling the
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Ukrainians what to do. Since Pastor Volodymyr did not wish to have his interview
recorded, below is a paraphrase of his thoughts about missionaries:
They come and behave the same as they do at home, without following our
traditions. Many of them don’t even know about our traditions before they come.
They don’t come prepared. I believe that all believers are equal to each other, and
don’t want Americans looking down on us. So if they come just with money, and
don’t want to be in a relationship with us, we don’t want it. It would be better for
them to go home. Instead, they should come to us as friends. In general, Western
missionaries should come to Ukraine better prepared to understand our culture.
In Pastor Volodymyr’s missionary critique he places the Ukrainian church on an equal
footing with American missionaries, and he rejects any missionary endeavors that
discount Ukrainian traditions and culture. Money is not worth it, and friendship is the
only acceptable basis for a relationship between his church and foreign churches. Here
Volodymyr is not arguing for the superiority of Ukrainian believers, as some of his
colleagues did, but he is making a case for the equality of all believers from other
countries. He is offended that some Western missionaries come to Ukraine without
understanding Ukrainian culture, and with what he interprets as an attitude of superiority
over the Ukrainians. For Volodymyr, the transnational church has potential (if the
Westerners come in friendship and with cultural understanding). But without those
conditions, he would rather sever the transnational connections.
What are specific aspects of Ukrainian (Baptist) culture that visiting Americans
often do not respect or imitate? Many of these had to do with clothing, cosmetics, and
form of worship. People mentioned that visiting American men sometimes wore shorts
to church. One American missionary was criticized for not removing his hat during an
English club meeting. American women sometimes came to church wearing pants and
jewelry; some of them have short hair and use cosmetics. Americans often pray while
seated, which is forbidden in Ukrainian Baptist churches, where everyone stands or
kneels for prayer. 47 Americans told stories in the pulpit that were deemed inappropriate
by Ukrainian audiences who do not want to hear amusing things in a serious situation,
and do not want to hear about sinful behavior at church, even if those stories are part of a
visitor’s personal narrative of coming to faith.
47

As Andrey, a middle-aged man in

Maksim from Vinnytsia Baptist mentioned the fact that missionaries pray while seated as a cultural
stumbling block and ‘a bit of a problem’ at church. However, he thinks the problem is actually with the
Ukrainians, ‘because we look at them and think that we are better than them because we kneel and they sit.’
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Vinnytsia, explained at a focus group interview, “there are many things that just
shouldn’t be talked about,” and “church is meant for the preaching of God’s word,” not
for stories about drinking too much or going to prison. Stories about conversion are
permitted, and the process of conversion is very important. However, specific details
about how sinful the person was in their pre-conversion life should be kept quiet and are
unwelcome in the church.
A young man from the L’viv Baptist Church complained about the lack of
cultural understanding exhibited by visiting missionaries:
I have one wish for the missionaries who come from other countries. Especially
in our church sometimes there is a lack of cultural understanding. It is a great
labor on behalf of our Ukraine for the missionaries to come here but sometimes
they do not understand some things about us. Sometimes this causes conflict in
the churches and only if they had a really good understanding of our cultural
differences, of the conditions in our church, of the specific things about us. . . .
When they are building churches on the Korean or American system, then they’re
not really thinking about the differences. It’s not a good work. 48
For this Baptist, the lack of cultural knowledge means that despite the effort and
intentions, the work of the missionaries is “not good.”
By criticizing their foreign partners, Ukrainian Baptists assert their own identity
as spiritual equals (or even superiors). They want to show that they are the experts in
Ukraine, and should be the leaders in any missionary ventures in the country. For
example, Pastor Oleksandr of L’viv Baptist disapproves of the way some missionaries
spend money in Ukraine. He recommends that Ukrainians, not Americans, determine
where and how the money will be spent:
It’s not a secret that sometimes a missionary came and would bring some money.
And he had been told how to spend the money. But you understand, that support
was wasted, and it wasn’t the most effective plan. Because here people know
better how to use that money to greater effect – such as in putting on
evangelizations, or various things.
By not relying on Ukrainians to determine how to spend the missions money, Pastor
Oleksandr believes that the support is “wasted.”

48

He mentions the “Korean or American system” because in addition to having many American
missionaries, in L’viv there is also a Korean Baptist missionary who pastors one of the ECB churches.
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Timofey, a youth pastor at the Kherson Baptist Church, gave a specific example
of missionaries who think they can teach the Ukrainian Baptists a spiritual discipline
(prayer), when the Ukrainians are probably better at it than the visitors:
I’ve seen many missions of Americans to Ukraine. I worked with them for two
years and we have had many missions groups since 1990. Almost all of the
Americans had euphoria. They all traveled here to teach us and it seemed that
God revealed much to them and not to us. They wanted to teach us how to pray.
There is an expression – the closer sorrow is to you the closer God is to you. I
think that God is closer to people from countries with wars and unstable
economies. It seems to me that God is closer to them because people need God
always and they ask and plead to Him for help.
Timofey here states that because life is difficult in Ukraine (with sorrow and an unstable
economy), believers already know how to pray. He finds it silly that Americans think
they can teach Ukrainian believers how to pray more effectively. Once again we see a
case made that Ukrainians are spiritually superior to Americans. Because of the suffering
Ukrainian believers have endured, Timofey believes that God is closer to them than to the
Americans who have not suffered as much.
As we have seen, Ukrainian Baptists respond in complex ways to Western
missionaries and to the processes of religious transnationalism. To generalize, it seems
that when there is a personal connection to a missionary the Ukrainian Baptists have a
positive response; when they are speaking about missionaries in general they have a
negative response. Ukrainian Baptists reject what they see as Western liberalism, and
they are disappointed that some missionaries do not show respect for Ukrainian Baptist
customs and the authority of Ukrainian Baptist leaders. They recognize that in the
relationship with international churches the Westerners are the ones with the money and
its ability to help build infrastructure for the Ukrainian church; however, the Ukrainian
Baptists tend to feel spiritually superior to these rich guests and often wish they would
just go back to America. Despite these problems, personal aspects of transnationalism
are able to overcome some of the negative feelings. Through the friendships and even
love that develops when an American missionary returns summer after summer to stay as
the houseguest of a Ukrainian Baptist family the negative impressions of Americans and
their liberal churches can be overcome, at least on a case by case basis.
The next three sections of this chapter examine themes that emerged as significant
ones in understanding Ukrainian Baptists and their involvement with the West. First is
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the idea of freedom, which is something that nearly all of the Baptists mentioned during
their focus groups and interviews.

They associate freedom with the West, and it

symbolizes both what they admire and what they fear in the West.

Next are the

generational elements of transnationalism and how they impact these churches. Older
people often accuse the West of being a corrupting influence on their young people, and
the young people have some interesting responses to these fears. Finally we will briefly
look at emigration to the West. Baptist churches in Ukraine have lost thousands of
families to America, Canada, and other countries in recent years, and this loss colors the
attitude of those who stayed behind.

7.2.3 Freedom, Independence, Liberty, License
As we saw earlier, Ukrainian Baptists often associate the West with the idea of
freedom, liberty, or license. Pastor Yuriy of Kherson Baptist Church said that because of
influence from the West, “Liberty – in the negative meaning of this word – appeared.”
Freedom and its ill effects were common refrains among members of all the Baptist
churches studied here, and the topics were usually raised in the context of a discussion of
transnationalism and interactions with the West. Before beginning this research project I
expected Baptists in Ukraine to cherish religious freedom and some of the changes that
have been available to them since 1991. Instead, they portrayed freedom as a test from
God, as something dangerous, and as the cause of serious conflict in the church. Here
Katya, a middle aged woman from Vinnytsia, compares freedom to the persecution
previously endured by the church:
Well, like they say, God is testing us by the times. When there was persecution,
God tested us by that, if we would stand through that. There were different tests,
and hard times in school and at work. Everywhere. And now it is freedom. And
God is testing us by freedom.
The angst that freedom has brought to Ukrainian Baptists is instructive of the central role
that it plays in many aspects of church life. Of particular note is that freedom is partly
blamed for what is perhaps the most contentious issue in Ukrainian Baptist churches
today: the divide between young people (who have come of age since 1991) and the older
generations.

Here we will examine three dominant uses of the term ‘freedom’ in
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Ukrainian Baptist churches. In the following section we will look more carefully at the
youth issue which develops from the first issue of freedom.
Baptists talk about several kinds of freedom, although they do not always
carefully distinguish between them. First is the religious freedom that was permitted
towards the end of glasnost in the late 1980s and then became institutionalized with the
advent of Ukraine’s independence. Two aspects of religious freedom are (1) that foreign
missionaries are permitted to work in the country and (2) that Ukrainians themselves are
free to evangelize their fellow countrymen.

With the arrival of (mostly Western)

missionaries a wider variety of religious organizations are active in the country.
Ukrainians can now choose their religion out of many possibilities.

This kind of

freedom, Baptists say, is difficult because the average Ukrainian person does not know
enough to distinguish the ‘good’ religions from the ‘bad’ religions. According to Pastor
Oleksandr in L’viv,
All the new things which came from the West sometimes brought us some danger,
or, because when the borders were opened, we had so much freedom. And while
that was good, with it came lots of bad. What used to be forbidden by the
government, by the communist regime, now became available. Understand? . . .
Someone said that in the past the government gave us hard, iron handcuffs to
wear. Now we are happy to put out our hands to receive gold handcuffs. So now
we act like we are free. Freedom came, many various denominations came, they
could confess freely, and it was very hard for an average person to figure out
where the truth is.
He mentions the Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses as examples of false churches that
lead astray Ukrainians who are not grounded in Bible knowledge. Following these false
religions is as dangerous now (gold handcuffs) as religious persecution was in the past
(iron handcuffs).
Not only are foreign missionaries now allowed to work in Ukraine, but
Ukrainians have the freedom to propagate their own religion to others in the country.
Several Baptists complained that their church is not doing enough to take advantage of
that kind of freedom while they have it. Maksim grew up in a village Baptist church and
at the time of this research was in his mid-thirties and the leader of an evangelistic team
of young people at Vinnytsia Baptist Church.

(He has since emigrated to Sacramento,

California). Maksim thinks that the purpose of church in society has fundamentally
changed from what it was before religious freedom came. In the past the church was a
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refuge from society, whereas now people in the church should go out into society and
spread their faith, but are not doing so:
Our church probably wasn’t ready and even now is not really ready for the times
we have now. There was a time in the past when we just sat in church and
listened and it was so good because it was like a breath of fresh air. Only there
we could hear something different, what we didn’t hear every day. And suddenly,
the time came when we could make the services different. And it is very hard,
this turning point. Freedom. . . . And I see that the pastors worry about this a lot,
and people who worry about the church are hurting because of this. I see it. It is
a theme of sermons. And we are just not ready to accept this freedom and use it.
I asked Maksim to clarify what kind of freedom he was talking about. He replied:
I was talking about freedom of faith. Believers were used to just sitting in church
and doing nothing. And when freedom came very few people started some
movement, action that has to be in Christianity. That’s telling others, doing
evangelism activities, talking with people, charity, and so on.
Maksim identifies freedom as a great opportunity for the church to take on
responsibilities that “have to be” in Christianity. But he also identifies moving out and
using freedom as a difficult step for the church, which is “not ready” to use it.
After religious freedom, a second type of freedom that Baptists mentioned is the
free, relaxed behavior of foreign guests. Ksenia (Vinnytsia Baptist Church) noticed an
overall difference in attitude between Americans and Ukrainians, that “when people from
America or any other country come to our church, we can see that they look more relaxed
or uninhibited, and we have the so-called code of obligations drawn up by our
brotherhood which tells us what Christians we should be.” This code is an unwritten
collection of rules, with scriptural supports, that are generally agreed to regulate the
behavior of church members. In recent years, one former Ukrainian Baptist told me,
some congregations post the rules in a prominent location on the church premises. Since
the Americans do not have the “code of obligations” they may behave quite differently
from their Ukrainian partners.
One young Baptist complimented the free behavior of foreign guests, and said
that people in the church were imitating that openness. His attitude is similar to that of
Marina, described earlier, who tries to imitate the attitudes of Americans that she meets.
Misha is a young man at Vinnytsia Baptist who believes that the nature of church people
is changing through their contact with the West:
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I think that ministers or youth that come here from other countries, they are more
open, free in their behavior. And it is also I think an example for us. I see that
many people try, not that they try to be like, but they become like them. It’s not
like they are copying them, but there is something in their behavior. Something
like independence.
Regardless of intentions, Misha sees that Ukrainian church people are becoming more
open, free, and independent in their behavior through their transnational relationships.
A third variety of freedom that the Baptists discussed, and this is perhaps related
to the carefree attitude observed in Westerners by Ksenia and Misha, is freedom from the
strict rules that governed the behavior of Ukrainian Baptists for generations, a freedom or
license to behave as desired. This kind of freedom is often associated with the West, as
the West influences Ukrainian culture in general. Young Baptists feel free to wear more
stylish clothes, listen to popular music, and watch Western films. This is the freedom
that most worries people I spoke with in Ukrainian Baptist churches. Pastor Oleksandr in
L’viv is quite concerned: “That which was bad in the West came here and was very
quickly taken in by our people, by our youth. They want to be free.” He continues:
Now people say that you are completely free. No one has power over you, and
you can do what you want. This has a very bad influence on people, because the
sinful nature which a person has leads us to do very bad things. We see that we,
say, have very high divorce rates. They used to be lower and now are very high –
more than fifty percent of marriages. The number of abortions has gotten
enormously high. In this way the West has influenced our country very badly. In
our church we try to . . . explain to people that freedom is not always good. If I
am free in Christ that is a completely different thing.
Pastor Oleksandr is misinformed about the impact of freedom on Ukraine’s abortion
rates, which during the Soviet Union were already astonishingly high. According to the
Population Resource Center, there has been little change in Ukraine’s abortion rate from
1994 to 1999, which remains more than double the rate in the United States (Westoff
2003). Nevertheless, Pastor Oleksandr’s concerns about the West’s bad influence on
Ukraine and on Ukrainian churches represent common fears within Ukrainian Baptist
circles and particularly among the middle and older generations.
Of note is that many of the symptoms of ‘worldliness’ that Pastor Oleksandr and
others cited during conversations about the influence of the West are related to gender.
Women wearing trousers in church, using makeup, cutting their hair short, and having
gold jewelry were all examples of being “in the world” that were condemned by most
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Baptists I spoke with. Everyone acknowledged that rules about what women can wear
have relaxed for this generation. Middle aged women now typically wear dresses at
church but are free to wear pants at home. Their mothers, however, (those women in
their 60s and above) usually wear only dresses for all occasions. Some younger women
would like to wear pants occasionally to church, although it is still generally frowned
upon by the church establishment. (It is nelzya, not allowed, as they say in Russian).
The L’viv Baptist young adult focus group reported that a few years ago the
clothing rules had been strictly enforced at their church, but had since been relaxed to the
point where Miroslava did not think that “anybody would forbid me to wear pants in
church if, for example, I just came back from classes and I had pants on.”
Of course this shift towards a more liberal dress code for women cannot be pinned
solely on interactions with the West through church channels, but should be seen as part
of a general shift of culture. Valentin, the young interpreter from Kherson, explained it
this way:
Sometimes, when you speak to the old ladies or the old people from the church,
they can tell that the church was influenced [by the West], because now the girls
start to wear the – instead of skirts they are wearing trousers. They are using
more of the makeup. And they are having different style of haircuts. But, uh, I
don’t know whether it’s the influence on the church. I think it’s the general
influence of the Ukrainian culture. And because we, as a church we are a part of
the culture, it does influence the church also. . . . [It’s] a part of the changes in the
whole Ukrainian society. It comes into the church also.
This is what some Ukrainian Baptists fear – that the secular culture will come into the
church. Valentin sees that “Ukrainian culture” has things in common with the West.
Perhaps “the world” that other Baptists so frequently referred to as influencing Ukrainian
churches is not only the foreign missionaries, but also Ukrainian society itself.
Why the focus on clothing as worldly and fearsome? A young man in L’viv
explained that people are not afraid of fashion per se, but with the other “worldly things”
that are often associated with more relaxed dress standards:
The nature of this problem here is not in the clothing but in the people;
unbelievers are dressed in a fashionable way. They go to discos and do some
other things and people from the church are afraid that with the fashionable
clothing will come other worldly things. They try to protect themselves from the
influence of the world.
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Once again, “the world” is something to be feared, something that could potentially harm
the church. In fact, these fears lay at the root of another important issue in the church:
generational conflict, which I will now address.

7.2.4 Youth and generational conflict in Ukrainian Baptist churches
Disagreements between youth and their elders are nothing new. Even in societies
that have not experienced a major governmental regime change and the economic, social,
and cultural shifts that are ongoing in Ukraine, throughout the world generational
tensions are a recurrent theme.

Generational conflict was cited in one study as a

component of post-Soviet religious change and the growth of western-oriented
evangelical churches in Lithuania (Lankauskas 2002). In Ukrainian Baptist churches the
topic of generational conflict was raised by my informants as a problematic church issue
more often than anything else, but even then, the feedback was not unanimous. Some
churches (like Vinnytsia Baptist) appear to be hit particularly hard by youth-adult
disagreements, while others (like Kherson Baptist) appear to be doing a better job of
understanding people of different generations. A few older people seem oblivious to the
simmering struggles in their midst, and a number of young people assured me that there
were no generational conflicts in their church. (Although at times they would then go on
to describe just such a conflict). Valentin, a man in his early 20s who often works as an
interpreter for American guests at his Baptist church, identified the generation gap as one
of the main problems at his church. So did participants in a focus group of middle agers
at Vinnytsia Baptist Church. One man in that group, Andrey, said that the problem of
how the world is influencing youth is “the most important issue in our church today.”
Some of the conflicts between young people and their parents’ generation are
about simple issues like when the youth group should meet (at Kherson Baptist Church)
and misunderstanding about youth group plans. At the L’viv Baptist Church, young
people grumbled that the older generation has different ideas about youth ministry, and
often “they don’t have an understanding of what we are doing” and this leads to “many
unpleasant times.” An example of this is that the youth group has begun a ministry called
the “Club,” where they can invite non-Christian young people to hear the gospel in a nonthreatening way. The older generation, however, is not excited about this idea, not
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because they disagree with the goal of evangelization, but because they do not approve of
this means of doing it:
They don’t understand some simple things about the new vision like the Club.
We see the Club thing as a good thing for outreach, for the evangelization of
young people. For our older generation because of some things from the past, for
them club is the place for communist meetings and it is absolutely a negative
thing.
This kind of disagreement can be explained as an everyday generational conflict that
might spring up in any society, where the refrain of the young people is “they don’t
understand us.”

However, in other ways the generational divide among Ukrainian

Baptists is more formidable and telling about changes in these churches and how they are
being impacted by transnationalism.
A key component of this other aspect of generational conflict has to do with how
new social freedoms are filtering into the church. Young people point to freedom as an
important component of these tensions. Miroslava, a young woman from L’viv Baptist
Church, explained that the older generation:
had different values and they had different problems. It was forbidden to meet,
and they had unity. Now we have freedom, but now different methods are
needed, but older people want to offer to us old methods and they are not effective
any more and it is hard for them to understand, and this is a problem.
Miroslava and her team of youth leaders believe that the newfound freedoms in Ukraine
mean that the methods the church should use for its activities have changed. She is
frustrated with the opposition to these changes among church leaders.
From the adult perspective it is the young people who are misusing the new-found
freedoms. Some who were raised in the Soviet-era Baptist church expressed the opinion
that today’s young people are indiscriminately adopting ‘worldly’ customs that lead them
away from true faith. Yulia, a participant in the middle aged focus group at Vinnytsia
Baptist, put it this way:
So now I tell them [the children] that we tried to be different from the world in
our appearance. And now you are not different. You just feel freedom. Now no
one is pointing at you with their fingers that you are stundas. And you need to
have this desire from inside to be different from the world. Unfortunately, this
new generation doesn’t really understand it. They don’t want to be different from
the world and to be saints in their appearance. At least in appearance. That’s
what our brothers and pastors are struggling for now.
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In the past Ukrainian Baptists were clearly marked as “different” from all those around
them. They were generally barred from higher education. They associated mostly with
each other. They wore somber, conservative clothing and very little jewelry. Children at
school were called stunda, a derogatory nickname for Baptists. Now that the restrictions
from the state have been lifted, Baptists are free to mingle with the rest of society and
become like those around them. Yulia finds it imperative, however, that the pressure to
be “different from the world” be maintained as an internal desire. She is particularly
upset that young people are losing the desire to be and look different from the world, and
they are starting to look more and more like secular society.
Yulia believes that the nature of Baptist youth has changed from when she was
young. In the past young people were “simple and obedient”; now they are not. They
used to be kinder; now they are less so. Because of the influence of popular culture
(through television, for example), and because they study together with unbelievers, it is
difficult for young people to maintain their difference from the world.
Yulia: As long as I can remember, when I was young, about 20, it was easier
then. Youth were simpler and more obedient. And now it is hard to discipline
youth. It is hard for the youth because the influence of the world through TV is
strong. Most of the youth now study. When I was young, it was practically
impossible to study in institutes. They didn’t accept us there.
Esther: Because you were believers.
Yulia: Right. And we were kinder and simpler. Today most of the youth study
and it is hard for them to be equal with unbelievers and to be different. They
seem to have little spiritual strength.
This blending of Baptist young people with society is a sign, according to Yulia, of their
spiritual weakness. It is also an outcome of post-Soviet transition. Despite the fact that
Yulia and her friends point to the West as a culprit here (see below), much of what she is
complaining about does not actually come from the West but is part of the changing
nature of Ukrainian society after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Later I asked Yulia and her fellow church members what they thought the West’s
role was in the problems with the youth. Is what is happening with young people, I ask,
in any way connected with Ukraine’s being more open to the West? At first Andrey, the
group leader who invited all the others, does not hesitate in his reply, although he then
goes back and hedges his response:
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Andrey: Directly. All 100 percent.
Viktoria: It has a great influence on our youth.
Yulia: It all comes from the West, right? . . . .
Andrey: Well, West or not West. You know, I also used to say that but I have
softened my opinion a little now. The West has done some damage and they have
the same problems we do. But there are also Americans who really come here
and carry themselves as the light. Not all. It is the same here and there.
Andrey’s gut instinct was to blame the West for all of the problems with Baptist youth.
Viktoria and Yulia support that idea, as well. Then Andrey softens his stance. Some of
the problems can be traced to the West, but he does not want to label all Americans as
corrupt and dangerous for the church. Perhaps because his interviewer is American, or
perhaps because he remembers some specific American missionaries who “carry
themselves as the light,” Andrey changes his mind.
While there are young people who speak out against the older generation, or who
at least vigorously defend themselves against these kinds of criticisms, others agree with
Yulia and Andrey that Baptist youth are going down the wrong path. I asked the
Vinnytsia young adult focus group to identify the most important issues facing their
church. A lively discussion ensued, with three different viewpoints expressed. Vika, a
young woman who converted and joined the Vinnytsia Baptist Church as a teen,
expressed some of the same sentiments about the problems of becoming like unbelievers
as Yulia and Andrey did in their focus group. Maksim, the group leader and oldest (at
age 35 he was not actually a young adult, but had agreed to invite young adults to his
home for the interview), countered with the idea that the outward signs of changing to be
like the world (for example, wearing makeup) are not the real problem, but are symptoms
of spiritual malaise. Misha, another participant in the discussion, said that control issues
are at the heart of the matter, that the adults are simply afraid of losing control of the
youth:
Vika: Well, people that come, we need to change them, but often it is the other
way around. That we change and become more like them, like unbelievers.
Esther: For example?
Vika: Before it wasn’t allowed to wear any makeup at all in church. And now
young people have started to use makeup more and more. . . . I think that the
problem is that we become more like them, and not they like us. . . .
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Maksim: I think that. . . the problem is not about makeup. But I judge for myself.
I guess it’s fear of God or, I don’t know. And generally we are not the way we
used to be before. I don’t know why. I guess it’s also time that changes, and I see
that pastors and many other people and we worry about it. But unfortunately, it is
very hard to change something. Because freedom always leads to this, a person is
not persecuted and he can freely come to church, or not go there. Same with
makeup – wear it or not. Well, the pastors talk about it, but people disobey, get
used to it. And it’s like people lose God’s fear. . . .
Misha: Well, I don’t know. I was thinking here and the first thought was that
there is a problem that older members of the church are kind of afraid to lose the
control over the church, the youth. Well, new people that come to church, just
repented, or younger by age. And it seems like they don’t trust them.
Maksim then suggests to Misha that it is not that the older people want to control the
youth, but that they are concerned about the spiritual well-being of the church. Sasha
rejects that explanation:
Sasha: There is a clear line between the older members, who are in the right, and
there are the youth who always need to be prayed for, and who regularly need to
be taught, who regularly need to be corrected. They are making youth go to
church, do ministries. And these youth need to be always under control, and they
always go astray. And they talk about it all the time. . . . They don’t want to hear
anything new. They don’t even want to learn anything new. They are not
interested in what I think. They think they are right and nothing else can be
accepted.
Elsewhere Sasha implied that he was experiencing difficulties in the church with some of
the older congregation members. Despite Maksim’s suggestion that the adults merely
feared for the spiritual well-being of the church, Sasha frets under what he sees as the
heavy controlling hand of authority figures at church.
Clearly, generational conflict troubles many Ukrainian Baptists. Parents and
grandparents worry about their decreasing ability to control the younger generation and
protect them from the corrupting influence of the West and from being “in the world.”
Some young people fear the same forces, while others chafe under the magnifying lens
and want the church to change its methods. At times the dispute becomes even more
serious. At one of the churches in this study a nineteen year old youth leader was called
before the board of elders because of his activities and the Western-style methods he used
in youth ministry.

Church members said that the elders disapproved of his non-

traditional ministry that included sports ministry, movie discussions, and games at
meetings. His youth group was similar to American church youth groups that aim to
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reach young people through entertaining activities. He was also supposedly criticized for
his hairstyle (a trendy short cut).

The senior pastor told me that the man was

“charismatic” and defiant to church authority. This young leader was banned from
ministry at the church and led to believe that excommunication would be the next step.
Instead, a group of his supporters left their church and started a new one in the same city
a few months after I left.

7.2.5 Ties that bind: Ukrainian Baptists and migration to the West
In any conversation with Ukrainian Baptists about the West, the topic of
emigration invariably arises. Although none of the churches in this study provided
detailed statistics of the number of their families who left to live in the West, people in all
of the churches expressed the opinion that their churches were damaged by the
emigration process. They are disappointed that those who moved away no longer sing in
the choir, lead various ministries, or pastor churches. Members of L’viv Baptist reported,
for example, that 150-200 of their church members plus children left for places like
Philadelphia, Seattle, Germany, Canada, and Poland. This seems a high number, but
there is no way to disprove the statistic. Young adults at Kherson Baptist said that they
lost “more than half” of their church in this way, more than 100 families. Pastor Evgeniy
at Vinnytsia Baptist told me that about 150 families from his church emigrated to the
West. Out-migration from Ukrainian churches fits in with the larger trend of migration
out of Ukraine in general. 49
While transnational connections through migration do increase the exposure
Ukrainian Baptists have of the West, nearly all of the people who spoke with me were
opposed to the idea of emigrating and felt abandoned by those who had already left.
Although some who moved away maintain contact with the church and support it
financially, one young man in Kherson said that “the rest have forgotten us. We don’t
hear or see anything from them.” The general consensus appears to be that when a
church family gets ready to emigrate, they make big promises about helping the church
financially when they get to their new home, but that most of the promises fall short.
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Pastor Oleksandr in L’viv, eager for American financial support, took a fundraising trip
to the United States in which he especially hoped to recruit Ukrainian Baptists to donate
to the church. Some people did help, he said, but:
Our desire was that those people who wanted to help would be much more. But a
person has various personal problems: “I have a house, or a car, I need to pay
insurance for my car” or “I’m sorry, I can’t help you.”
Pastor Oleksandr actually found that recent immigrants were more generous than those
who had been in the United States for a longer period of time. He felt that after being in
the United States for awhile, Ukrainian church members had become more concerned
with their own personal financial needs and less concerned about the needs of the church
they had left behind.
Ukrainian Baptist pastors try to discourage their flocks from leaving Ukraine. In
response, those who do decide to leave sometimes provide Christian excuses to justify
their exit. Pastor Evgeniy in Vinnytsia quoted some parishioners as claiming that they
would go to America to raise up the level of morality there. Pastor Evgeniy remained
unconvinced, and blamed some of the problems in the church on the fact that so many of
his parishioners had left for the West:
They could be ministers, of whom we don’t have enough. We could establish
more churches in our region, but there’s a lack of ministers. It is very sad that
those families emigrated. I worried a lot about that. I preached trying to stop
them. Of course there were people who did not like me for that. I mean those
people who were going to emigrate. I told them, “You have to be here. America
is for Americans. They evangelize, and you won’t help them evangelize. God’s
will for you is to be here and to evangelize your nation.” They said, “We will go
to America. Its morality has fallen, and we will go to raise it.”
All of the preaching against migration and the teaching about the corrupt influence of the
West cannot persuade some Baptists to stay in Ukraine as they leave for what they hope
will be a better life. The parishioners who move away go with the disapproval of their
church leaders. Even so, they believe that the morality of America has fallen, and they
are hoping that a missionary attitude will make their pastors at home feel better about
losing them.

49

From 1992 to 2003, for instance, over 223,000 Ukrainians legally immigrated to the United States
(Office of Immigration Statistics 2003). Ukraine’s population decreased from 52.2 million in 1993 to 48.5
million in 2001. Part of this decline is a result of emigration (Malynovska 2004).
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An interesting statement included in Evgeniy’s remarks is that “America is for
Americans.” He also means that Ukraine is for Ukrainians, and the rightful place for
Ukrainians to live and minister is in their own country. Perhaps he also believes that the
rightful place for Americans to live and minister is in America. Baptist church leaders do
not seem very fond of the transnational networks they find themselves in, apart from the
money.
Dima, a young musician and youth group leader at L’viv Baptist, is so against
emigration that he considers it an unpatriotic act. He accuses those who leave of “just
searching for an easier life.” He defined being a patriot in this way:
First, that Ukraine is the first country in my mind. That is, I won’t move from
here permanently. If there would be the possibility, I would be happy to study in
the United States or somewhere in Europe, but with the purpose of bringing it
here to Ukraine. That is in the first place. I don’t want to run away because there
are economical or other problems here. That’s what I see as a patriot.
Dima, not by coincidence, is a nationalistic native of Western Ukraine and vows never to
turn his allegiances from his country. In the previous chapter we saw that evangelicals in
Western Ukraine were much more likely than those elsewhere in the country to identify
themselves or their churches as “Ukrainian,” and were more likely to identify themselves
as patriotic.

Here we see that Dima connects his patriotism to his opposition to

transnationalism. He is opposed to emigration. Earlier in the chapter, in a discussion of
ministry tools borrowed from the West, Dima said that he did not “really like the
influence of the West” and that he always tries to be a patriot.

Even though

transnationalism may open doors for bettering himself, Dima stands in opposition to
much of it because it is unpatriotic.

7.2.6 Baptists and transnationalism: Conclusion
The attitude of Ukrainian Baptists towards transnationalism and the West is
marked by skepticism and caution. They fear the corrupt influence of the West (“the
West has influenced our country very badly”) even as they continually seek out Western
ministry partners. They seek to construct and maintain boundaries between themselves
and the West in order to control the its influence on their churches, and especially on
their young people. Independence from the West is an assumed standard, and feelings
are hurt when visiting missionaries do not show adequate respect for or knowledge of
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local customs and history. Despite all of the safeguards in place to protect the church
(such as sermons against leaving Ukraine or social pressure to maintain traditional
practices), Ukrainian Baptist churches are seeing themselves change before their very
eyes. The church that split over the wayward (and Western oriented) youth leader is just
one example of what can happen as Ukrainian Baptists continue to engage a global and
interconnected church.
7.3 New churches and transnationalism
The new evangelical churches in this study approach transnationalism from a
much different perspective than do the Baptists. While exposure to the West has been a
difficult adjustment for Baptist churches as they emerged from the repressive Soviet
system, for the new churches transnationalism has always been the status quo. Members
of these churches joined organizations that had a great deal of American influence from
their inception. In the following pages I examine how members of new churches have
responded to transnationalism. Then I use two themes as ways of further interrogating
the relationships between these Ukrainian Protestants and their foreign partners. The first
is the idea of dependence. To what extent do members of new churches feel financially
or spiritually dependent on the missionaries and American church partners? What are
they doing about it? The second theme is the juxtaposition of transnational and national
identity. At times the new churches are labeled as American churches. What do their
church members think about the American label, and how does it relate back to their own
national identity?

7.3.1 New churches and their positive views of transnationalism
Nearly all of the remarks that new Protestants made about missionaries exuded
enthusiasm and affection.

A focus group of retirees at Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy

Presbyterian Church, all of them adult converts to evangelical Christianity, provides an
example of this. The group was asked to evaluate the role of evangelical missionaries in
Ukraine. One woman responded that “they are like God’s helpers.” A man added, “They
have a great role. They are God’s servants, God’s children working among us.” Another
expressed satisfaction that ideological enemies had become friends: “We are glad, of
course, that the so-called most evil enemies became our close friends; they became like
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family.” 50 Galina called the first Presbyterian missionaries who worked in her town her
“spiritual parents” because through them she came to know God. Lila, in the same group,
said that by the time most of the frequent American visitors come to Belgorod for a
second visit that
we already look out for each other like our own relatives, because we already
know each other. We know these people. We even know their families. When
Rod from Odessa, when he came, when he was in the car accident, we suffered
through it with him, we prayed. . . . [When he came back with crutches] how I
threw myself at him like a family member! He’s already one of the family.
After these men and women were introduced to evangelical Christianity by Americans,
their lives changed dramatically. For this reason, it is understandable that they had such
strong praise for the missionaries they came to love. They consider the missionaries to be
parents, relatives, and emissaries of God.
Unlike the Baptists, the members of new churches are almost all new converts, so
initially missionaries were their primary religious role models. Vitaliy from Greater
Grace Church in L’viv said that when the missionaries started coming in to Ukraine,
“really for the first time in 70 years we saw what it means to be a real believer, we saw
that example. And we heard the good news, the gospel, like we’d never heard it before,
because earlier we just didn’t have any information about this.” At times the Ukrainians
were so impressed by the missionaries that they wanted to model themselves after them.
Pastor Dmitri of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church explained that when he and
the other Bible study participants were deciding to organize a church, they decided it
should be Presbyterian not because they knew a lot about Presbyterian doctrine at the
time, but because they wanted to be like the Presbyterian missionaries who had been
instrumental in their conversion:
We wanted to be such people. And only then, later, when Alex Monroe came for
seven months . . . only then we learned for the first time about what the
Reformation was, what was Reformed teaching, theology, we learned about John
Calvin and so on. And there was a moment when I believed and it was a joyous
moment for me in my life.
Here Dmitri associates the Western missionaries with the “joyous moment” in his life
when he became a believer. He wanted to model his life after these Americans who came
50

Translation note: This portion of the interview recording was lost after a preliminary transcription and
could not be checked and edited.
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to Ukraine, and he did. He studied at the seminary they opened in Kyiv, was ordained
into the ministry, quit his job as a pathologist, and now works full-time as a church
pastor.
Nadia, at Kherson Presbyterian, just loves the Americans: “There is so much
[good] that I can’t even say anything bad.” She says that she finds it hard “to imagine
how I would be in the church without them. It’s just that on their side, they were the
initiators. They just, they helped me” come to the Lord. “Thanks to their help, you could
say, I realized that I am a child of God.” The collective, exuberant response of these new
evangelicals to the American missionaries who started churches in Ukraine is quite
different from the mixed and guarded feelings of many Baptists.
Of course, the enthusiasm of these respondents should be presented with a caveat:
the people who chose to participate in this study were self-selected. That is, some church
members who were offended by the Americans they may not have chosen to speak to an
American researcher. Furthermore, this study only included current church members – I
had no contact with former members who may have left the church out of dissatisfaction
for any reason. At Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church, for example, there was
one couple who had been deeply hurt by other Ukrainian church members and some
American missionaries in the recent past. Church people were very discreet and did not
want to gossip – no one told me the whole story of what had happened, although it had to
do with the expectation of a church job that did not come through. While I did spend
time with the husband and interviewed him, I was never able to meet the wife. Valentina
had stopped attending church before I arrived in Belgorod, and her relationships with
other church members were still raw. Although I invited her and she agreed to come to a
focus group interview with a small group of carefully selected people (who were not
involved in the disagreement), at the last minute Valentina decided not to attend.
There were two areas in which many of the participants, both new Protestants and
Baptists, saw eye to eye. Both groups admired the high education level of foreign
missionaries as well as their willingness to make material sacrifices to come to Ukraine.
Galina, a retired doctor and Presbyterian from Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, was particularly
impressed by the missionaries she met the first time she visited the church. What she saw
countered the stereotype that Protestants were uneducated people. The only Protestants
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she knew about were Ukrainian Baptists – a group that during the Soviet period had a
negative reputation as being made up of uneducated country people. To her surprise,
“When I came to the American people I saw that they were educated people – doctors –
and I believed!” 51

The American missionaries she met were highly educated

professionals, not peasants. She saw that the evangelical faith was something that might
fit into her life after all. She was attracted in part by the urbane cosmopolitanism of the
American missionaries.
In an earlier portion of the chapter we saw that many Ukrainian Baptists think of
the United States as a wealthy country where everyone lives comfortably and well.
Several members of new churches also expressed pleasant surprise that Americans would
leave the land of plenty to live in Ukraine. Serhy, of Greater Grace in L’viv, praised the
material sacrifices made by American missionaries:
In general I’m really thankful for the American families. . . . Because it was due
to their desires and strivings to share the gospel, regardless of the fact that they
could live quietly there [in America]. . . .La, la, la, everything is there. There are
no needs. But, you understand that happiness is not found in that. All of life is
not in that. There is something bigger that cleanses my soul. Something bigger.
That is to serve God, to serve other people, so God serves other people through
me. And . . . there’s a lot of bad things that we didn’t talk about, but you could
say that the greatest praise goes to the missionaries.
It is unclear what “bad things” Serhy declined to discuss. Perhaps he had reason to
criticize missionaries, but felt that their willingness to make sacrifices to come to Ukraine
outweighed the bad. Sergey has lofty ideas about America, where there are “no needs,”
because “everything is there,” and is glad that missionaries are willing to leave that land
of abundance and come to Ukraine.
Something that rarely arose in conversations with Ukrainian Baptists but that was
observed among some members of new evangelical churches was a deep pessimism
about Ukraine and about the ability of Ukrainian churches to prosper without ongoing
American support. Nadia was an English teacher in her forties and a member of Kherson
Presbyterian Church.

Her enthusiasm for American missionaries simultaneously

criticized Ukrainians:
I have a dream. Maybe someday our Ukrainians will have such radiant faces as
you Americans. I think that we have our lives printed on our foreheads and we
51

This is also from the unverified recording.
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can read it from a kilometer away. Our people can’t even smile like Americans
do. I don’t even understand. Maybe they teach it to them, or else they have their
own mentality and different life. But we have our own problems printed on our
faces. We can’t even be open, joyful in life and smile. Maybe in 20 or 30 years
we’ll learn to do it.
When Nadia admires the cheerfulness of Americans and regrets the grim faces of
Ukrainians she is critiquing Ukrainians in general, not necessarily just other Ukrainian
evangelicals. In this instance her negative view towards Ukrainian identity stands out as
quite different from what we heard Baptists saying. They were more likely to criticize
Americans and compliment Ukrainians. Here it is the other way around.
Other members of new evangelical churches also were critical towards the
weaknesses of Ukrainians, Ukraine itself, and Ukrainian churches. Some people were
particularly pessimistic about the ability of Ukrainian Protestant churches to stand on
their own financially, without regular support from their Western sponsors. The whole
issue of dependency is one that arose frequently in conversations with members of new
Protestant churches in Ukraine, and is the focus of the following section.

7.3.2 Dependency and independence
All of the churches in this study, both Baptist and non-Baptist, would look quite
different if not for the financial support of Western churches in recent years. The amount
of support given and even the fact that churches rely on this help was often an
uncomfortable topic of conversation, and no one provided detailed financial information
for this study. The financial inequalities between Americans living in Ukraine and their
Ukrainian friends were large, and missionaries uniformly reported a history of awkward
situations because of those economic differences. Missionaries would like Ukrainian
churches to eventually pay their own way, and Ukrainians would also prefer to be
financially independent. However, this kind of independence, especially for the new
churches, seems a lofty and unrealistic goal to some church members. One exception to
this is Greater Grace in L’viv, which has made great strides to be financially independent
from its American sponsors.
Nadia, the English teacher in Kherson who commented on Ukrainians’ sad faces,
finds it hard to imagine a future in which her church would be fully functioning without
American support. She is grateful to Americans,
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Because I think that our Ukraine is too weak to stand on its own feet, to have
enough of its own missionaries without the help of Americans. I can’t imagine if
it could or not. It seems to me that it couldn’t. The help is enormous and without
it we wouldn’t manage. We just wouldn’t manage. Their work – in the future if
we think about it, it’s hard to imagine that we would be able to function
independently. It seems to me that we are not yet ready for this at all.
In Nadia’s world Ukraine is sad, poor, and weak while America is happy, wealthy, and
strong.

Ukraine and its churches depend on help from America.

She knows that

functioning independently is something that could happen in the future, but is so
overwhelmed by the problems she sees before her that she finds it hard to imagine that
the church will ever be able to stand on its own.
Sergey, a father of two young children, is the church music director at the same
church in Kherson.

He, too, expressed discouragement about Ukraine’s economic

situation and said that the church continued to need help from abroad:
International relationships [are] everything, because we all have really different
possibilities. And God has blessed us all differently, and some he hasn’t – that is,
financially, like us right now. When we receive support and help from America,
when God has blessed America financially and they can share God’s blessing
with Ukraine, with us. At this time we have a collapsed economy, destabilization
in the whole economic structure. There’s no work, there are no finances.
Sergey thinks of help from America as a blessing from God, and finds it absolutely
normal that a country with plenty should share with a country that does not have very
much. The wealth that belongs to America does not really belong to them, anyway, but is
from God and should be shared with those in need. He finds it natural and right that
Kherson Presbyterian church should receive help from Western churches.
Despite eagerness for eventual independence, at one new church people expressed
disappointment that the transnational involvement had not been even greater. They
regretted that more missionaries had not actually lived in Belgorod during the first critical
years of church development there. The Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church
was not started in a conventional way by a group of missionaries living there for a time
for that purpose, but was begun by a group of Ukrainians after missionaries had already
left. With the exception of a short period of less than a year, there were no church
planters in residence to train the people in how to start a church. Instead, missionaries
based in Odessa would take regular trips to Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy to meet with church
leaders, and several men from the church enrolled in the Presbyterian seminary in Kiev to
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receive theological education and ministry training.

The one long-term American

missionary in residence is a nurse who helps in the administration of the Christian
medical clinic started by the church.

One man interviewed, Grigoriy, expressed

disappointment that the Presbyterian mission did not send a pastor to help them for a
longer period of time, and thinks the lack of missionaries may have contributed to the fact
that the church has not continued to grow rapidly in size after its initial founding.
At the time of my two month stay in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy the church was
embarking

on

the

process

of

particularization,

or

becoming

independent.

Particularization at Presbyterian churches entails developing and training lay leaders
(deacons and elders) and having the particularization approved by the regional ruling
body – the Presbytery. Once a church is particularized it has more privileges within the
denomination and the elders and deacons move from being called ‘proto-deacons’ and
‘proto-elders’ to the real thing. In this case the Presbytery consists of ordained American
missionaries and ordained Ukrainian pastors and elders from churches that have already
been through the particularization process (the churches in Kyiv and Odessa).
At one congregational meeting several people voiced fears about the future if they
should actually move from a mission church status to being fully independent. The
following excerpt from my field notes describes the interaction between members at that
meeting.
An older woman suddenly called out from the front row: “Our church is not ready
to be independent financially!” She explained that in order to live in Ukraine you
need a minimum of 340 rubles (grivny 52 ) a month, and that pensions were usually
only 120 rubles a month. How will we pay a pastor? “If America doesn’t help
us, I don’t know how we’ll do it.” Grigoriy responded that that was an important
and serious question. In his opinion, the job of a pastor is a full time job so the
pastor should not work elsewhere in addition to serving as pastor. “Are we
ready” to pay a pastor, he asked. “This is very serious,” how will we pay a
pastor tomorrow? When in the future will we be able to pay? Pastor Dmitri
stood up at this point: Independence (samostoyatelnost’) isn’t financial. It is
independence in other ways. His wife Lena called out: “We aren’t financed by
America, but by our Lord.” The older woman from the front row then said
loudly: “America is far away. They are rich.” Grigoriy: We need to pray for
people to help us. “The Lord will not abandon us.” We have faith.
52

In conversation, many older Ukrainians continue to call their currency the ruble, even though it has been
grivny for years. In September 2002, the time of this congregational meeting, these figures were $65 for
living expenses and $23 for the pension.
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This exchange shows a range of opinions about the hope of being independent, what
independence means, and their relationship with people in the United States. The first
woman has no hope that the church could continue to function without help from
“America,” an abstract place that is rich and far away. Her notion of participating in a
transnational network means receiving money from a faceless, distant, abundant place.
Grigoriy (the same man who wished for more missionaries) is also pessimistic about the
church’s independent future, and does not think they should rush into any decisions about
moving from mission church status. He does express confidence, however, that “the
Lord will not abandon” them. Dmitri and Lena are more optimistic. They want their
church to move from a mission church to independence. Lena sees the financial help
they receive as not “American” but from God himself. God rules over all churches
around the world – he is above transnationalism – and is using American churches to help
the Belgorod church. Lena wants her church to exist as an independent, self-governing
congregation within a wider network of “our Lord’s” churches, who can help each other.
Discouragement about church finances was present at both Presbyterian churches.
Pastor Oleg at Kherson Presbyterian told me that church members collectively provide
about $110 per month towards the church’s operating expenses. This is not enough to
carry on the ministries of the church (Bible studies, help for the poor, the drop-in center
for street children) or cover salaries of church staff and rent the meeting hall. This $110,
Pastor Oleg said, is “not so much,” and church leaders are thinking through how they can
encourage their people to give more. He continued:
And I know it will be a difficult time because I know we haven’t money, but we
can teach our people about what it means to give money to God. But for example
we did fund raising in Ukraine here for some kids ministry and other, and we
received some money from another church [in] Ukraine and from some personal
people who want to give this money. But the situation right now is we can’t have
ministry without money from Western Europe and the U.S.A.
Because of the finances of the congregation, Pastor Oleg doubts that they can survive
financially without continued help from partners in the West.

In other remarks it

becomes clear that Pastor Oleg, like Pastor Dmitri and Lena, sees help from Americans as
help from God, not a polite favor from American churches to Ukrainian churches. His
church, too, was making preparations for particularization, which is a slow and serious
process in these Presbyterian churches.
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The financial dependence of Presbyterian churches in Ukraine on their Western
partners stands in sharp contrast to the independence of Greater Grace Church in L’viv.
Pastors and lay people alike reported their church’s financial self-sufficiency. Kolya, a
middle aged church member who works as the church administrator, realizes that his
church is different from many others in Ukraine:
I am always thankful to God that he sometimes sends us good Christians to help
us from other churches – like missionaries – for various reasons. Because I think
that now there are very few good churches. Good churches, in general they are
few. Few. And God somehow, it is interesting that we support our own church,
100 percent comes through people, not automatically from America, like some
people think.
One of Kolya’s pastors reported that the church actually does receive some gifts from
people in America, but that they are unsolicited and are not considered in the regular
budget. The church relies on giving from church members and profit from the English
language school they operate. The language school basically pays for the building’s
utilities. Most of the students at the language school are Ukrainians who are learning
English in preparation for emigration to Canada or the United States. Half of their
building’s purchase price was paid by a Ukrainian businessman in their congregation, and
the rest apparently came from the United States. The church also opened a Christian
kindergarten and elementary school that they hope will be financially self-sufficient.
The fact that L’viv Greater Grace is operating a business is unusual among
Ukrainian evangelical churches, but not unknown. What is unusual is that it is making a
profit. Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church also has a business – a medical
clinic. Patients are expected to pay a small fee to see a doctor and for lab tests, and there
is a pharmacy kiosk on the premises where they can buy their prescriptions. Doctors
actually rent their consultation rooms from the clinic and the patient fees go directly to
the doctors. At the time of my fieldwork the clinic housed a pediatrician (the only
privately practicing pediatrician in the Odessa oblast), a general practitioner, a
gynecologist, a surgeon (for consultation only), and a doctor who performed ultrasounds
and other lab work. They were preparing space for a dentist, who arrived shortly after I
left. The clinic was a unique medical institution in the area, and some patients traveled
from other cities to visit the doctors. Among other qualities the physicians there were
known for was not accepting bribes from patients and promising to tell them the truth
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about their medical condition! The clinic hosted several visits each year from American
physicians (most of them Presbyterians) who would spend a week or two working
alongside the Ukrainian doctors seeing patients. However, the clinic certainly was not a
financial success, and relied on donations from churches in the United States for most of
its operating expenses.
7.3.3 On being ‘American’
Close affiliation with American missionaries gives some new churches a
reputation as ‘American’ in the cities where they are located.

Even an American

missionary living in L’viv who was unaffiliated with Greater Grace referred to it as an
‘American’ church. Despite Greater Grace’s strides towards financial independence, the
‘American’ label lingers. Church members seemed sensitive about the subject. One
woman, the director of their English language school, responded vehemently when asked
if she considered Greater Grace to be an American church: “This is NOT an American
church! I am a Ukrainian patriot!” No one else at Greater Grace responded as strongly
when asked about the American nature of the church, but they all seemed to agree with
her sentiments.
One of Greater Grace’s pastors, Serhy, also objected to the American label, and
said that it should be considered Christ’s church instead:
I don’t think that this church should be called an American church. . . . It’s clear
that the church is where Christ is. Nobody owns it. That we are accountable to
Pastor Chris, or Pastor Stevens who is in Baltimore – that’s another thing. We are
just accountable to them.
According to Serhy, the connections with two prior American pastors and people at
church headquarters in Baltimore are important, but do not bestow any kind of American
identity on the congregation. Like Lena at Belgorod Presbyterian, they see God as a
being who stands above all churches, in Ukraine and in the United States. Christ stands
outside of national identity and transnationalism.
Just as the Presbyterians have particularization, Greater Grace churches have their
own established procedures for church development. An American pastor and his family
lived in L’viv for several years as the work was beginning. Eventually the first pastor left
and his brother took over the pastorate. The missionaries encouraged any interested
people – men and women – to enroll in a Bible college there in L’viv, with courses taught
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primarily by the American pastor. Several men completed Bible college and then began
working at the church under the Americans. Eventually some of them were selected for
ordination.

At least one of the Ukrainian pastoral candidates spent a few months

studying in Baltimore at the ‘mother’ church. When the American missionaries decided
that the Ukrainian candidates were ready, they sent them to Baltimore for ordination.
Once the American missionaries left L’viv (in 2002), they maintained close contact with
the L’viv pastors through visits, phone calls, and email exchanges. They communicated
with each other at least once a week, and the Americans were always available for
consultation about any issues that arose. The Ukrainian staff ran all church activities
without an American in residence: worship services, the Bible college, the Christian
elementary school, the English school, the crisis pregnancy center, the youth group, the
music team, and a pantomime troupe.
Antonia, the director of the church’s crisis pregnancy center and a fluent English
speaker, considers the church to be Ukrainian, not American. However, because of the
close association with Americans over the years she thinks that people at her L’viv
church have grown in their thinking from before.
With co-working with people from other cultures, you are kind of being made
many ways of thinking, you know? It’s kind of [an] exchange. . . . So it’s [a]
Ukrainian church, I would say, but people, like, here they think in [a] much
broader way [than the] average Ukrainian would think, you know?
According to her, an example of what people at Greater Grace received from the West is
the notion that a leader should be a servant of the people, not just tell everybody what to
do. Antonia told me that most Ukrainian leaders are autocrats – they lead by giving
orders and expect them to be obeyed. Instead, after interacting with Americans, people at
her church realize that the best leaders are actually servants – they lead by taking care of
their people.
The senior pastor at Greater Grace, Mykola, is about thirty years old. When I
asked him about the American label he spoke strongly that the church was not American,
but Ukrainian.

He pointed to the church’s use of the Ukrainian language and the

presence of the Ukrainian flag in their church meeting hall as evidence:
Yes it was founded by Americans, but it’s not [an] American church . . . . You
can see the flag in our chapel, and really, like, in [the] right way we are patriots of
our country, of city, of our language, and no it’s not [an American church.]. Yes,
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um, maybe a little of that culture which you have in America came in our church,
so people can see this freedom [emphasis his].
When asked what kind of freedom he associates with America that is now in his church,
he replied that it is freedom in worship to clap hands and laugh, which is not allowed in
older churches in Ukraine. Even though the church was started by Americans and people
in the church “deeply respect Americans,” they are unanimous in their rejection of the
American label and demand their own identity and independence as Ukrainian believers.
Moreover, the Ukrainian flag (usually interpreted as evidence of nationalism), is here
instead deployed as protection against an ‘American’ identity.

7.3.4 New churches and transnationalism: conclusion
Unlike most Baptists, members of new evangelical churches tended to have
strongly positive impressions of transnationalism, missionaries, and the West. Because
new churches were started by missionaries, the American connection was nothing new.
In fact, the American influence is what initially attracted some church members to these
organizations, and then later they developed other reasons to stay.
Members of these new churches were, for the most part, pessimistic about their
ability to survive independently from the Western partners, although Greater Grace was
an exception to this rule. Not only was Greater Grace a more nationalistic church than
the others (with a Ukrainian flag in the sanctuary, for example), but it was also the only
church that did not count on American financial contributions to stay in operation. There
is not enough evidence to support a link between nationalism and financial independence.
Instead, I think that American missionaries did a better job training people at Greater
Grace about sacrificial giving and financial stewardship than did the missionaries at the
Presbyterian churches. Even members of other new churches that were not financially
independent expressed a strong desire to move from being someone else’s mission
project to being an equal partner with the Americans.

7.4 Conclusion
Interaction with Western Christians and participation in a transnational religious
network has had profound impacts on the lives of Ukrainian Protestants. Responses to
transnationalism vary widely, however, and are not correlated with region of origin but
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according to church denomination, age of the church member, and personal history in the
church (e.g., whether they grew up in the church or are adult converts). The most
significant differences found are between older Baptists and members of new churches.
Overall, a Baptist perspective on transnationalism is one of control and caution, while the
response of new Christians is typically more enthusiastic and desiring of even closer
relationships. Within Baptist churches, younger people and relatively new converts tend
to be more welcoming of missionaries and new ideas than the older members, although
even some young people are critical of transnational processes.
One young Baptist in L’viv expressed his view this way: “As for the church, we
want to keep the current positions, and we want to be able to be in control of the
influence on the church from everywhere, East or West.”

For many Baptists,

transnationalism has brought economic, social, and spiritual opportunities but also
opportunities for moral danger.

For the Baptist church as a whole the West also

represents a great threat as a high percentage of old Baptist families have moved away to
seek new lives in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere.
New evangelicals acknowledge that transnational relationships have completely
changed their lives.

Most were non-religious people before their encounter with

Protestantism at their foreign-connected churches.

Now many have strong personal

religious faith as well as opportunities for social interaction, education, and even
employment (if they work for the church or a church ministry) that would have been
unthinkable before.

These new Protestants warmly praised missionaries and even

complained that there were not enough of them working with their churches.
Transnational processes in Ukrainian churches are clearly not a matter of
American missionaries coming uninvited and unwelcome to force ideas on unsuspecting
Ukrainians. Nor can it be said that Ukrainians embrace all transnational activity in their
churches with open and undiscriminating arms.

Instead, Ukrainian Protestants are

continually navigating their way through these waters as both initiators and recipients.
Wanner described a process in which Ukrainian evangelicals adapt outside ideas and
create new hybrid religious forms:
To the extent that evangelical congregations in Ukraine acquire or adapt western
missionaries’ discourses, customs, and institutions, they do so by molding them to
their local preferences and in the process change the original model. . . . [W]e see
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a highly discerning selection of certain attributes and practices and a rejection of
others (2004, 743).
Ukrainians are active agents in processes of religious transnationalism. At the same time,
they are well aware of their position as players with few economic and geographic
options.
We have seen that transnationalism is an uneven process with uneven results.
That is, religious transnationalism has unevenly penetrated Protestant churches in
Ukraine. This means, for example, that not all church members have regular personal
contact with foreigners, not everyone has the opportunity to travel abroad to visit
churches and Christian conferences, not everyone can obtain employment at a Western
funded religious organization or charity, and not everyone attends classes at a foreign-run
theological seminary. While each church in this study had significant interactions with
Western contacts, the extent to which these contacts affected people in the church varied
greatly. It is obvious to Ukrainian evangelicals that the mobility and opportunities of
transnationalism are not equally distributed. Nadia, the English teacher at Kherson
Presbyterian Church, said that
Sometime in the future I want there to be the possibility that not only the pastor
[because of his work] can travel to various countries and work, but I want there to
be the possibility for every brother and sister to have an opportunity to go to
different countries to see how people work in other churches, and how people
glorify the Lord, and to learn something, and to return to share their experience
and impressions. But we can’t do it because of finances. We can’t go anywhere.
Nadia knows that her possibilities of moving easily across the world – one of the chief
components of transnationalism – are limited at best. Those who can reap this benefit
include all American missionaries but only a select few from her church.
Nadia and other Ukrainians cannot ultimately control their transnational
experiences. Their earthly identities remain rooted in the physical places where they
work, worship, and live. Their transnational relationships depend in part on the desires of
Westerners and on the economic disparities of the larger world.

While Ukrainian

Protestants have been fundamentally impacted by their social, spiritual, and material
interactions with the West, the mundane facts of poverty and the tight net of visa
restrictions for travel to Western countries remain barriers to their full participation in a
transnational world.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions

From the fieldnotes:
February 22, 2003
Ira is a young believer in Kherson. She told me that in Kherson she doesn’t feel
Ukrainian, she doesn’t feel anything. It was only when she lived in L’viv that she began
to feel Ukrainian, and love it. It is primarily so that she can feel more Ukrainian that she
wants to go back to L’viv.
Human identity is complicated. People hold several identities at once – identities
that sometimes seem to contradict each other and that usually change over time. The
above excerpt from my fieldnotes records a conversation with a young evangelical
woman who had recently moved back to Kherson after university studies in L’viv. Her
remarks show that identities do not always follow the rules – here is a Kherson native
(Khersonians are not supposed to be nationalists) who would rather live in L’viv than in
her home city because she wanted to “feel more Ukrainian.” She recognized the regional
differences in her country as they relate to nationalism, and yearned to live in a more
nationalistic area. Ira was not a member of either case study church in Kherson, so I
cannot evaluate her remarks in the context of the opinions of others in her congregation.
However, unlike other evangelicals I spoke with in her city who de-emphasized a
Ukrainian identity, Ira verbalized national longing. She reminds us that as we consider
how this dissertation contributes to our collective understanding of spatial identities,
regional differentiation in Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism, and the processes of religious
transnationalism, we should always be looking for exceptions, contradictions, and
variegated patterns.
This dissertation has investigated the complex, shifting, and interconnected spatial
identities of Ukrainian Protestants. The voices that speak on these pages represent a
historical account of post-Soviet evangelical life, and they also provide detailed examples
of how identities are reworked by the transnational processes of contemporary life. The
preceding chapters examined three spatialized identities within the Ukrainian Protestant
church community: regional, national, and transnational. Here I summarize the research
findings and organize them around the original questions that were presented in the first
chapter.
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8.1 Regional identity
This study recognized that the long history of Ukrainian regional differentiation
would need to be addressed in any examination of Ukrainian spatial identities.
Furthermore, if regionalism is important to accounts of Ukrainian politics, language, and
religious history, then regionalism must also be relevant to evangelical life. The regional
identity research questions were as follows:
•

How do Ukrainian Protestant churches vary regionally?

•

How do Ukrainian evangelicals portray Ukrainian regions? How do they position
themselves and their churches within their respective region of Ukraine?

•

How does their self-awareness of regional identity contribute to, or undermine,
national and transnational identifications?

•

Are there differences between members of older Baptist churches and newer
evangelical churches, or between people of different generations, in how they
approach matters of regional identity?
Research participants did not agree on how many regions exist in Ukraine or

where the boundaries between regions are located.

Despite this lack of overall

consensus, on one regional matter they did unite: participants were nearly unanimous
that the oblasts including and surrounding L’viv should be considered a region apart from
the others. Western Ukraine is distinct from the rest of the country in a number of ways,
and evangelical religious life there reflects the regional distinctiveness of its inhabitants.
The most obvious difference between churches in L’viv and elsewhere is the
language used at church events: church services in L’viv are conducted in Ukrainian,
services in Kherson and Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy take place in Russian, and services in
Vinnytsia use a mix of the two languages. Language is more than a way to communicate
– it is an expression of identity. Participants in this study had strong feelings about
language use, and were uncomfortable with the language division in their churches. They
described a regional disconnect about the place of the Ukrainian and Russian languages
in Ukrainian church life.
The pattern of language preference in Ukraine is closely related to beliefs about
Ukrainian national identity. The L’viv Protestants that participated in this study find the
Ukrainian language integral to Ukrainian national identity. They consider themselves
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Ukrainian patriots, and cannot imagine a national identity that incorporates the Russian
language. They enforce the use of the Ukrainian language at their church services.
Meanwhile, members of churches outside of L’viv feel alienated by the nationalist push
for the exclusivity of the Ukrainian language. Instead, they desire a Russian-speaking
identity, and express this desire by casting themselves as diverse and cosmopolitan –
qualities they think are excluded by nationalism.
Another example of regional differentiation is the portrayal of western Ukraine as
a bastion of religious traditionalism.

Within L’viv the region is understood as a

stronghold of the traditional Ukrainian religions of Orthodoxy and Eastern Rite
Catholicism.

Elsewhere evangelicals described all western Ukrainians – including

Protestants – as traditional in their religious practices. It is convenient for a member of a
Russian speaking church to name L’viv evangelicals as religiously traditional, a label that
can easily be interpreted as code for ‘backward.’ Thus, L’viv evangelicals are also
characterized as linguistically narrow-minded and fanatical. In contrast, the Russian
speaking Protestants see themselves as open-minded, ethnically diverse, non-judgmental
about language use, cosmopolitan, and forward thinking. One wonders whether a L’viv
pastor would actually feel comfortable preaching in Ukrainian at a Kherson church.
These regional stereotypes tell a story about the battle for Ukrainian identity.
Despite obvious regional differentiation in the churches, only in L’viv was
regional identity explicitly identified as important to religious life. L’viv evangelicals
described the Ukrainian language as an important component of their national and
regional identity, and most of them defended the exclusive use of Ukrainian in their
churches. In the other three cities, church members did not describe their own region as
important to their sense of identity, and the only Ukrainian region they consistently
referred to was not their own, but “Western Ukraine.” I found matters of Ukrainian
regionalism to be unrelated to church type or the ages of church members. Instead,
perspectives on Ukrainian regions seemed to be a function of the location of the church,
of whether it was in L’viv or not. That is, the members of L’viv Greater Grace and L’viv
Central Baptist responded to questions about Ukrainian regionalism in similar ways, but
differently than evangelicals of any church from the other cities.
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Because Ukraine is a linguistically divided country, and because its pattern of
language use is largely a regional one, we see that regional and national identity are
closely interconnected. Regionalism and transnationalism, however, are not as obviously
linked. One possible connection between the two is this: church members outside of
L’viv seemed to place more stress on the multi-cultural aspects of their churches than did
church members inside L’viv.

However, this emphasis on cultural and linguistic

diversity should not be interpreted as a byproduct of transnational connections with the
West, because evangelicals in all parts of the country participate in these same processes.
Instead, it is related to a desire for a pan-Soviet, Russian-speaking identity. That is, it can
reasonably be argued that evangelicals in the Russian speaking areas of Ukraine perceive
themselves as more culturally connected to other parts of the former Soviet Union than to
the western region of their own country. They acknowledge that they belong to the
Ukrainian state and are pleased about that (see below), but they reject a Ukrainian
identity that excises the Russian language. These findings corroborate the work of Anna
Fournier, a scholar who examined Russophone resistance to linguistic Ukrainisation in
central and eastern Ukraine. She wrote that when Russophone Ukrainians speak against
Ukrainian language laws, they are protesting against “a perceived linguistic/cultural
exclusion” from Ukraine. Fournier found that these Ukrainian citizens resist a language
law “that does not recognise (empire-generated) hybridity within Ukraine” (2002, 415).
The Russophone evangelicals are also resisting the erasure of hybrid identities formed in
the Soviet era.

8.2 National identity
This dissertation has provided an opportunity to examine the place of national
identity in the lives of one population subset in a newly independent state. Ukraine has
now been independent for fourteen years – the longest time the country has ever existed.
However, being a new state does not mean that national identity will be uncontested.
Studying the national identity of members of this minority religious group adds an
interesting layer to the analysis. The questions are as follows:
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•

How do congregation members position themselves and their churches within the
Ukrainian nation?

•

How does their self-awareness of national identity contribute to, or undermine,
regional and transnational identifications?

•

To what extent do Ukrainian evangelicals challenge or accommodate the idea of a
Ukrainian national church?

•

Are there differences between members of older Baptist churches and newer
evangelical churches, or between people of different generations, in how they
approach matters of national identity?
The Ukrainian evangelicals who participated in this study overwhelmingly reject

a Ukrainian national identity expressed through religion. To them, ‘nationalism’ retains
negative Soviet connotations of exclusion, not inclusion, and they find this kind of
nationalism contrary to their religious beliefs. Despite this aversion to nationalism per
se, expressions of national identity are evident in Ukrainian Protestant churches, although
only in western Ukraine do they go by that name.
Some ideas about the nature of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people were commonly
held by research participants in all four cities. Collectively, these evangelicals described
their country as poor, as a place where people are heroes because they live in material
deprivation. They believe that life is difficult, and this theme was repeated both by
Baptists and by members of new evangelical churches. What could legitimately be
viewed as a problem (poverty) actually becomes a rallying point for Ukrainians. The
concepts of suffering and sacrifice are elevated to a high moral plane and contrasted with
wealth and comfort, both of which are seen as inherently dangerous to moral purity. This
component of Ukrainian national identity actually contributes to how Western
missionaries and the West itself are perceived.

Ukrainian evangelicals admire

missionaries for their willingness to leave behind lives of wealth and material comfort.
They may even envy them because of the freedom that wealth has brought – they have
freedom to travel around the world, build large church buildings, and finance large
church budgets. They believe, however, that Ukrainian believers often have stronger
faith than Americans, because their faith has been forged in the fires of poverty and
suffering.
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Another component of national identity in Ukrainian evangelical churches is the
widespread agreement that the Orthodox Church is Ukraine’s national religion.
Evangelicals also accept Catholicism in this role, and sometimes (especially in L’viv)
group the two faiths together. Despite the fact that their Protestantism defines them as
religious outsiders in their own nation, the participants in this study seem to feel no loss
about not being part of the Orthodox Church. Protestants – from churches of various
kinds in multiple regions – often pointed to theological differences as reasons why they
could not be Orthodox. Some Baptists went even farther. While they recognized a
common history with Orthodoxy (since their churches began as offshoots of the Orthodox
Church in the nineteenth century), they also sought to discredit the Orthodox Church in
two ways. First, they said that the real national religion of Ukraine is not the Orthodox
Church but is paganism, a religion that predates Christianity. This would strip away the
Orthodox Church’s presumed claim as the religion with the oldest relationship with the
Ukrainian people. A second tactic does not remove Orthodoxy’s tie to the Ukrainian
nation, but undermines its validity as a Christian faith. One Baptist pastor said that the
Orthodox Church is influenced by paganism, that Orthodox traditions and rituals are
actually built upon pagan rituals, and that the two religions are closely related. To him,
losing Orthodoxy as a component of his national identity is not a big loss. These
evangelicals recognize that while most people hold Orthodoxy as part of their Ukrainian
identity, they themselves cannot participate in that national tradition.
Despite not owning one common component of Ukrainian identity (Orthodox
Christianity), evangelicals do incorporate aspects of nationalism into their religious
practices.

New evangelical churches, especially, portrayed a strong sense of civic

nationalism among their members. This was true not just in Ukrainian-speaking L’viv,
but also at other churches, including the mixed Ukrainian-Russian language Nazarene
congregation in Vinnytsia and the Presbyterian church in Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy. New
Protestants at more than one church told me that they prayed for their president. They
also openly spoke of their desire for their children to grow up to be influential members
of Ukrainian society. They would like their fellow evangelicals to be mayors, business
people, members of Parliament, and even the president of the country. L’viv Greater
Grace Church displayed a Ukrainian flag prominently in its worship hall. On January 24,
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2005, the day after Viktor Yushchenko was finally inaugurated as Ukraine’s new
president, Pastor Dmitri of Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church sent an email to
American supporters, thanking them for their prayers for Ukraine and pledging his own
prayers for the American president in return:
In this short time we have begun to more fully understand how God uses the
power of the governing officials in society and also how it relates to the church.
Therefore we are continuing to pray for President Yushenko [sic] now that he has
taken office and we are also praying for President Bush. May the Lord richly
bless you, your families and your country.
Dmitri’s civic nationalism is related to his theology – he believes that God rules over
society and uses governments for divine purposes. Because of this belief, Dmitri feels
that God will hear his prayers for President Yushchenko. Transnational relationships add
an interesting dimension to this civic and religious act. Not only does Dmitri pray for his
own president, but he also prays for the United States president, and the prayers and the
internet (through which this message was sent) serve to unite people from his Ukrainian
church and churches in the United States.
Civic nationalism in Protestant churches in some countries is nothing new. For
example, Protestant congregations in the United States often display an American flag
and sing patriotic songs in worship. However, the trend towards civic nationalism is
noteworthy in Ukrainian churches, given Protestantism’s status as a minority faith.
Although Baptists at times also prayed publicly for their government, civic nationalism
was observed less often in their communities. This can likely be traced to the fact that
until recently Baptists were persecuted as enemies of the state.

8.3 Transnational identity
Religious transnationalism and its effects on identity are the issues that drew me
into this dissertation study. Our world is an increasingly interconnected one, and the
transnational religious networks to which Ukrainian churches belong have branches in
nearly every country. This phenomenon is being produced within and through local and
national networks that are also in constant flux. How does transnationalism work itself
on the ground in this religious context? The specific questions are as follows:
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•

How do Ukrainian evangelicals position themselves within a transnational religious
network?

•

How does their self-awareness of a transnational identity contribute to, or undermine,
regional and national identifications?

•

Are there differences between members of older Baptist churches and newer
evangelical churches, or between people of different generations, in how they
approach matters of transnational identity?
One element of the transnational processes examined here was experienced by

members of both kinds of evangelical churches – old and new. Despite many striking
differences between these kinds of churches in how their members dealt with
transnationalism, an important feature for both groups was the personal nature of
transnational processes. People from every church described close personal friendships
they had developed with visiting American missionaries. No matter what their overall
impressions were of American culture, the United States, American missionaries, or
American churches, Ukrainians expressed admiration for Americans they knew well.
They may have had a bad opinion about some or many missionaries, but at every focus
group and at every church, particular Americans were identified by name in an admiring
and even loving manner. That said, as a researcher I could not remove my American
identity from my relationship with the research subjects, and any pro-American language
used by them should be received with caution. Nevertheless, in this project I found that
transnationalism is not only about money, ideas, education, and immigration – it can also
be a personal experience that affects the emotional lives of individuals involved and can
transcend previous prejudices.
Apart from that important commonality, the two kinds of evangelicals responded
to transnationalism in quite different ways. Members of new churches were extremely
positive about their American contacts and church partners. Foreign missionaries were
influential in opening each of the new churches, and current church members’ lives had
been (usually dramatically) affected by their association with the church. The new
evangelicals who participated in this study were happy about how their lives had changed
because of their church involvement, and several of them spoke in somber tones as they
considered how their lives would have been different without the transnational encounter.
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None of the new Protestants I spoke with described any regret for their decision to join
the church.
Despite the overall positive tone towards their transnational experiences, many of
the new evangelicals expressed a desire for independence from the missionaries. They
longed for both fiscal and organizational independence.

Some of them positioned

themselves as equal partners to the Americans; others presented themselves as equal in
some areas (say, spiritually) but not in others (e.g., financially).

During my field

research, members of the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church were debating the
merits of becoming “particularized,” or officially independent.

At a service of the

Vinnytsia Nazarene church one of the worship leaders repeatedly emphasized the need
for members to give generously for the financial needs of the church.

Kherson

Presbyterians described a future day when they could be financially self-sustaining. In
contrast with new churches outside of L’viv that avoided the ‘Ukrainian’ label, at L’viv
Greater Grace members emphasized their church’s independence by insisting that theirs
was a Ukrainian, not an American, church. For Greater Grace members, being Ukrainian
was not only about having the Ukrainian flag in their church hall and singing “I pray for
Ukraine” in Sunday services. For them, their Ukrainian identity was especially important
because it signified that they were NOT American. They wanted to establish a distinct
identity from the Americans who founded their church and set them on a Protestant
spiritual path. No matter where they lived, new Protestants were generally positive about
transnationalism but did not want to be swallowed up by their Western partners.
Baptists had a more complicated and contradictory response to transnationalism
than did members of new churches.

While on the one hand they actively used

transnationalism to materially benefit their churches, on the other hand Baptists treated
transnationalism as a threat to the spiritual well being of their people. Three of the
Baptist churches in this study had spacious new buildings that were largely financed by
Westerners, and the fourth (in L’viv) had a historic building that was gutted and
renovated with the help of Western friends. The churches regularly hosted long and short
term American missionaries; they sent their pastors and members to American-run
seminaries and Bible colleges for advanced training, and their people read Bible study
books written in English that had been translated into Russian or Ukrainian. Ukrainian
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Baptists were not at all averse to gleaning financial and spiritual benefits from their
membership in a transnational religious network, and they were adept at pursuing the
benefits and rejecting unwelcome aspects of their transnational relationships.
The negative side of religious transnationalism as seen by Ukrainian Baptists is
related to their cosmology, in which everything fits into one of two categories: the church
and the world. The church is holy and sacred, while the world is secular and sinful. The
duty of Ukrainian pastors is to guard the church from the influence of the world, keeping
harmful forces at bay. This is relevant to religious transnationalism because Ukrainian
Baptists do not approve of everything that Western evangelicals do. They consider
Western believers, including many missionaries and other visitors, to be worldly. After
all, American women wear pants and makeup at church, and most American evangelicals
see nothing disrespectful about sitting down while praying, and may even do so during a
prayer service at a Ukrainian church. Because of these and other worldly behaviors
exhibited by Western guests, Western evangelicalism is often placed in the ‘world’
category. Of course, most secular Western influences on Ukrainian society (through
Hollywood, for example) are included in ‘the world.’ Since Ukrainian Baptists observe
evidence of ‘worldliness’ in many of the American Christians they meet, they perceive
religious transnationalism as a risky endeavor.

Liberal foreign churches active in

Ukraine are seen as bringing the world into the Ukrainian church, threatening its very
foundation.
Three other attributes of religious transnationalism were also seen as threatening
to Ukrainian Baptists churches:

the West representing freedom, the West as the

destination for Baptist émigrés, and the West as the cause for generational division in the
church. The freer behavior of American Christians visiting Ukraine reminds Baptists that
not only does the West represent ‘the world,’ but it also represents ‘freedom.’ Baptists
expressed gratefulness that they no longer live in an oppressive society that forbids the
free practice of religious faith. However, their gratefulness is not overwhelming; they
perceive freedom as having negative consequences.

Freedom threatens the church

because it means that Baptists now have more opportunities to stray from their historic,
fundamental roots. When writing about the post-Soviet Lutheran church in Latvia, one
author used the phrase “romancing freedom.”
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Before freedom came the church

“romanced” it; when it arrived it was more difficult than they had anticipated
(Hoppenbrouwers 1999).
The West also threatens Ukrainian Baptist churches because it is the destination
of many Baptist families who are permanently leaving Ukraine. Each of the four Baptist
churches in this study lost large numbers of people – up to half of their pre-1991 families
– as they emigrated to America, Canada, and other countries. The Baptists who left were
seen as abandoning their church, depriving it of pastors (actual and potential) and lay
leaders. Once Baptists arrived in America they tended to disappoint those who stayed
behind by not sending as many plump checks as had been hoped for from the land of
plenty.
The West is also blamed for generational disagreements prevalent in Ukrainian
Baptist churches. Middle aged and older Baptists often disagree with young people about
how much to accept from Western Christians in their dress, music styles, theology, and
ministry methods. One striking example of this rift was the removal from ministry of a
young youth leader at a large Baptist church. He was criticized for using Western
methods in his church-sponsored youth group. In a focus group interview, some middleagers pointed to ‘the West’ as a source of problems among the youth of their church.
Although Baptists in all cities portrayed religious transnationalism as somewhat
of a threat to the church, in only one of them – L’viv – was it identified as a threat to
national identity. One young man there said that although he appreciated the help of
some Western religious study books, the influence of the West challenged his patriotism
and he did not like it.

8.4 Money
An incident that sparked this research project took place in 2001 after a visit to a
Baptist family in rural Poltavskaya oblast, in central Ukraine. This family occasionally
hosted Americans from a Pennsylvania church that financially supported their local
Baptist congregation. Two of those former guests had been my parents. After a week’s
stay I reimbursed the Ukrainians for what I estimated had been my expenses, plus some.
They agreed to the amount, but one of them later emailed my father to report his “empty
pockets.” I was startled, and wondered about the larger picture. How did my Ukrainian
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hosts perceive America, the American church, and American visitors? What were their
goals for their transnational relationships? How had their churches been impacted by
these transnational processes? How did interactions with Americans affect their identity
as Ukrainians and as world citizens? And what role did money play in the transnational
relationships?
The ‘empty pockets’ episode introduced me to the significance of the disparity of
wealth within transnational networks. The sharp differences in economic level provoke
different kinds of reactions among Ukrainian evangelicals. One reaction is what I saw in
Poltavskaya oblast. The young man who sent the message requesting money was eager
to financially benefit from his contact with an American visitor. While I do not believe it
to have been the case in that instance (although I could be wrong), at times money seems
to be the central feature of the transnational relationship. Wanner quotes a Ukrainian
Baptist pastor talking about American supporters: “As long as we are still building our
church, we will be patient, but after that, it’s goodbye” (Wanner 2004, 745). He would
tolerate their worldly ways only while he was receiving financial compensation; after the
building project was completed, he wanted the Americans to leave.

An American

missionary and seminary professor in Odessa spoke with me about this issue.

He

believed that if given a choice, the Ukrainian Baptists he worked with would rather have
had the money it took to support him and his family than to have him teaching at the
seminary.
The economic disparity between Ukrainian and Western churches seems to color
the entire transnational project. In some ways this unevenness is the fuel behind the
religious networks. If Ukraine had emerged form its Soviet past as a prosperous country
with wealthy churches, what would these transnational flows look like? Are the spiritual
aspects of the transnational relationships vibrant enough to carry on if money were not
involved?
While the Ukrainian-Western economic difference is a persistent theme in
religious transnationalism in Ukraine, it is not always the central feature. Pastor Oleg at
Kherson Presbyterian Church described an exchange he had with a retired Presbyterian
pastor from a Southern U.S. state. The American wanted to come to Kherson and
conduct leadership seminars out of the Kherson Presbyterian Church. After investigating
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the retired pastor’s background and the details of the project, Oleg decided that he did not
want to invite the man to his church. The pastor said, “But you know, I can bring a great
deal of money.”

Oleg replied, “We can’t be bought.”

That was the end of the

conversation.

8.5 Future directions for research
Although missionaries play a central role in religious transnationalism, on the
pages of this dissertation the missionaries are nearly silent. Many questions remain about
missionaries, their place in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and within
transnational religious networks more broadly. What are their views about the churches
that they are helping to build? What are the missionaries’ goals? What are the goals of
their sending churches? How do American evangelical missionaries formulate their own
identities as Americans and as members of a ‘global church’? If I could go back and do
anything differently on the field, I would spend more time focusing on the missionaries
themselves and their own actions and identities, and not just investigating missionaries
from the Ukrainian point of view.
Another aspect of religious transnationalism that demands further study is the
finances. Looking back on my field experiences, I acknowledge that I was reticent to
deeply probe the financial relationships between Ukrainian churches and their Western
sponsors. Although the few specific questions I did ask were rarely answered, I need to
ask if my reluctance to investigate the money was because of my own sense of what is
‘private’ or because it really was something that was unavailable to me? After ten
months visiting Ukrainian churches I still do not have a thorough grasp of how much
money actually comes into Ukrainian churches from the West. How much money enters
churches through private donors, through foreign churches, and through independent
mission boards? How much is sent to church members as remittances from former
church members who now live abroad? Are the emigrants really not sending very much
money (as the people left in Ukraine testify), or do those at home have a mistaken view
of the wealth of America and how much money is realistic for the emigrants to actually
send? There are many financial aspects of religious transnationalism that call for a more
detailed examination.
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A natural project to follow this one would examine the communities of Ukrainian
evangelicals who have migrated to the United States and other Western countries. How
do religious migrants position themselves in the transnational religious networks? How
do they construct their own identities in relation to the Ukrainian nation and the world?
Where do they see the place of language in national identity? Do they use their position
with feet in both places to increase their own power or prestige? How do they perceive
their relationship to the churches back in Ukraine – it is unlikely that they consider
themselves the ungenerous, forgetful, deserters that they are portrayed at home. How do
they position themselves spiritually – as part of ‘the church’ or ‘the world’? Do they
believe, like many of their co-religionists in Ukraine – that freedom is a threat to the
church? How have they maintained or transformed the religious traditions that they grew
up with?

8.6 Conclusion
It often happens that an academic paper about a religious topic gives secular
aspects more in-depth treatment than spiritual ones. I fear that this dissertation has fallen
into that pattern. In one sense that is to be expected: this is not a dissertation in the fields
of theology or religious studies but in geography. Spirituality is but one aspect of the
lives of Ukrainian evangelicals – lives that have economic, political, national, familial,
and geographic components. However, the research subjects who participated in this
project were always more interested in their religious faith than they were in their views
towards their national identity or the West. They were more eager to converse about
religious topics – worship styles, the Bible, what they thought about a sermon, how their
life had changed since coming to God, or why they decided to convert to their faith in the
first place – than they were to talk about my research questions. Their sense that
spirituality outweighs other identities rarely comes out on these pages.
Although he patiently answered my questions in an interview, one member of
Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Presbyterian Church told me that these issues were not important
to him. How should I interpret his comment? Should I have walked away from my
dissertation project because one research subject felt that it was an unimportant
endeavor? Obviously I believe that questions about regional, national, and transnational
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identity are important, and that Ukrainian evangelicals are an opportune group through
which to examine these ideas. However, in analyzing the impacts of involvement in
transnational religious networks I have given more emphasis to the ‘transnational’ than to
the ‘religious.’ Where is God in all of this? The religious components of transnational
relationships may be more significant, in the end, than social or economic ones. The
spiritual elements of church involvement should fit somewhere in a scholarly
examination of post-Soviet religious life. Valerie, from the Vinnytsia Central Baptist
Church, described her conversion. In essence, it was a spiritual experience, unrelated to
national identity, the West, or post-Soviet economic life: “I repented at home, in my
room. Without anybody. Only with God and the Bible.”

Copyright © 2005 Esther Grace Long
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